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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON PUBLIC SPENDING IN EDUCATION, SOCIAL PROTECTION, AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
BY
BIPLAB KUMAR DATTA
AUGUST 2017
Committee Chair: Dr. Andrew Feltenstein
Major Department: Economics
In this dissertation, I visit areas of government spending that are core to human develop-
ment and economic growth, and have equity and efficiency considerations. In three separate
essays, I explore issues related to formation of human capital in the form of education;
public provision of physical capital in the form of infrastructure; and a trade off between
broad-based subsidy and targeted social security spending.
In the first essay, I examine the relationship between education and air pollution. How
pollution affects education is typically studied through the health aspects of pollution expo-
sure, and its subsequent effects on academic performance. This essay proposes a financing
channel of pollution’s impact on education outcome. Local property tax is a major source of
public K-12 school revenue in the USA. Literature has shown that preference for air quality
is capitalized in housing prices. School districts with better air quality are, therefore, en-
dowed with higher tax base, and can generate more resources. Panel fixed effect analysis for
a group of metropolitan school districts in the USA suggests that decrease in air pollution
increases property tax revenue per pupil in the district.
The second essay investigates the incidence of broad-based energy subsidies, and whether
poor households could gain from targeted transfer programs financed by savings from energy
subsidy reform. I analyze the tariff differential subsidy program in Pakistan, and find that
the subsidy is regressive. I conduct a computable general equilibrium exercise and find that
reducing energy subsidy would hurt both poor and non-poor households. However, redis-
tributing savings from subsidy reform to poor households, would improve poor household’s
welfare.
The third essay studies how public infrastructure capital affects growth in developing
countries. The relationship between infrastructure and economic growth is widely studied in
developed country context, but very few studies explore this relationship for developing coun-
tries. This study contributes to literature by estimating output elasticities with respect to
public infrastructure capital stock for two developing countries – Mauritius and Bangladesh.
Estimated output elasticities are mostly positive for both countries, which suggests that
public infrastructure stimulates economic growth in developing countries.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Resources are scarce, and allocation of resources to maximize social welfare has been a
long endeavor. Governments provide public goods and services that are essential for society’s
well-being. All the different systems of government - federal, state, and local have certain
spending responsibilities, and different sources of funds. The critical consideration from
government’s part is to decide how much of public goods and services to provide, and how to
finance public expenditure. A more intriguing issue here is the conflict between equity and
efficiency1. Certain public budgeting and spending could be inefficient but socially desired;
while others could be efficient but not equitable. Balance between equity and efficiency
in taxation and in public spending is instrumental to the betterment of society. In my
dissertation, I visit issues that are core to human development and economic growth, and
have equity and efficiency considerations. Both physical and human capital are driving forces
of economic growth2. Apart from growth, government supported social protection programs
are one of the mainstays of social justice and economic well-being. Public provision of
physical capital in the form of infrastructure, human capital in the form of education, and
social security spending are three key agendas of my dissertation.
1See Musgrave (1964) for a comprehensive analysis of equity, efficiency, and distribution aspects of public
finance.
2See Lucas (1988) for analysis of physical and human capital accumulation and economic growth.
1
The broader aspect of my work is to investigate how public sector contributes in socioe-
conomic development through spending in education, social protection, and infrastructure.
With this broad research agenda, my dissertation comprises three essays, which are i) Effects
of Ambient Air Pollution on Public K-12 Education Financing in USA, ii) Energy Subsidy
Reform and Fiscal Space for Social Protection, and iii) Provision of Public Infrastructure in
Developing Countries. The first essay examines local government fiscal operation in USA,
which appears to be efficient but suffers from equity concerns. The second essay examines
analyzes efficiency and distributional impacts of broad-based energy subsidies in a develop-
ing country. Lastly the third essay revisits the infrastructure-growth nexus from developing
country perspectives.
In the first essay, I investigate a financing link between public education and pollution.
How pollution affects education is typically studied through the health aspects of pollu-
tion exposure, and its subsequent effects on academic performance. Other than the health
channel, this work proposes a financing channel of pollution’s impact on education outcome.
Financing of K-12 public education in USA is fairly decentralized, where local property tax is
a major source of school revenue. Literature has shown that preference for air quality is capi-
talized in housing prices. School districts with better air quality are, therefore, endowed with
higher tax base, and can generate more resources for K-12 education. Hence, public school
funding across jurisdictions could be affected by pollution as well. This financing aspect of
pollution and education nexus is generally not emphasized in literature. Poor households
can not afford housing in less polluted areas, where property values are higher. Hence, there
arises an equity concern, which provides a new perspective to the pollution-education nexus.
The second essay looks at the trade off between broad-based energy subsidies and targeted
social safety net programs in developing countries. Food and fuel subsidies are critical fiscal
issues in many developing countries. Economists are generally suspicious of subsidies since
they are inefficient and create distortions, but politicians do not want to eliminate them since
2
subsidies are politically popular. International development organizations often claimed that
broad-based subsidies are regressive in nature and mostly benefits non-poor households. Any
adverse effect of subsidy removal can, therefore, be mitigated if there are well-targeted social
protection or transfer programs. Here, I examine the subsidy incidence, and analyze how
poor households could be benefited from targeted transfer programs, financed by savings
from energy subsidy reform.
The third essay revisits the widely asked question that how public infrastructure stim-
ulates private sector productivity. Public infrastructure facilitates private production by
making factors of production more productive3. Existing literature on public infrastructure
provision mostly features developed or OECD countries, and there are hardly any exten-
sive work in developing country context. In this essay I feature the infrastructure-growth
nexus from developing country perspectives. Infrastructure investments are expensive, and
are often crowded out by other non-productive expenditures of the governments in devel-
oping countries. Reallocating resources from non-productive sectors like energy subsidy to
accumulation of infrastructure could result in higher economic growth and enhanced social
welfare in these countries.
Each of the three essays individually brings some equity and efficiency issues of govern-
ment expenditure to the table. They cover issues specific to local or federal government
systems in developed to developing countries. Together, they provide the big picture of how
government spending and economic and social development are inter-related. Understanding
of these relationships is pivotal for fiscal policy actions. To ensure the best use of scarce
resources, it is crucial to identify areas that stimulates growth and enhance welfare. It is
also critical to take into account equity aspects to uphold social justice. My work is a small
3There is factor adjustment effect of public infrastructure as well, which could offset the productivity
effect. See Feltenstein & Ha (1995) for detailed discussion.
3
step in the quest for developing effective fiscal policies that serve the best purposes of the
society.
4
Chapter II
Is There A School Finance Channel?
Effects of Ambient Air Pollution on
K-12 Education in USA
2.1 Introduction
The effect of air pollution on education outcome is generally modeled through health
damage from pollution exposure, and its subsequent impact on academic performance. Epi-
demiological literature shows that children’s exposure to air pollution increases illness and
chronic disease (Schwartz, 2004). Economists follow this lead to relate school absenteeism
and underperformance in class with illness and fatigue caused by pollution (Ham et al., 2014).
This paper asks the question whether there exists some other channels than health, through
which pollution can affect education. One such channel, particularly in the USA context,
can be the school finance channel. Public K-12 education financing in USA is fairly decen-
tralized, where local property tax has traditionally been a major source of school revenue.
Communities with larger property tax base can generate more revenue than poor commu-
nities, and thus expenditure per pupil can vary widely across school districts1. If housing
1For example, two large suburban school districts in Pittsburgh, PA Metropolitan Statistical Area - Gate-
way School District and Plum Borough School District, both had around 4300 students in 2002. However,
with per pupil property tax revenue of $8,903, Gateway’s current expenditure per pupil was $12,231 in 2002
academic year, while that of Plum Borough was only $8,428 with per pupil property tax revenue of $4,076.
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prices, and thereby property tax base in the district are affected by pollution, then pollution
may affect school finance as well. Investigating this financing aspect is important because if
the finance channel is not accounted for, then pollution’s true costs and abatement benefits
could be understated. These numbers are critical for policy makers to decide on appropriate
pollution control regulations, as well as to design equitable school finance policies.
Demand for better air quality is capitalized in housing prices, which suggests that im-
provement in air quality rises property values. In fact, a popular technique to measure
willingness to pay for better air quality is to use hedonic housing price models, assuming
that people will pay more for a housing unit in a less polluted area than for otherwise iden-
tical housing unit in a more polluted area (Harrison & Rubinfeld, 1978). Therefore, school
districts with better air quality are endowed with higher tax base, and can generate more
local resources for K-12 education. Local resources are critical for education outcome since
student performance indicators such as test scores are positively associated with school dis-
trict expenditures funded by local taxes (Mensah et al., 2013). Studies, investigating the
nexus between pollution and education outcome, typically disregard this effect. Research in
this area mostly focuses school absenteeism (Currie et al., 2009b; Chen et al., 2000), cog-
nitive developments (Currie et al., 2009a), and academic performance (Ham et al., 2014)
being affected by pollution. Ignoring a probable school finance effect is a gap in the existing
literature, which this study intends to address.
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to introduce and analyze the school finance chan-
nel of pollution. To establish the existence and magnitude of the school finance channel,
I analyze per pupil property tax revenue and per pupil current expenditure across school
districts, and examine how those vary with the level of air pollution. Among the six common
air pollutants or criteria pollutants2, for which The United States Environmental Protection
2Six criteria pollutants are Ground-level Ozone, Particulate Matter (PM), Carbon Monoxide, Nitrogen
Oxides, Sulfur Dioxide, and Lead
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Agency (EPA) sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), I use ground level
ozone (henceforth ozone), Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2), coarse particulate metter (PM10), and
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) pollution levels in this paper. These pollutants are commonly used in
both pollution-education and hedonic housing price literature. I match pollution monitor
location coordinates with school district centroid coordinates, and identify all monitors lo-
cated within 25 miles of each school district centroid. I then calculate annual pollution level
for school districts by taking weighted average of monitor readings3. My pollution measure
is three-year average of annual pollution levels. It takes some time for change in housing
prices to affect property tax revenue collection, and hence I use four year lag of pollution
measures. Finally, I analyze school finance data in three-year intervals, so that the impact of
change in pollution could channel in housing prices. Since housing prices are more likely to
be affected in urban areas, my sample includes school districts located in cities and suburbs
in metropolitan areas only. Using panel fixed effect analysis for around 1100 metropolitan
school districts from 1996 to 2008 academic year, I found negative impact of pollution on
property tax revenue per pupil.
My analysis suggests that in addition to conventional health channel pollution also affects
educational outcome through a school finance channel. Existing literature approaches the
pollution education nexus through the health channel only, and to the best of my knowl-
edge, school finance channel has not been critically emphasized in any other studies. Previous
studies, in general, estimate empirical specifications of student achievements as dependent
variable, and include pollution levels, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, school
characteristics, and expenditure per student as explanatory variables. However, these stud-
ies ignore the possibility that variation in instructional characteristics or expenditure per
student in US school districts can be affected by pollution. Hence, the coefficient estimates
3School districts that do not have at least one pollution monitor within 12.5 mile radius are not included
in the sample.
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of pollution variable are likely to be underestimated due to multicolinearity problem. Esti-
mated benefits from air quality regulation could, therefore, be larger if this nexus between
pollution and school resources is considered. On the other hand, pollution abatement alone
may not ensure environmental justice since the effects of pollution on education outcomes are
multidimensional. This paper will advance the literature by introducing the school finance
channel, and thereby providing a new perspective in the pollution education relationship.
I find that both current expenditure per pupil and property tax revenue increase (de-
crease) as pollution level decreases (increases) for all four pollutants. However, magnitude
of effects varies by pollutants. A squared term of log of pollution, along with level form is
included in regression analysis to examine whether effects are different at different levels of
pollution. For ground level ozone and NO2, it is found that marginal effects of change in
pollution are higher at higher percentiles of pollution, while for PM10 and SO2 marginal
effects are higher at lower percentiles of pollution. At median level of pollution, property tax
revenue per pupil increases from 0 to 157 dollars4 for 5 log point decrease in pollution level
for different pollutants5. For the median school district in my sample with around 3900 stu-
dents, this accounts for 0 to 612,300 dollar increase in property tax revenue, which is 2.1% of
the median instructional expenditure in 2008. Results for current expenditure per pupil are
similar. A 5 log point decrease in pollution accounts for 0 to 105 dollars increase in current
expenditure per pupil at median level of pollution. When property tax revenue per pupil is
controlled for as an independent variable in the current expenditure per pupil specification,
the pollution coefficients become much smaller and/ or statistically insignificant. However,
instead of property tax revenue per pupil if state revenue per pupil is controlled for, that
doesn’t change the original coefficient estimates by much. These suggest that the effect of
pollution on current expenditure is primarily transmitted through property tax revenue.
4All dollar amounts are in constant 2009 prices unless otherwise mentioned.
5Average compound growth rate over 3-year periods from 1992 to 2004 for ground level ozone, NO2,
PM10, and SO2 are −0.82%, −4.36%, −5.52%, and −8.60% respectively.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as following: section 2 presents literature
review, section 3 provides model specification and empirical strategy, section 4 describes the
data, section 5 provides baseline results, section 6 presents robustness check results, and
finally section 7 outlines conclusion and plan for follow-up work.
2.2 Literature Review
The literature review in this paper is organized in two major parts. In the first part I
discuss existing literature on education and pollution nexus to show that finance channel
is generally overlooked. And, in the second part, I discuss several relevant literature to
establish the school finance channel. This includes literature on how school resources affect
student outcome, how property tax revenue affects school resources, how pollution affects
housing value, and how housing value affects property tax revenue.
Studies that analyze pollution’s effect on education through adverse health outcomes, can
be categorized in three major groups. The first stream of literature shows that ambient air
pollution increases school absenteeism (Ransom & Pope, 1992; Chen et al., 2000; Gilliland
et al., 2001; Mohai et al., 2011). A common concern for these studies is that poor households
are located in more polluted areas (Pastor et al., 2004), and they have limited access to
preventive health care. As a result, confounding factors like family income are likely to affect
both pollution exposure and delayed health recovery, causing longer school absenteeism.
Studies exploit panel structure of data (Currie et al., 2009b) or natural experiments (Ransom
& Pope, 2013) to address such issues. Referring school absenteeism as a core impediment to
learning, these studies claim that pollution adversely affects students’ academic performance.
Another stream of literature relates cognitive developments with prenatal or early childhood
pollution exposure and demonstrates adverse impacts of pollution on infant health (Chay
& Greenstone, 2003; Currie et al., 2009a), education attainment (Isen et al., 2015), and
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academic achievement (Sanders, 2012). These literature are built on the idea that early
childhood events or events during fetal development in womb have long run impacts, and
are important determinants of adult outcomes (Currie & Almond, 2011). A third stream
of literature investigates pollution’s impact on various standardized test scores and found
negative associations between pollution and student performance (Ham et al., 2014; Lavy
et al., 2014; Miller & Vela, 2013). Studies under this genre also show that academic outcomes
are affected by school indoor air quality (Stafford, 2015; Haverinen-Shaughnessy et al., 2011).
Neither of the three major streams consider the likelihood that pollution can affect school
inputs, which along with family background influences, peer influences, and innate abilities,
is a common input in any standard education production function (Hanushek, 1979).
To formally develop the idea of a school finance channel of pollution, I first need to estab-
lish a link between school resources and student achievements, and then to show that school
resources can vary with pollution levels across districts. In a meta-analysis of education
production studies, Hedges et al. (1994) report a systematic positive relationship between
school outcomes and resource inputs. Studies by Hanushek (1986, 1997), however, ruled
out any strong or systematic relationship between student performance and school expendi-
ture. Dewey et al. (2000), in another meta-analysis, argues that regression results suggesting
ineffectiveness of school inputs on education attainment can be attributable to model mis-
specifications; and they conclude that school inputs have positive impact on learning. In a
recent report, Baker (2012) reviews major studies on whether aggregate expenditure, and
school resources that costs money, matter, and conclude that aggregate measures of per
pupil spending, and schooling resources are positively associated with student outcomes.
Several other studies show positive impacts of spending on pass rates and student test score
(Papke, 2005; Sander, 1993, 1999; Taylor, 1998; Ludwig & Bassi, 1999); and positive ef-
fects of spending on high school graduation (Wilson, 2000). Studies also demonstrate that
instructional quality is an important determinant of student performance (Rockoff, 2004;
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Rivkin et al., 2005; Koedel, 2008); and school quality positively affects student achievements
(Eide & Showalter, 1998). Analyzing district level spending, Wenglinsky (1997) shows that
higher instruction spending per pupil reduces pupil-teacher ratio and enhances test scores.
All these studies suggest that school resources are important determinant of student educa-
tional achievements.
Second, I need a link between pollution and school resources. As mentioned earlier, the
key element of this relationship is property tax revenue. The connection between school
funding and property taxation is such that it is impossible for someone to ignore the role
of property tax while studying school finance, and alternatively it is inevitable to consider
school finance questions while studying property taxation (Kenyon, 2007). Property tax
revenue accounts for nearly 36% of the total revenue for public elementary and secondary
schools in 2011-12 (Snyder et al., 2016). A dollar increase in property tax revenue per pupil
rises total current expenditure and instructional expenditure per pupil by 59 cents and 39
cents respectively in elementary and secondary school districts at metropolitan areas 6. With
this strong reliance of school funding on property tax revenue, it now requires to show how
pollution affects property values, and whether increase (decrease) in housing prices increase
(decrease) property tax revenue in a jurisdiction.
Empirical investigation of the association between residential property values and air
pollution dates back to Ridker & Henning (1967), who finds that owner occupied residential
property values in St. Louis Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) are positively associated
with reduction in annual sulfation levels7. Anderson & Crocker (1971) extends this analysis
for Kansas City and Washington D.C. in addition to St. Louis and concludes that pollution
has a negative influence on residential property prices. Reviewing 37 studies that estimate
marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for reduction in pollution, measured as change in asset
6Author’s estimate from panel fixed effect regression for 1865 metropolitan school districts from year 1992
to 2014.
7Measured by an index indicating presence of SO2, SO3, H2S, and H2SO4.
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value of the house, Smith & Huang (1995) find that the range of MWTP lies between 0 to
98.52 (in constant 1982-84 dollars) for 1µg/m3 reduction in total suspended particulates. The
rationale behind these findings is well articulated and tested by Banzhaf & Walsh (2008)
that better environmental amenities in a jurisdiction attracts people to move in, causing
increase in demand for housing in that jurisdiction, and thus increases housing prices.
These hedonic analyses implicitly assume that that people can move freely across jurisdic-
tions. In reality, however, there are costs of migration, and MWTP estimates for air quality
are even higher when mobility costs are incorporated in analysis (Bayer et al., 2009). This
suggests that households are more likely to move among neighborhoods within a MSA rather
than across different MSAs, causing property value differentials among neighborhoods in the
MSA. Low income households living in a previously low environmental amenity neighbor-
hood may not gain most from large improvements in air quality since their partial equilibrium
gains can be offset by increase in housing prices (Sieg et al., 2004). Despite these issues like
who is benefited or whether to incorporate moving costs to estimate MWTP, there is gen-
eral consensus that property values vary with pollution levels. Reduction in air pollution
increases mean housing value (Chay & Greenstone, 2005), while opening of industrial plants
causes decline in housing prices in surrounding areas (Currie et al., 2015).
Next is to justify whether changes in property values due to environmental improvement
or degradation affect property tax revenue collection. Lutz (2008) provides essential results
in this regard. He studies how much property tax revenue rises, and how long it takes for
property tax revenue to increase when housing prices rise. He finds that elasticity between
house prices and property tax revenue is around 0.4, and it takes three years for housing
price increase to influence property tax revenue. Hence, pollution affects property tax revenue
collection. However, if there are assessment limits, then increase in housing prices due to
improvement in air quality may not increase property tax revenue.
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It is apparent from above discussion that school funding are linked with pollution level.
Moreover, it is likely that better educators will accept teaching positions in financially af-
fluent school districts where compensation and work conditions are better. Districts with
higher property values essentially generate more resources for K-12 education, and can re-
cruit more skilled educators. Lankford et al. (2002) finds that poor, nonwhite students
are taught by lesser-qualified or less-skilled teachers in New York public schools. Clotfelter
et al. (2006) reports similar results for North Carolina schools that lower qualified personnel
serve high poverty schools since qualified educators find the combination of compensation
and working conditions less attractive in those schools. Qualified educators could also have
preference for socioeconomic and environmental amenities and may avoid school districts
located in polluted areas. Studies show that teacher mobility and turnover in public schools
are mostly attributable to teachers’ preferences for race, socioeconomic mix, and achieve-
ments of students (Hanushek et al., 2004; Clotfelter et al., 2011). Pollution may impact
residential sorting, and thereby influence more qualified teachers to stay in or leave a juris-
diction. However, such sorting channel is not the focus of this paper. Analyzing findings of
relevant studies, what I have shown in this section is that apart from health related effects,
pollution can also affect public education resources in the USA.
2.3 Model and Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Theoretical Model
The relationship between pollution and education is usually studied using a education
production function framework. Education outcome generally depends on student’s health,
family attributes like parents’ income and education, school resources like teacher quality,
class size etc., and socioeconomic characteristics of the jurisdiction. Incorporating these
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factors, I assume the following education production function:
Y = y(H,E, ~F, S) (2.1)
where, H is health, E is school resources, F is family attributes, and S is socioeconomic
characteristics of the district. Education production function is non-decreasing in health and
school resources, i.e. yH ≥ 0, and yE ≥ 0. For simplification, I assume that school resources
are measured by level of current expenditure.
Existing literature treats H as function of pollution, and analyze the impact of pollution
on Y through H . I extend this model by treating E as a function of pollution as well. For
this, I need a functional specification for school resources, E, that incorporates property
tax revenue. It is standard to assume that school resources are financed by local property
tax revenue, which depends on property tax base and tax rate, and by state and federal
government contributions. Since local governments, like school districts, are required to
have a balanced budget, school resources, here, is equivalent to total revenue, and takes the
following functional form:
E = e(T,R) = T +R = t(C, γ) + r(V,M) = t(C, γ) + r(V,m(V, T )) (2.2)
where T is transfer from State and/ or Federal government, and R is local property tax
revenue. T depends on some state specific characteristics γ, and business cycle C. T is non-
decreasing during economic boom and decreasing during economic downturn. γ represents
state policies, court litigation, etc. that affect elementary and secondary school funding.
Property tax revenue R depends on property tax base V , and tax rate M . Local authorities
usually adjust tax rates to generate desired level of revenue. Commonly tax rates are lower if
tax bases are large, and vice versa. Tax rate also depends on state government contribution
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T . When T declines, local authorities increaseM to offset the decrease in state contribution,
and vice versa. Hence, rV ≥ 0, rM ≥ 0, mV ≤ 0, and mT ≤ 0.
Property tax base in a jurisdiction depends on pollution level, non environmental ameni-
ties, area specific characteristics, and business cycle or housing market trend. It takes the
following functional form:
V = v(P, ~Z, θ, C) (2.3)
where, ~Z is vector of non-environmental attributes, and θ is jurisdiction fixed effect. I assume
that property values are non-increasing in pollution level, i.e. vP ≤ 0. The remaining argu-
ment of education production function, socioeconomic characteristics could also be affected
by pollution level and other amenities since households sort according to their preferences.
For example, wealthy people are likely to be sorted in areas that are less polluted since they
can afford higher property prices in areas with better air quality.
Pollution, therefore, affects education through a direct health channel via pollution expo-
sure, a school finance channel via air quality preference, and a sorting channel in respective
jurisdictions. Total differentiating equation 2.1, after substituting in equations 2.2, and 2.3,
and rearranging yields:
dY
dP
=MPH
δh
δP
+MPE(
δr
δV
δv
δP
+
δr
δM
δm
δV
δv
δP
) +MPS
δs
δP
(2.4)
where MPH , MPE, and MPS are marginal products of health, school resources, and
socioeconomic characteristics respectively. The first term in equation 2.4 denotes the health
channel, the second term denotes the school finance channel, and the last term denotes
a sorting channel. The school finance channel has two major components - MPE and
( δr
δV
δv
δP
+ δr
δM
δm
δV
δv
δP
) or dR
dP
. A good number of research estimate the first component of the
school finance channel, MPE, and components of other channels - MPH , and MPS. I
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have already discussed the impact of school resources on education in previous section.
Studies investigating MPH , show that health status affects academic achievements (Crump
et al., 2013; Crosnoe, 2006), and educational attainments (Haas & Fosse, 2008; Champaloux
& Young, 2015). Studies looking at MPS, find that test scores are affected by school
demographics and socioeconomic status (Sutton & Soderstrom, 1999), and neighborhood
quality (Thompson, 2002; Ceballo et al., 2004).
While examining the school finance channel in this paper, I do not intend to come up with
new estimates for the marginal product of school resources. I will rather focus on the other
component, dR
dP
. As described in Lutz (2008), the first part of dR
dP
, δr
δV
δv
δP
is the mechanical
component, which refers that property tax revenue mechanically increases (decreases) as
property value increases (decreases). The second part, δr
δM
δm
δV
δv
δP
is the policy offset component
that refers to any adjustment in tax rate to offset the mechanical change. Since δr
δV
≥ 0,
δr
δM
≥ 0, δm
δV
≤ 0, and δv
δP
≤ 0, the sign and size of dR
dP
depend on respective magnitudes of
mechanical and policy offset components. Changes due to mechanical component can be
fully or partially offset by adjusting tax rates. dR
dP
is 0 if the effect is fully offset and less than
0 if partially offset. Data from my sample suggests that partial policy offset usually occurs
in most cases (Figure 2.1).
How property tax revenue is affected by pollution, depends on the elasticity of property
tax rate and property tax base, δm
δV
V
M
. If property tax base V increases (decreases) due to
decrease (increase) in pollution level P , then there are five possible outcomes for property
tax revenue R (Figure 2.2). First, if there is no change in property tax rate then δr
δM
δm
δV
δv
δP
equals 0, and dR
dP
equals to V δv
δP
. For this case elasticity of property tax rate and property
tax base is 0. Second, property tax rate is decreased as such that revenue doesn’t change,
i.e. dR
dP
equals to 0. It requires |( δr
δM
δm
δV
δv
δP
)| = |( δr
δV
δv
δP
)|, which implies elasticity is −1. Third,
increase in property tax revenue due to increase in tax base can be partially offset by decrease
in property tax rate. In this case |( δr
δV
δv
δP
)| > |( δr
δM
δm
δV
δv
δP
)|, which implies −1 < δm
δV
V
M
< 0.
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Fourth, property tax rate is increased as such that increase in property tax revenue is higher
than that in the first case. It will require δm
δV
> 0, implying elasticity, δm
δV
V
M
> 0. And, fifth,
property tax rate is decreased as such that property tax revenue is lower than that in the
second case. For this case |( δr
δM
δm
δV
δv
δP
)| < |( δr
δV
δv
δP
)|, which implies δm
δV
V
M
< −1.
Let us denote initial property tax rate as M0, and property tax rates for five cases as
M1, M2, M3, M4, and M5 respectively. Here, M5 < M2 < M1 = M0 < M4. For case five, it
suggests that people who move to the jurisdiction to enjoy better environmental amenities,
prefer less spending for public education. This could be because of more households without
school going age children, or households with children going to private schools moving into
the district. On the other hand, case four can happen if people moved into the district
have very high preference for public K-12 education. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
determine how elasticity of property tax rate with respect property tax base is affected by
preference for public K-12 education. But to provide the readers with a general perception,
I estimate the elasticity for school districts in Ohio8, which is −0.15. This suggests that case
three is the most probable case, where increase in property tax revenue due to increase in
property tax base is partially offset by decrease in property tax rate.
Typical school year in USA begins from July and ends in June next year, i.e. 2007-08
school year is the time period from July 2007 to June 2008. Property values are assessed
for tax purposes during the months of January to March of the preceding school year. For
example, property tax assessment for 2007-08 school year took place in January 2007, during
2006-07 school year. At the beginning of the school year tax rates are adopted by the school
district authorities, i.e. effective tax rates for 2007-08 school year was determined in August
8Ohio is one of the very few states for which data for tax base and tax rate are available at school district
level. I use panel fixed effect model to estimate elasticity of property tax rate and property tax base. The
identification comes from within district change in property tax base over years. My sample includes 599
school districts from academic year 1990 to 2008. To be consistent with the main empirical part in this
paper, the time dimensions in this regression are three-year intervals. That is, sample time periods are 1990,
1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008.
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2007. Tax bills are then sent to property owners during September to October, and taxes
are due by December9. That’s why property tax base for a jurisdiction at time t depends
on lag values of pollution, and other attributes. Findings of Lutz (2008) also suggest lags in
assessment of property values. Hence the property tax base in district j in state s at time t
is:
Vjst = v(Pj,s,t−k, ~Zj,s,t−k, θj,s, Ct−k+1) (2.5)
where, t refers to current academic year, and (t − k) denotes lag values with k being the
appropriate lag. This is noteworthy that under this framework, property tax base is not
affected by contemporaneous pollution, but depends on its lag values. On the contrary
health is affected by current pollution level and may also be affected by lag pollution levels.
Differentiating the education production function for individual i in district j in state s at
time t, Yijst, with respect to Pj,s,t−k yields:
δYijst
δPj,s,t−k
=
δYijst
δHijst
(
δh
δPj,s,t−k
) +
δYijst
δEjst
(
δr
δVj,s,t
δv
δPj,s,t−k
+
δr
δMj,s,t
δm
δVj,s,t
δv
δPj,s,t−k
)
+
δYijst
δSjst
(
δs
δPj,s,t−k
)
(2.6)
The term ( δr
δVj,t
δv
δPj,t−k
+ δr
δMj,t
δm
δVj,t
δv
δPj,t−k
) in equation 2.6 is the key component of the school
finance channel, which can be retrieved from differentiating Rjt with respect to Pj,t−k. Local
property tax revenue in jurisdiction j at time t is following:
Rjst = r(Vjst,Mjst)
= r(v(Pj,s,t−k, ~Zj,s,t−k, θjs, Ct−k+1), m(v(Pj,s,t−k, ~Zj,s,t−k, θjs, Ct−k+1), Tj,s,t))
(2.7)
Following (Lutz, 2008), I consider k = 4. Property tax revenue at time t depends on property
value at time (t − 3); and housing price at time (t − 3) is determined by housing market
9Property tax calender varies by state and county, and could be different for different jurisdictions.
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trend at time (t − 3), and pollution level and other arguments at time (t − 4). Since my
pollution measure is 3-year average pollution level, for year t, the corresponding pollution
data is average of periods (t− 4), (t− 5), and (t− 6).
2.3.2 Empirical Model
For baseline analysis I employ panel fixed effect regression approach to control for school
district level unobserved heterogeneity. I also control for state-year fixed effects in the model.
State-year fixed effects take into account of general economic conditions across states over
time, and state level policy changes that affect K-12 education expenditure. For current
expenditure per pupil, I estimate the following equation:
Ejst = γ0 + γ1 lnPollutionj,s,t−k + γ2 lnPollutionj,s,t−k
2 + αj
+
∑
t
∑
s
ωst Fipss Y eart + ǫjst
(2.8)
where, Ejst is current expenditure per pupil in district j in state s at time t, and pollutionj,s,t−k
is 3-year average pollution level for district j in state s at time (t − k). A square term of
pollution is included in the model to control for non-linearity in pollution and school re-
source relationship. αj is school district fixed effect, and ǫjt is idiosyncratic error term.∑
t
∑
s ωst Fipss Y eart is state-year fixed effect, where Fipss and Y eart both are binary
variables. Fipss takes the value 1 if state = s and 0 otherwise; and Y eart takes the value 1
if year = t and 0 otherwise. I assume that αj is not orthogonal to Xjt for any t, where X
is a vector representing explanatory variables in the model. A Hausman specification test
confirms that random effect model is not consistent, i.e. αj is not random. Therefore, time
invariant district level characteristics such as district size and locale can not be controlled
for in the model.
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Controlling for other contemporaneous district level variables such as racial composition,
poverty rate, and median household income may arise multicollinearity concerns, and hence
are not included in the model. As discussed in the theoretical model section, pollution may
affect sorting and thereby sociodemographic characteristics in the districts. Since past pollu-
tion can affect present pollution, the idiosyncratic error terms are not serially uncorrelated,
i.e. E[ǫjtǫjs] 6= 0, ∀ t 6= s. This assumption is tested using Wooldridge test for serial correla-
tion in panel-data models, and the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation is duly
rejected. Idiosyncratic errors are also not homoskedastic, i.e. E[ǫjǫ
′
j ] 6= σ
2
ǫ IT . This is con-
firmed by Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity, where the null hypothesis of constant
variance is rejected. Hence heterskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors
are estimated using cluster option in Stata, where standard errors are clustered at school
district level.
For property tax revenue per pupil, a similar model like equation 2.8 is estimated. It
includes state-year fixed effects, district level controls, and a control for state level housing
market trend. The model is following:
Rjst = β0 + β1 lnPollutionj,s,t−k + β2 lnPollutionj,s,t−k
2 + Local′j,s,t−k β4
+District′jst β5 + β6 HPIs,t−k+1 + αj +
∑
t
∑
s
δst Fipss Y eart + ǫjst
(2.9)
Both Localj,s,t−k and Districtjst control for district level characteristics. Localj,s,t−k in-
cludes public education related variables that might affect housing prices. These variables
are measure for school quality, and school infrastructure facility at time (t − k). Studies
have shown that school quality affects housing prices (Bayer et al., 2007; Weimer & Wolkoff,
2001). Ladd & Loeb (2013) suggests spending per pupil as one of the most common proxies
for school quality. Here, I use variation in instructional spending per pupil as measure of
school quality. In particular, I calculate per pupil instructional spending for a school district
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as percentage of median per pupil instructional spending across states10. Studies also find
that increase in school facilities positively affects housing prices in the district (Cellini et al.,
2010). Here, I use capital outlay expenditure per pupil as proxy for school facilities.
Districtjst includes variables that might effect property tax rate in the school district.
These variables are total outstanding short and long term debts, and share of other local
revenue in K-12 revenue of district j in state s at time t. School districts with larger debt to
service may increase property tax revenue by increasing property tax rate. School districts
can also diversify revenue generation by introducing other taxes like school district income
tax (Ross & Nguyen-Hoang, 2013). It is expected that property tax rates would be lower
if other local revenue share is higher, holding everything else constant. Finally, HPIs,t−k+1
is the housing price index for state s at time (t− k + 1), which controls for overall housing
market trend in the state. Controlling for HPI ensures that change in housing prices that
affects property tax revenue in the model, is net of any economy wide housing market shock.
State-year fixed effects are also included in the model to control for statewide economic
conditions and state K-12 education policy changes. Property tax revenue is expected to be
higher if state revenue share is lower, and vice versa.
Identification in this model comes from within district variation in pollution level over
time. The identification assumption is that correlation between the pollution variables and
any unobservables that affect property tax revenue, is eliminated by controlling for district
level unobserved time-invariant fixed effects along with relevant policy and economic variables
as analyzed in the theoretical model. However, deviations from means remove useful time-
invariant information as well. Several robustness checks are,therefore, performed to check
the validity of baseline results. These tests and results are discussed in the Result section.
10Median values are obtained for each state for every academic year. For a school district located in New
Jersey, the measure of school quality is per pupil current instructional expenditure of that school district as
percentage of median per pupil current instructional expenditure of New Jersey.
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The school finance channel component11 is measured by the marginal effects of pollution on
current expenditure and property tax revenue per pupil, which are following:
δEjt
δ lnPollutionj,s,t−k
= γ1 + 2γ2 lnPollutionj,s,t−k (2.10)
δRjt
δ lnPollutionj,s,t−k
= β1 + 2β2 lnPollutionj,s,t−k (2.11)
From equations 2.10 and 2.11, we see that marginal effects of pollution in my model specifi-
cation varies with level of pollution. Coefficients of the level form of pollution γ1 and β1 alone
do not have any meaningful interpretations. Along with γ2 and β2 as outlined in equations
2.10 and 2.11, they provide the effect of pollution on school finance variables. Pollution
negatively affects school resources if
δEjt
δ lnPollutionj,s,t−k
< 0 and
δRjt
δ lnPollutionj,s,t−k
< 0. If sign
of β1 and sign of β2 are same, then the effect of pollution will be higher for higher values
of pollution. If signs of β1 and sign β2 are different then effect will vary at different level
of pollution depending on respective sign and magnitudes of coefficients. I report marginal
effects at 10th, 20th, 30th, 40th, 50th, 60th, 70th, 80th, and 90th percentile values12 of ozone,
NO2, PM10 and SO2 concentrations.
2.4 Data
I obtain data from various sources. School district expenditure and revenue data are
obtained from National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)’s Local Education Agency
Finance Survey Data. Data for the academic years 1992 to 1994 are obtained from US
Census Bureau’s Government Finance Statistics data. All dollar values are converted in
2009 constant dollar by using Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index (PCEPI)
11 δr
δV
δv
δP
+ δr
δM
δm
δV
δv
δP
.
12Percentile values are based on panel form.
22
deflators. PCEPI data are obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website. School
district characteristics are obtained from NCES’s Local Education Agency Universe Survey
Data. School district centroid coordiantes are obtained from NCES’s Universe Survey Data
and US Census Bureau’s gazetteer files.
Following Murray et al. (1998) the sample includes only unified school districts i.e. dis-
tricts offering both elementary and secondary education since there are cost differences be-
tween elementary and secondary education. School districts located in rural areas, and
outside metropolitan areas are excluded since the desired effect is most likely to observe in
urban metropolitan areas. School districts in large, mid-size, and small cities and suburbs
located in metropolitan areas constitute the sample. The sample is further restricted to regu-
lar local school districts or local school districts that are component of a supervisory union13,
and to school districts for which there were no significant boundary change. One concern
in my analysis is existence of property tax limitations across states, which limits increase in
assessed values of property in a jurisdiction. If there exists assessment limits then increase
in property values due to decrease in pollution will not be reflected in property tax revenue.
Hence, states that have statewide assessment limits are excluded. A robustness check is
performed later including these states in the sample. States with and without statewide
assessment limit14 are identified from Table 1 in Anderson et al. (2006). There are also some
states that experience a major policy shift regarding K-12 education financing15. For these
states, the major share of K-12 financing has shifted from local property tax revenue to state
revenue, and as a result property tax revenue per pupil has declined gradually (Figure 2.5).
13School district that is a component of a supervisory union, shares superintendent and administrative
services with other participating school district. 92% of the school districts in the sample are regular local
school districts, and the rest are part of some supervisory union.
14States with statewide assessment limit are: Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas.
15States with major shift in K-12 financing policy are Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin. North Dakota has a similar policy shift, but
after 2009.
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Some of these states impose assessment limits and are excluded from the sample. For the
rest of these states, state-year fixed effects in the model account for policy changes16.
State level average current expenditure, property tax revenue, state revenue, total rev-
enue, and student count is obtained from NCES’s Digest of Education Statistics various
issues. HPI data is obtained from Federal Housing Finance Agency. State level HPI is an
all transaction index, estimated by using sales prices and appraisal data. The original index
was a quarterly index, which is transformed in an annual index by averaging four quarterly
values. Initial index value was 1980 quarter 1 = 100, which is transformed to 1995 = 100.
A three-year lag value of HPI is used in regression analysis as per the setting of theoretical
model.
Air pollution data and monitor location coordinates are obtained from United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) website. Pollution data for ozone, NO2, PM10,
and SO2 are available from 1990 onward. I calculate the distance between school district
centroids and monitor locations by using respective latitude and longitude coordinates17.
To get pollution measure for a school district, I consider all pollution monitors located
within 25 miles of the school district centroid with at least 1 monitor located within half
of 25 miles i.e. 12.5 miles18. Considering all monitors within 25 mile radius provides a
gradient of pollution level for the district, and at least one monitor within 12.5 mile radius
gives a more precise calculation of pollution level. Average median distance of pollution
monitors from district centroid is 10 miles, while average minimum distance is 5.6 miles.
I then take weighted average of daily monitor readings. Inverse of squared distances of
monitor locations from district centroid are used as weights, so that a closer monitor from
district centroid is given a higher weight, and a distant monitor gets a relatively lower weight.
16These states are Idaho, Kansas, New Hampshire, Vermont, andWisconsis with 73 school districts (around
7% of the sample).
17Stata’s geodist command is used to calculate distances.
18Samples with smaller and larger distances than 12.5 miles are tested for sensitivity analysis.
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Annual pollution measures are then calculated using EPA guidelines. For ground level ozone,
pollution measure is 3-year average of annual 4th highest daily maximum 8-hour average. For
NO2, pollution measure is 3-year average of annual arithmetic mean of all of the reported 1-
hour values. Pollution measure for PM10 is 3-year average of annual arithmetic mean, which
is average of four quarterly means. And for SO2, pollution measure is 3-year average of
annual 99th percentile of 1-hour daily maximum concentration. Details of pollution measure
calculations are described in Appendix A.
Since first year of pollution measure is 1990 calendar year (January 1990 to December
1990), corresponding first school year in data is 1996 (July 1995 to June 1996). This is
because we assume 4-year lag in our model, that is pollution level of 1992 will affect property
tax revenue in 1996. The 3-year average pollution level at 1992 is average pollution level
of 1990, 1991, and 1992 calendar years. I consider 3-year intervals in finance data to allow
effect of pollution change be transmitted in housing prices. Hence, school finance variables
are of academic years 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008. This also ensures that there is no
overlapping of pollution data19. I restrict my analysis till academic year 2008 because of
the impact of the great recession after 2009 academic year (Figure 2.3). As discussed in the
theoretical model, property tax revenue increases as state share in K-12 revenue decreases,
and vice versa. After 2009 academic year, state revenue for K-12 education has started to
decline as state government revenues got affected by the recession. Local school districts
might respond by increasing tax rate to offset revenue loss. Since I can not distinguish
between the mechanical component and policy offset component of change in property tax
revenue, the sample is restricted till 2008 to avoid any spurious results. 2008 academic
year’s property tax revenue depends on housing prices of 2005, which is affected by average
pollution levels of 2002, 2003, and 2004. Finally I estimate a balanced sample, and school
19Average pollution level of 1990, 1991, and 1992 corresponds to 1996 academic year; and average pollution
level of 1993, 1994, and 1995 corresponds to 1999 academic year school resources.
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districts for which data for all 5 periods are not available are excluded20. This is to ensure
that results are not influenced by sudden inclusion or exclusion of school districts.
There are approximately 2100 regular elementary and secondary school districts located
in cities and suburbs in metropolitan areas in the USA, for which finance data are publicly
available. Among them around 700 are located in states with state wide assessment limits. Of
the remaining 1400, my sample includes 545 to 1036 school districts, depending on availability
of pollution data for different pollutants. More than 70% of the school districts in sample are
located in large size suburbs. 15% of the districts are located in small, mid-size, and large
cities; and the rest are in small and mid-size suburbs. Two-thirds (66%) of the districts in
sample are located in three Mid-Atlantic states New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania,
and neighboring Midwest state Ohio. 20% of the districts are in several other states in
Midwest region, and the rest are scattered across different other regions. During the period
of analysis, school districts included in the sample generally show an increasing trend in
property tax revenue and current expenditure (Figure 2.3), and a declining trend in level
of air pollution (Figure 2.4). Average property tax revenue per pupil was $5597 in 1996,
which increases to $7199 in 2008. Average current expenditure per pupil was $9093 in 1996
academic year, which increases to $12345 in 2008.
Mean ozone pollution measure in 1992 was 85.8 ppb21 which decreases to 82.1 ppb in 2004,
while EPA standard for ground level ozone during that period was 0.08 ppm or 80.0 ppb. For
NO2, EPA standard is 53 ppb, and mean pollution measure decreases from 24 ppb in 1992 to
19 ppb in 2004. Mean PM10 measure in 1992 was 33 µg/m
3, which decreased to 26 µg/m3
in 2008. EPA standard for PM10 pollution during that time period was 50 µg/m
3. Lastly,
EPA standard for SO2 is 75 ppb, and mean SO2 pollution measure decreases from 84 ppb
in 1992 to 53 ppb in 2004. SO2 pollution level shows the largest decline from 1992 to 2004,
20An unbalanced sample with at least two years of data is later used to perform robustness check.
21EPA measure for ground level ozone is expressed in parts per million (ppm). Ozone pollution measure
in this paper is transformed in parts per billion (ppb) for computational purposes.
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followed by PM10, NO2, and ozone (Figure 2.4). Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of
the key variables used in regression.
2.5 Results
A linear model, excluding log pollution squared term is first estimated for both current
expenditure per pupil and property tax revenue per pupil. For the current expenditure
regression, coefficients of log pollution are negative for all four pollutants. However, the co-
efficient is not statistically different from 0 SO2 (Table 2.2). 5 log point decrease in pollution
level, increases current expenditure per pupil by 94, 28, and 23 dollars respectively for ozone,
NO2, and PM10. These results provide primary evidence that public K-12 school resources
are negatively affected by ambient air pollution. When a quadratic term of pollution is added
in the model then the pollution coefficients γ1 and γ2 become jointly significant for ozone,
NO2, and PM10. (Table 2.4). γ2 is individually significant for all four pollutants. Similarly,
log pollution coefficients in linear specification of pollution for property tax revenue model
are negative for all four pollutants, but not statistically significant for PM10 and SO2 (Table
2.3). 5 log point decrease in pollution level increases property tax revenue per pupil by $145
for ozone and $66 for NO2 on average. With the quadratic term, both β1 and β2 are jointly
significant, and β2 is also individually significant (Table 2.5) for all pollutants. These results
provide rationale for including a quadratic pollution term in the model.
2.5.1 Current Expenditure per Pupil
The coefficient of log pollution for current expenditure specification is positive, and the
coefficient for the squared term is negative for ozone andNO2. For PM10 and SO2, coefficient
of the level term is negative and coefficient of the squared term is positive (Table 2.6). All
pollution coefficients are statistically significant. This suggests that current expenditure per
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pupil increases with pollution up to certain initial level; and then decreases with pollution
for ozone and NO2. In other words, decrease in pollution in relatively more polluted areas
increases current expenditure per pupil more, compared to that in less polluted areas. The
opposite is the case for PM10 and SO2. For these pollutants, decrease in pollution in less
polluted areas affects current expenditure more, than decrease in pollution in more polluted
areas. To examine how level of pollution changes with initial pollution, I plot compound
growth rates of pollution over 3 year periods from 1992 to 2004 against 1992 level of pollution,
and obtain quadratic prediction fit curves. For ozone, the regression fit curve is concave and
downward sloping, which refers higher decrease in pollution over time for higher initial level
of pollution. For NO2, the fit curve is convex, downward sloping, and becomes flat at higher
values of initial NO2 pollution level. The fit curve of PM10 is convex shaped, downward
sloping at lower initial values, and slightly upward sloping at higher initial values of PM10.
Finally the fit curve is relatively flat at higher initial pollution measures of SO2. Pollution,
on average, decreases more in areas with high initial level of pollution for ozone and NO2.
For PM10, pollution increases in some districts with higher initial pollution, and for SO2,
the growth rates of pollution decrease are lower at higher initial level of pollution (Figure
2.6). If larger improvement in pollution level is associated with greater increase in school
resources22, then these patterns of change in pollution, to some extent, explain why signs of
β1 and β2 are different for different pollutants in the model. Current expenditure per pupil
increases more on average, in districts where ozone and NO2 pollution level were initially
higher and experienced larger improvement of pollution level. Conversely, districts with
higher initial level of PM10 and SO2 pollution and lower improvement in pollution end up
with relatively lower increase in current expenditure per pupil.
22Banzhaf & Walsh (2008) shows that larger improvement in public goods increases mean neighborhood
income as richer households, who care for better environmental amenities, move in communities that expe-
rience larger environmental improvement.
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At 10th percentile of ozone, 5 log point decrease23 in pollution increases current expendi-
ture per pupil by 64 dollars. Increases are 105 dollars and 141 dollars respectively at 50th and
90th percentiles. For NO2, marginal effect at 10
th percentile is negative but not statistically
significant24. Marginal effects are 58 dollars and 122 dollars respectively at 50th and 90th
percentiles. For PM10, marginal effects at 10
th, and 50th percentiles are 56, and 23 dollars
respectively, and not statistically significant at 60th percentile and onward. Finally for SO2,
marginal effects are small and not statistically significant. (Table 2.7).
Second, I investigate whether this variation in school resources in the form of current
expenditure is attributable to pollution affecting property tax revenue. Two major sources
of K-12 revenue are property taxes, and state revenue. Each are separately included in the
current expenditure regression model to see whether their inclusion causes any changes to
pollution coefficients. When property tax revenue per pupil is controlled for, the coefficients
for pollution become much smaller and statistically insignificant (Table 2.8). On the other
hand, when state revenue per pupil is included in the model, the pollution coefficients remain
almost unchanged as base line regression (Table 2.9). These results suggest that the effect
of pollution on current expenditure is primarily channeled through property tax revenue.
2.5.2 Property Tax Revenue per Pupil
Results for property tax revenue per pupil are similar to current expenditure per pupil
analysis. The control variables, capital outlay expenditure, total debt outstanding, other
local revenue share, annual housing price index, and property tax index show desired effects
for almost every pollutant (Table 2.10). 5 log point decrease in pollution increases property
tax revenue per pupil by 110, 157, and 200 dollars respectively at 10th, 50th, and 90th
23Marginal effects discussed in this section are for 5 log point change in pollution level, if not otherwise
mentioned.
24Stata’s nlcom command is used to calculate marginal effects, and delta method is applied to calculate
standard errors.
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percentiles of ozone pollution. For NO2, marginal effect at 10
th percentile is not statistically
significant; and 115 and 222 dollars respectively at 50th and 90th percentiles. Marginal effect
for PM10 is 39 dollars at 10
th, and not statistically significant beyond 20th percentile. For
SO2, marginal effects are quite small, and statistically significant up to 40
th percentiles. 5
log point decrease in SO2 level increases property tax revenue per pupil by 23 dollars at 10
th
percentile of SO2 pollution (Table 2.11). These results provide empirical support for school
finance channel of ambient air pollution described in the theoretical model.
2.6 Robustness Checks
2.6.1 State Specific Time Trend
To check the validity of baseline results, a number robustness checks are conducted. I
begin robustness check by introducing state specific linear time trends instead of year fixed
effects. State specific time trends control for unobservables that vary over time and over
states. While state-year fixed effect in base line regression controls for effects specific to that
year, state specific time trends controls for effects that are not year specific but extend across
time periods. During my sample period, property tax revenue shows an overall upward trend,
which is one of the rationales for this robustness check exercise. I estimate the following
model:
Rjst = β0 + β1 lnPollutionj,s,t−k + β2 lnPollutionj,s,t−k
2 + Local′j,s,t−k β4
+District′jst β5 + β6 HPIs,t−k+1 + αj +
∑
s
ρs Fipss T ime + ǫjst
(2.12)
Where T ime takes values 1 to 5 depending on corresponding academic years. The coefficient
estimates become smaller for all pollutants, particularly for ozone and PM10. Estimates also
become statistically insignificant for PM10 (Table 2.12). Marginal effects are much smaller
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for ozone - $5.35 for 1 log point decrease in pollution at 50th percentile compared to that of
$31.5 in baseline model. Marginal effect for NO2 at 50
th percentile is $10.7, which is also
smaller than that of $22.9 in baseline model. At 10th percentile, marginal effect for SO2 is
$4.7 in baseline model, and $3.2 in the model with state specific linear time trend. Though
magnitudes of effects are smaller, compared to those in baseline analysis, evidence of a school
finance channel prevails under this robustness check specification.
2.6.2 Lagged Dependent Variable
Next I substitute Local variables, i.e. school quality and capital outlay expenditure with
four year lagged property tax revenue per pupil. This essentially introduces some sort of
dynamic panel structure in analysis. Apart from being a substitute for school quality, lagged
property tax revenue per pupil, to some extent, also accounts for district level unobserved
characteristics, which could affect housing values. For this specification, I estimate the
following model:
Rjst = β0 + β1 lnPollutionj,s,t−k + β2 lnPollutionj,s,t−k
2 + β7 Rj,s,t−k
+District′jst β5 + β6 HPIs,t−k+1 + αj +
∑
t
∑
s
δst Fipss Y eart + ǫjst
(2.13)
With lagged property tax revenue in the model, pollution coefficients are quite similar to
baseline model (Table 2.13). Marginal effects for 1 log point decrease in pollution at 50th
percentile are $29, and $17.1 respectively for ozone and NO2, which are slightly smaller than
the baseline model. For SO2, marginal effect at 10
th percentile is $2.6, and marginal effects
for PM10 are not statistically significant. Overall results suggest existence of school finance
channel under this specification as well.
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2.6.3 Weighted Regression
School districts are different in size. Average number of pupil varies from 724 at 1st
percentile to 64627 at 99th percentile25. Most school districts (about 40% of the sample)
have student counts between 2,000 to 4,999. The second largest group, which is 21% of
the sample, has average pupil count between 5,000 to 9,999, followed by 19% having pupil
count from 1,000 to 1,999. Less than 2% of school districts has pupil count of 50,000 and
more, and 4% of the school districts has pupil count of less than 1,000. My next robustness
check involves heterogeneity across school districts in terms of school district size. I perform
weighted regressions, where weight is the average number of pupil in the school district.
The pollution coefficients in weighted regressions are smaller than baseline results, and not
statistically significant for PM10 (Table 2.14). For 1 log point decrease in pollution, marginal
effects are $18.3, $17.0, and $1.7 respectively at 50th percentile of ozone, NO2, and SO2.
Despite differences in magnitude, the general findings of baseline analysis sustain when
weights are introduced for taking care of heterogeneity in student number across districts.
2.6.4 Including Assessment Limit States in Sample
Next, I investigate how change in pollution affects property tax revenue if school districts
that are excluded because of assessment limit condition are included in analysis. For this
exercise I interact pollution variables with a dummy indicating assessment limit condition.
25The largest school district in the sample in terms of student population is City of Chicago School District
299 in Illinois with average pupil count of 423,115. The smallest school district in the sample with average
pupil count of 229 is Brooklyn Community Unit School District School 188, which is also in Illinois.
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I estimate the following equation:
Rjst = β0 + β1 lnPollutionj,s,t−k + β2 lnPollutionj,s,t−k
2
+ β8 lnPollutionj,s,t−k Astlimits + β9 lnPollutionj,s,t−k
2 Astlimits
+ Local′j,s,t−k β4 +District
′
jst β5 + β6 HPIs,t−k+1 + αj
+
∑
t
∑
s
δst Fipss Y eart + ǫjst
(2.14)
Where, Astlimits takes the value 1 if state s has a statewide assessment limit, and 0 if
otherwise. For districts located in states with assessment limit, we can expect little or no
effect of pollution on property tax revenue. Hence, for the sample including assessment limit
states, the overall impact of pollution will be smaller. Therefore, it is expected that the
sign of β8 will be the opposite of that of β1, and β9 will have the opposite sign of β2. I get
opposite signs for β1 and β8, and for β2 and β9 for all pollutants (Table 2.15). β8 and β9 are
statistically significant for all pollutants except PM10. Marginal effect for school districts
located in assessment limit state is following:
δRjt
δ lnPollutionj,s,t−k
|[Astlimits = 1] = (β1 + β8)
+ 2(β2 lnPollutionj,s,t−k + β9 lnPollutionj,s,t−k)
(2.15)
Because of opposite signs of β1 and β8, and β2 and β9, marginal effects for assessment limit
states are smaller in magnitude than marginal effects in baseline analysis. For example,
marginal effect for ozone in baseline regression is 34482− 8470 lnPollution, while marginal
effect for assessment limit states is −7826 + 1960 lnPollution. For median ozone pollution
of 85ppb, these marginal effects are −3147.3, and 881.6 respectively. Not only the magnitude
of marginal effect is smaller, the direction of effect is also opposite for districts in assess-
ment limit states. Hence, the public finance channel story doesn’t fit for these excluded
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school districts as expected, and thereby provides support for validity of the baseline sample
selection.
2.6.5 Spurious Relationship
From Figure 2.4, we see that pollution measures show a declining trend during the analysis
period. On the other hand, property tax revenue shows an increasing trend during the same
period of time (Figure 2.3). A concern of spurious relationship between these variables is not
unlikely. Since there are only 5 periods in data, cointegration tests for panel data are not
credible. Under the circumstances, I check whether pollution can explain state revenue per
pupil, which also demonstrates an increasing trend like property tax revenue. According to
the framework presented in this paper, pollution affects school resources through property
tax revenue, and pollution doesn’t affect state revenue. If statistically significant coefficients
for pollution are obtained from the state revenue - pollution regression, then concerns can
arise that pollution - property tax revenue relationship could be spurious as well. On the
contrary, if coefficients are not statistically different from zero, then it can be argued that
pollution and property tax revenue per pupil are less likely to be spuriously correlated.
Results show that pollution coefficients are quite small and statistically insignificant for all
pollutants (Table 2.16). This result strengthens the assertion that the relationship between
pollution and property tax revenue is not spurious.
2.6.6 Multiple Pollutants
Next, I run a regression with all four pollutants in linear form. The coefficients of
pollution in this regression provides an overall idea of how a certain pollutant affects property
tax revenue on average, while other pollutants are controlled for. However, a caveat of
this exercise is that pollution measure for all pollutants are not available for all districts,
34
which restricts the sample size. Only 28% of the districts in the sample has pollution
measure for all four pollutants. Pollution coefficients for all four pollutants are negative but
statistically significant for ozone only (Table 2.17). All four pollutant measures, however,
are jointly significant. Moreover, ozone has the highest impact on property tax revenue
per pupil, followed by PM10, SO2, and NO2 when all four pollutants are controlled for. I
then estimate different samples for groups of districts for which pollution measures for three
pollutants are available. There are four such groups – one excluding SO2, one excluding
PM10, one excluding NO2, and the last one excluding ozone. Only the coefficient for ozone
is statistically significant for groups excluding SO2, and NO2. Coefficients for NO2 along
with ozone are statistically significant for the group excluding PM10. None of the pollution
coefficients are statistically significant for the group excluding ozone. These results could
be attributable to restricted sample size, or relationships between different pollutants. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly analyze these inter pollutant relationships. But
the negative sign of pollution coefficients in general suggests existence of the school finance
channel of air pollution.
2.6.7 Sensitivity to Monitor Location Distance
In baseline analysis I consider school districts that have at least one pollution monitor
within 12.5 mile radius of the district centroid. Here, I check sensitivity of analysis to various
monitor distances. I take four different samples of school districts that has at least one
pollution monitor within 5 miles, 9 miles, 15 miles, and 20 miles radius respectively. Like
baseline sample, all pollution monitors within 25 miles radius are considered to calculate
pollution measure. For ozone, pollution coefficients are not statistically significant for 15
miles and 20 miles sample, and smaller than baseline for 5 miles and 9 miles sample (Table
2.18. Marginal effects for 1 log point decrease are in ozone pollution at 50th percentile are
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smaller than baseline as well – $4.0 and $7.9 respectively for 5 miles and 9 miles sample.
Though smaller monitor distances provide more precise pollution measures, it also decreases
sample size. On the other hand, larger monitor distances increase sample size at the cost of
less precise measure of pollution.
For NO2, pollution coefficients are statistically significant for all four samples, however,
smaller in magnitude for 15 miles and 20 miles sample (Table 2.19). Marginal effects for 1
log point decrease in pollution at 50th percentile gradually declines with monitor distance.
They are $35.3, $27.0, $16.3, and $10.3 respectively for 5 miles, 9 miles, 15 miles, and 20
miles sample. For SO2, pollution coefficients are smaller than baseline estimates for 9 miles,
15 miles, and 20 miles samples, and not statistically significant for 5 miles sample (Table
2.21). Pollution coefficient estimates are not statistically significant for any of the samples
of PM10 (Table 2.20). This could be attributable to smaller sample size of 5 miles and 9
miles samples, and less variation in PM10 pollution measure in 15 miles and 20 miles sample.
Number of observations in 5 miles and 9 miles 214 and 421 respectively, which are smaller
than the baseline sample size of 545. Standard deviations for 15 miles and 20 miles samples
are 5.84 and 5.79 respectively, whereas that is 6.05 in baseline sample. Smaller variation
in pollution measure is due to proximity of school districts in PM10 samples, and thereby
sharing of same pollution monitors. 16% of the school districts in 20 miles sample share at
least one pollution monitor with more than 25 districts, which is only 2% in the baseline
sample. These trade offs between number of observations and variation in pollution measure
may result in insignificant coefficient estimations.
2.6.8 Sensitivity to Unbalanced Sample and Time Period
In the baseline analysis, I use a balanced sample. Now I check the sensitivity of baseline
results by analyzing an unbalanced sample with at least 2 periods. I get coefficient estimates
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similar to baseline line results, except for PM10 (Table 2.22). Coefficients for PM10 become
much smaller and statistically insignificant for unbalanced sample. Marginal effect for 1 log
point decrease in pollution at 50th percentile is $31.1 for ozone, which is quite similar to
that of baseline analysis. Marginal effect for NO2 at 50
th percentile is $15.5, smaller than
marginal effect of $22.9 in baseline model. For SO2, marginal effect at 10
th percentile is $3.2,
which is also slightly smaller than that of the baseline analysis. Other than estimates for
PM10, baseline results are quite robust to unbalanced sample, which further validates the
general findings of this paper.
Next, I do sensitivity analysis for different time period samples. In baseline analysis I have
years from 1996 to 2008 in 3-year intervals. A concern may arise that the results are specific
to this particular sample period, and not robust to other sample periods. Hence, I check
sensitivity for four different time periods. They are from 199526 to 2007, and 1997 to 2009 in
3-year intervals; and 1996 to 2008, and 1997 to 2009 in 4-year intervals27. Pollution coefficient
estimates for ozone are quite similar to baseline analysis across different samples (Table 2.23).
Marginal effects range from $26.6 to $44.6 for 1 log point decrease in ozone pollution at 50th
percentile. For NO2, I get similar to baseline analysis pollution coefficients as well (Table
2.24), and marginal effects at 50th percentile range from $20.2 to $31.1. Coefficients for
PM10 are quite similar to baseline estimates for 1995 to 2007 3-year interval sample and
1996 to 2008 4-year interval sample. Coefficients for 1997 to 2009 3-year interval sample and
1997 to 2009 4-year interval sample are much smaller and statistically insignificant (Table
2.25). Finally, pollution coefficient estimates are also similar to those baseline analysis for
26Pollution measure for 1991 (corresponding to 1995 academic year) is average pollution level of 1990 and
1991, since 1989 pollution level is not available.
27Academic years for 1995 to 1997 3-year interval sample are – 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007; and
for 1997 to 2009 sample are – 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009. For 1996 to 2008 4-year interval sample,
academic years are – 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008; and for 1997 to 2009 sample, academic years are – 1997,
2001, 2005, and 2009.
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SO2 (Table 2.26). These results suggest that the baseline results are in general robust to
different time period samples.
2.6.9 Relative Pollution Measure
Lastly I check robustness of baseline results with a different measure for pollution. I
calculate pollution measures of the school district as percentage of 25th percentile pollution
level of the Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA), and named it relative pollution. For this
purpose, I only include CBSAs with at least 5 school districts in the sample. Unlike baseline
analysis there is no quadratic term of pollution in this specification since pollution levels are
already expressed as share of 25th percentile pollution level. For this specification I estimate
the following model:
Rjcst = β0 + β8RelativePollutionj,c,s,t−k + Local
′
j,c,s,t−k β4
+District′jcst β5 + β6 HPIs,t−k+1 + αj
+
∑
t
∑
s
δst Fipss Y eart + ǫjcst
(2.16)
Relative pollution coefficients are negative and statistically significant for ozone, NO2, and
SO2. The coefficient is negative but not statistically significant for PM10 (Table 2.27). 1
percentage point decrease in relative pollution increases property tax revenue per pupil by
10.9, 11.1, and 3.5 dollars respectively for ozone, NO2, and SO2. These results reinforced
the findings of baseline analysis.
2.7 Conclusion
The primary goal of this paper is to establish the school finance channel of ambient air
pollution, which is generally not emphasized in literature. I argue that school resources have
38
effects on student achievements, and allocation of school resources in a jurisdiction strongly
depends on its property tax revenue. Property values in the jurisdiction affects property tax
revenue collection, and pollution level affects property values. Hence, school resources are
affected by pollution. The overall effect is, however, not one-to-one mechanical effect since
it involves policy offsetting components like changes in property tax rate. Magnitude of any
offsetting effect depends on the elasticity of property tax rate and property tax base. This
has been discussed thoroughly from theoretical perspective in the paper. In empirical part,
panel estimation results suggest that per pupil property tax revenue increases as air pollution
decreases, and thereby confirms existence of a school finance channel. However the effects are
different for different pollutants, and different at different levels of pollution. A decrease in
pollution level in relatively less polluted area is more effective in terms of increasing property
tax revenue per pupil for PM10 and SO2. In contrast, decrease in pollution shows a larger
effect in more polluted areas for ground level ozone and NO2.
One shortcoming of this analysis is that I only observe property tax revenue in data, and
do not observe property tax base and property tax rate separately. Hence I can not tell how
much of the total effect is mechanical, and how much is due to policy offsetting. Another
shortcoming is that I can not differentiate how much revenue is collected from homestead
properties and how much is from commercial and industrial properties. Manufacturing
plants in a school district increase the commercial and industrial property tax base, but
increase pollution level as well. Homestead property values are affected by pollution from
manufacturing plant operation. I can not distinguish between these two opposite impacts.
These are areas to focus in future research.
This paper is the first in literature to show a link between air pollution and school
resources. Such association could have critical policy implications. The results suggest that
the effect of pollution on education outcome is not uni-dimensional. Children from poor
households located in polluted areas are more exposed to air pollution, which directly affects
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their academic achievements. Moreover, schools in polluted areas have less resources, which
affects education from another angle. The total effect of pollution on education is, therefore,
higher than what we are commonly perceived of. Studies that treat pollution education nexus
from a uni-dimensional perspective would recommend enhancing efforts to reduce pollution
as standard policy. However, the way pollution affects education outcome is more complex
and requires more than one policy actions.
To ensure environmental justice, and equity in school expenditure, a relevant policy
action could be compensating the affected school districts. The analysis provided in this
paper are partial equilibrium analysis, which are not sufficient to suggest appropriate policy
recommendations. A general equilibrium analysis is required in this regard, which is one of
my future research agendas. In this exercise, I focus on how change in pollution partially
affects school district revenue and expenditure. In a general equilibrium framework it will
be quite interesting to incorporate costs of pollution abatement, and to relate the costs with
benefits from increase in school district revenue. On the other hand, more revenue from
property taxes means less expenditure for other private goods, which could have interesting
welfare dynamics. This paper brings all these issues to the table, and provides directions for
future research in this area.
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Chapter III
Energy Subsidy Reform and Fiscal
Space for Social Protection: An
Analysis from Pakistan
3.1 Introduction
Broad-based energy subsidies are quite common in developing countries. Pre-tax petroleum
and electricity subsidies amounted to 0.34% and 0.23% of global GDP respectively in 2013.
Advanced economies’ share in the global energy subsidies was only 4%, while the rest be-
longed to developing countries (Coady et al., 2015). Consumers, in countries that subsidize
energy products, pay a lower price for energy as governments bear a significant part of the
energy expenditure burden. Proponents of energy subsidies claim that broad-based sub-
sidies benefits poor households, who otherwise could not consume fuel and electricity at
higher prices. However, studies show that substantial part of broad-based subsidy benefits
are captured by non-poor households (del Granado et al., 2012). Moreover, energy subsi-
dies in developing countries crowd out priority sector public spending and aggravate fiscal
imbalances (Clements et al., 2013). Alternative to broad-based energy subsidy is targeted
subsidy or targeted transfer programs for the poor. However, targeting could be costly and
hard to implement in developing countries. Hence, whether broad-based energy subsidy is
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a good policy choice or not, is an interesting public finance question in developing country
perspective.
To investigate this issue, I analyze the tariff differential subsidy (TDS) program in Pak-
istan. Using household level microdata, I first analyze the incidence of TDS across consump-
tion expenditure quintiles. I find that top quintiles receive higher proportion of subsidy ben-
efits. My analysis provide evidence in support of regressive nature of the electricity subsidy
program in Pakistan. I then conduct a computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis for
Pakistan, where I run simulations of energy subsidy reduction, and energy subsidy reduction
and transfer payment to poor households. Results from CGE analysis suggest that all types
of households get hurt from subsidy reduction. However, when savings from subsidy reduc-
tion are distributed among poor households, recipient households experience comparative
improvement in welfare.
In a similar exercise on Pakistan, Walker et al. (2014) analyzes reform scenarios where
electricity subsidy as percentage of GDP gradually declines over time, and electricity tariffs
are adjusted accordingly to held electricity subsidy expenditure to certain percentage of
GDP. They also analyze scenarios where government provides targeted compensation to
poorest households. Their analysis differs from mine in the way that they do not use savings
from subsidy reform to be distributed among poor, rather they arbitrarily decide to top-up
existing cash transfer program payment1. My counterfactual scenarios are similar to those
of Dennis (2016) where energy subsidies are completely eliminated in the first counterfactual
simulation, and fiscal savings are fully transferred to households in the second counterfacutal
simulation. However, unlike my counterfactual scenario, transfers are not targeted by income
level, rather all households receive compensation. Rentschler (2016) conducts a similar
exercise on Nigeria, where savings from subsidy reform is again redistributed to all Nigerians
1They analyze the scenario where monthly benefit of Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) is
increased by Rs. 300.
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through an uniform cash compensation scheme. Other studies mostly focuses welfare effects
of subsidy reform, and do not analyze scenarios with targeted transfers (Wesseh et al., 2016;
Jiang et al., 2015).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as following: section 2 provides an overview
of electricity subsidy and analysis of electricity subsidy incidence in Pakistan, section 3
describes the computable general equilibrium specification, section 4 provides data sources,
section 5 provides simulation results, and section 6 outlines conclusion and directions for
future research.
3.2 Overview of Energy Subsidy in Pakistan
The Government of Pakistan runs a sizable energy subsidy program that accounts for
9.6% of the current expenditure and 1.5% of GDP in 2012-13. Pakistan also runs annual
budget deficit of more than 5% of GDP. Hence, energy subsidy is a substantial public spend-
ing in the context of Pakistan. Almost all of the energy subsidy goes to electricity consumers
under the Tariff Differential Subsidy (TDS) program. The National Electric Power Regula-
tory Authority (NEPRA) determines cost-recovery electricity tariffs for different distribution
companies (DISCOs) across Pakistan2. The Government of Pakistan (GOP), however, sets
an uniform tariff for all DISCOs, and pays DISCOs the difference between NEPRA deter-
mined tariff and GOP notified tariff via TDS. TDS alone accounts for 96.8% of the total
energy subsidy, and 89.2% of the total subsidy in 2012-13. Residential consumers receive
half of the TDS in 2012-13; while one quarter goes to industry, and the remainder goes to
low-consuming businesses (Walker et al., 2014). In this paper, I focus on domestic electricity
consumption, which is 47% of the total electricity consumption in Pakistan.
2There are 10 distribution companies in Pakistan. 5 are located in Punjab, 3 in Sindh, 1 in Balochistan, 2
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Cost recovery tariffs vary across regions based on geographic location, proportion
of urban and rural consumers, etc.
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3.2.1 Energy Subsidy and Priority Sector Spending
From 2008-09 to 2015-16, Pakistan spends around 7% of current expenditure on average
in TDS. It was as high as 14.6% in 2011-123, but gradually declines to 2.9% of current expen-
diture in 2015-16 (Table 3.3). During 2012-13, Pakistan had a budget deficit of 7.8% of GDP,
and TDS was 18.2% of the budget deficit. These large subsidy spending limits government’s
ability to spend in priority sectors like education, health, and social welfare. During 2008-09
to 2015-16, Pakistan spends only 2.1% of current expenditure on average in health and nu-
trition, 10.7% in education, and 2.4% in social security and welfare (Table 3.2). Pakistan’s
spending in these sectors are much lower than those of other South Asian countries, India
and Bangladesh (Figure 3.1). Form 2008-09 to 2014-15, India and Bangladesh on average
spend 13.1% and 14.5% of current expenditure respectively in education, while Pakistan’s
average spending in education during this period is only 10.5%. During the period, Pakistan
spends only 2% of current expenditure on average in health, while average spending in India
and Bangladesh are 3.9% and 5% respectively. The story is similar for social security and
welfare where Pakistan’s average spending of 2.2% of current expenditure is significantly
lower than India’s 3.8%, and Bangladesh’s 7.4%.
Lower spending in priority sectors could also cause dismal socioeconomic outcomes. Ex-
pected years of schooling in Pakistan is 8.1 years, while that is 11.7 years in India, and 10.2
years in Bangladesh. Life expectancy at birth in India and Bangladesh is 68.3 years and
72 years respectively, which is 66.4 years in Pakistan. Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live
births is 30.7 and 37.9 respectively in Bangladesh and India, while that is as high as 65.8
in Pakistan (UNDP, 2016). Pakistan is certainly lagging behind in priority sector spending,
but spends substantial amount of resources in energy subsidy. This is one of the rationales
for Pakistan to cut subsidy and to create fiscal space for priority sector spending.
3This was primary due to increase in oil prices in the international market.
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3.2.2 Calculation of Tariff Differential Subsidy
For domestic consumption, electricity tariff in Pakistan are different for different units
according to level of usage. There are 5 consumption slabs for residential electricity con-
sumption exceeding 50 kWh4. These slabs are - i) 1 to 100 kWh, ii) 101 to 200 kWh, iii)
201 to 300 kWh, iv) 301 to 700 kWh, and v) above 700 kWh. Electricity tariff per kWh
increases in ascending order from lower to higher consumption slabs. For example, GOP
notified tariff for “1 to 100 kWh” slab was Rs. 5.8 per kWh in 2012-13, while that was
Rs.15.1 per kWh for “above 700 kWh” slab. Prior 2013-14, residential consumers, consum-
ing electricity at any slab got benefited from lower tariffs at each of the previous slabs. For
example if a household consumes 250 kWh of electricity, then it would pay “1 to 100 kWh”
slab tariff for the first 100 kWh, “101 to 200 kWh” slab tariff for the next 100 kWh, and
“201 to 300 kWh” slab tariff for the last 50 kWh. Since 2013-14, consumers are allowed only
to use lower tariff benefits of the previous slab. For consumption of 250 kWh of electricity,
the household would now pay “101 to 200 kWh” slab tariff for the first 200 kWh, and “201
to 300 kWh” slab tariff for the last 50 kWh.
For each of the 10 DISCOs, NEPRA determines per unit consumption tariffs for each
slab. Provincial average of NEPRA tariffs for different consumption slabs are presented in
Table 3.4. Average NEPRA per unit tariff for “1 to 100 kWh” consumption slab was lowest
in Punjub (Rs.9.4), and highest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Rs.15.0) in 2012-13. The GOP
determined tariff for each slab is presented in Table 3.5. The GOP tariff for “1 to 100 kWh”
consumption slab was Rs.5.8 in 2012-13. Tariff differential subsidy is the difference between
NEPRA tariff and GOP tariff. Hence, per unit subsidy for “1 to 100 kWh” consumption
slab in 2012-13 was Rs.6.3 in Punjab, and Rs.9.2 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Calculated per
unit subsidy amounts are presented in Table 3.6. Since 2013-14, if GOP tariff is greater
4Residential consumers consuming 1 to 50 kWh of electricity are considered as “Life-line Consumers”
and pays a minimal tariff of Rs. 2.00 per kWh.
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than NEPRA tariff, then government imposes a surcharge equal to the tariff difference
to ensure uniform GOP tariff across all provinces. Average electricity consumption per
domestic connection was 167.32 kWh in 2012-13, average monthly expenditure per domestic
connection was Rs.1828.45, and average monthly subsidy benefit received was Rs.629.8 (Table
3.9).
3.2.3 Subsidy Incidence
From Table 3.6, we can see that per unit tariff differential subsidy is different at different
consumption slabs. Total subsidy benefit depends on the amount electricity consumption.
For example, a household in Punjab, consuming 250 kWh of electricity in 2012-13 would
receive a TDS benefit of Rs.1665. The household would receive Rs.1320 of TDS benefit if it
consumed 200 kWh of electricity, and Rs.2010 of TDS benefit if it consumed 300 kWh of
electricity. Subsidy benefits also differ across states. A household in Sindh, would receive
TDS benefit of Rs.2195 for consumption of 250 kWh of electricity, which is Rs.530 higher
than the TDS benefit for same amount of electricity consumption in Punjab. Table 3.7 and
Table 3.8 show the minimum and maximum amount of TDS benefit received at each of the
consumption slabs across provinces. Since households consuming higher amount of electricity
receives higher TDS benefit,6 it is required to analyze electricity consumption of households
to understand subsidy incidence. If wealthier households consume more electricity than
poor households, then TDS would be regressive, that is, wealthier households will acquire
larger shares of TDS benefit. I analyze household level microdata from Household Integrated
Economic Survey (HIES) of Pakistan to produce evidence for nature of electricity subsidy
incidence in Pakistan. I use data for 2011-12, 2013-14, and 2015-16 rounds of HIES.
5There is a general sales tax (GST) of 16% on electricity consumption.
6Since 2013-14, TDS benefit increases with electricity consumption upto 300 kWh, and declines for
consumption above 300 kWh. For Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, benefits decline after 700 kWh
in 2014-15 (Table 3.7).
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From HIES data, I know monthly electricity consumption expenditure of the house-
holds. The households can be geographically identified across provinces of Punjab, Sindh,
Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; and across urban and rural areas. Since I know the
electricity tariff and General Sales Tax (GST) rate on electricity bill, I can calculate the
amount of electricity consumption for each household in the sample. Using per unit TDS
benefit from Table 3.6, I can also calculate total TDS benefit received by each household.
For subsidy incidence analysis, I first aggregate total TDS benefit by electricity consumption
slabs and construct 100% stacked bar graphs for provinces across urban and rural areas. I
also construct 100% stacked bar graphs for aggregate number of households in each slab.
From the diagrams, we can see that most of the aggregate TDS benefit is received by con-
sumers at “101 to 200 kWh” consumption slab in urban areas (Figure 3.2). Consumers at
“1 to 100 kWh” consumption slab receives very little aggregate TDS benefit compared to
share of households consuming at “1 to 100 kWh” slab. This provides initial evidence from
household level data that TDS benefit is higher for higher level of electricity consumption.
Consumers at “101 to 200 kWh” consumption slab also receive majority of the aggregate
TDS benefit in rural areas (Figure 3.3). However, aggregate TDS benefit for consumers at
“1 to 100 kWh” slab is comparatively higher than urban areas.
Next I calculate household expenditure quintiles for urban and rural regions for each of
the 4 provinces. I then construct 100% stacked bar graphs of aggregate TDS benefit over
household quintiles across regions and provinces (Figure 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7). Diagrams
show that proportion of households consuming at “1 to 100 kWh” slab is comparatively
higher at 1st quintile, and gradually declines at higher quintiles. Conversely, proportions
of households consuming at “301 to 700 kWh” slab and at “above 700 kWh” slab are
comparatively lower at 1st quintile and gradually increases at higher quintiles. This is in
general the case for all provinces in both urban and rural regions. These results provide
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evidence that electricity consumption of wealthier households are comparatively higher than
electricity consumption of poor households.
I then calculate average electricity consumption per household by expenditure quintiles.
Average electricity electricity consumption at 1st quintile of urban Punjab is 129.9 kWh
in 2013-14, while that is 182.4 kWh and 206.1 kWh at 2nd and 5th quintiles respectively.
Distributions of average electricity consumption per household for different provinces are
presented in Table 3.10. For both urban and rural, and for all 4 provinces, average electricity
consumption increases with ascending order of quintiles. I then calculate average TDS benefit
per household at different quintiles, and present results in in Table 3.11. These numbers also
show that average subsidy benefit is higher at higher quintiles. Average TDS benefit at 1st
quintile of urban Punjab is Rs.744, whereas it is Rs.997 at 5th quintile. These results further
confirms the regressive nature of electricity subsidy incidence in Pakistan.
Finally, I aggregate TDS benefit by household quintiles, and construct 100% stacked bar
graphs over provinces and across urban and rural regions (Figure 3.8). From the diagrams
we can see that households in 1st quintile, receives less than 20% of aggregate TDS benefit for
both urban and rural regions in all provinces. On the other hand, households in 5th quintile,
receive more than 20% of aggregate TDS benefit in most cases. The top 2 quinties receive
more than 40% of aggregate TDS benefit, while the bottom 2 quintiles receive less than 20%
of aggregate TDS benefit. All these analysis provides proof that rich households receive more
benefits from electricity subsidy, compared to poor households. This is another rationale for
implementing subsidy reform, and creating fiscal space for social welfare in Pakistan. The
disparity in subsidy benefit distribution, however, is relatively smaller in 2015-16, because
of government’s policy to limit TDS benefit at higher consumption slabs. This suggests that
targeted subsidies could generate better distribution outcomes than broad-based subsidy
programs.
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3.3 A General Equilibrium Specification
I use a dynamic general equilibrium model similar to Feltenstein & Shamloo (2013),
which endogenously generates an underground economy. This type of model had been used
in Feltenstein & Cyan (2013) and Feltenstein et al. (2017) for computable general equilibrium
analysis of Pakistan economy7. The model has n discrete time periods, and agents optimize
in each period over a 2 period time horizon. Agents have perfect foresight over 2 periods,
and expectations for future periods. At period t, agents know prices for period t and period
t + 1, and have expectations8 for prices for future periods after t + 1. At period t + 2, new
information are available to agents, and they re-optimize for periods t + 2 and t+ 3.
3.3.1 Production
There are 8 factors of production in the model – 2 types of labor, 5 types of capital,
and land. The labor types are – i) Urban Labor, and ii) Rural Labor. The capital types
correspond to aggregate of the following non-agricultural productive sectors – i) Light Man-
ufacturing, ii) Heavy Industry, iii) Electricity, Water, and Sewage, iv) Transport, and v)
Hotels, Housing, and Health Services. There are 3 types of financial assets – i) Domestic
Currency, ii) Bank Deposits, and iii) Foreign Currency. Intermediate and final production
in period t is determined by a 50x50 input-output (I-O) matrix, taken from the most recent
social accounting matrix for Pakistan. The first 49 rows and columns in the I-O matrix
correspond to domestic production, and the final row and column represent import of inter-
mediate and final goods. 5 types of capital and urban labor is used to produce sector specific
value added for non-agricultural sectors; and land and rural labor is used to produce value
added in agricultural sector. The production of value added in jth non-agricultural sector in
7The size of informal economy is more than 30% of GDP in Pakistan (Gulzar et al., 2010).
8Agents form expectations based on weighted average of historical prices, and agents’ past errors in
predicting those prices (Feltenstein & Cyan, 2013).
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period i is:
vaji = vaji(y
j
Ki, y
j
Li, YGi) (3.1)
Where, yjKi and y
j
Li are capital and urban labor inputs to j
th non-agricultural sector, and
YGi is the outstanding stock of public infrastructure in period i. Capital and labor in j
th
sector are taxed at the rates of tKij and tLij respectively in period i. Capital tax is the tax
on firm’s profit,9 and labor tax is personal income tax, withheld at source.
There are sector-specific investment technologies, which produce each type of sectoral
capital using capital and labor inputs. Firms borrow from the banking sector to acquire
inputs used in production of new capital. If H1 quantity of capital is produced in period 1,
then the borrowing cost to produce H1 quantity of capital must equal the present value of
the return on H1 quantity of capital. Suppose, CH1 be the cost-minimizing cost of producing
H1 quantity of capital in period 1, then
CH1 =
n∑
i=2
PKi(1− tKi)(1− δ)
i−2H1∏i−1
j=1(1 + rj)
(3.2)
Where, PKi is return to capital in period i, δ is depreciation rate of capital, and rj =
1
PBj
is
interest rate in period j. PBj is the price of bond in period j. Firm’s decision to invest in new
capital also depends on its decision of whether to pay taxes or not; and if the firm decides not
to pay taxes, then it enters into the underground economy. The firm compares the tax rate
on capital with the rate of return on new capital, and pays tax only if return on new capital is
greater than tax. In a two period world, the firm pays full tax on capital input if PK2
1+r1
≥ tK1,
where, PK2
1+r1
is the present value of the return on one unit of new capital. Conversely the
firm evades capital tax and enters into the underground economy if PK2
1+r1
≤ tK1. In this case,
the gap between the tax rate and the rate of return on new capital determines the extent to
9Capital tax in the model is equivalent to corporate income tax. However, the production functions are
constant returns to scale, and, hence, capital tax here is a tax on returns to capital.
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which the firm goes into the underground economy. The firm’s implicit capital tax rate is:
t¯K1 = tK1
[
1−
(
tK1 −
PK2
1+r2
tK1
)]α
(3.3)
Where, α is a firm-specific behavioral variable, and α ≥ 0. If α = 0, then t¯K1 = tK1, that
is, the firm pays full taxes. If α > 0, then t¯K1 < tK1, that is, the firm evades tax by under-
reporting income. Higher the value of α, higher the degree of tax evasion, and t¯K1
tK1
is the
share of the sector that operates in underground economy in the model.
3.3.2 Banking
Firms borrow from banks; and in order to obtain loans, require to provide banks with
tax returns. Firms face a single, flat corporate income tax rate. Banks then asses the value
of firm’s capital from its tax return, and decide on the amount of loan. If a firm evades
tax, then banks will assess a lower value of the firm’s capital, based on the submitted tax
return. This could limit access to credit for the firm. There are 5 banks in the economy, each
corresponds to one of the five non-agricultural sectors mentioned earlier. A bank primarily
lends to the sector to which it is associated with; however, is not fully specialized in that
sector. Each bank holds a fixed share of outstanding debt of its corresponding sector, and
additional fixed shares of debt of each of the other sectors. This diversification of asset allows
tax evading firms to receive varying degree of credit rationing from different banks.
If the firm fully complies with its tax obligation in period 1 and pays TK1 amount of tax,
then the value of the firm’s capital is Kˆ1 =
TK1
tK1
. Bank will lend to the firm an amount L1,
which is less than CH1. This is because in case of a default, the bank would not be able to
seize the full value of the firm’s capital. Hence, under perfect certainty, there will be credit
rationing if requested amount of loan is higher than firm’s estimated value of capital; and
no credit rationing if requested loan amount is less than firm’s capital. Under uncertainty,
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the amount lent by bank is following:
L1 = CH1
[
Kˆ1
CH1
1 + Kˆ1
CH1
]γ
= CH1
[
Kˆ1
CH1 + Kˆ1
]γ
(3.4)
Where, γ is the measure of risk aversion for the bank. If γ = 0, then L1 = CH1 and there
is no credit restriction. For Kˆ1
CH1+Kˆ1
< 1, the bank increasingly restricts lending as γ rises.
Estimated value of capital, Kˆ1 is 0 for a firm that operates entirely in underground, and
receives L1 = 0 amount of loan from the banking sector.
3.3.3 Consumption
Consumers in the model maximize inter-temporal utility functions which have arguments
of consumption goods and leisure in each of the two periods. There are 18 consumer cate-
gories, of which 3 are urban, and the rest 15 are rural. Urban consumer categories are: i)
Urban Quintile 1, ii) Urban Quintile 2, and iii) Urban Other. Rural consumer categories are:
i) Landless Farmer Sindh, ii) Landless Farmer Punjab iii) Landless Farmer Other Pakistan,
iv) Waged Rural Landless Farmers Sindh, v) Waged Rural Landless Farmers Punjab, vi)
Waged Rural Landless Farmers Other Pakistan, vii) Small Farm Sindh, viii) Small Farm
Punjab, ix) Small Farm Other Pakistan, x) Medium Farm Sindh, xi) Medium Farm Punjab,
xii) Medium Farm Other Pakistan, xiii) Rural Non-farm Quintile 1, xiv) Rural Non-farm
Quintile 2, and xv) Rural Non-farm Other. Each of the consumer categories has initial allo-
cation of land, 5 types of capital, and financial assests – money, bond, and foreign currency.
The urban consumer categories have urban labor, and rural consumer categories have rural
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labor. The consumer’s problem is following:
max
{xi,xLui,xLri}
U(x) = U(x1, xLu1, xLr1,x2, xLu2, xLr2)
s.t.
i) (1 + ti)Pixi + PLuixLui + PLrixLri + PMixMi + PBixBi
+ eiPBFixBFi = Ci
ii) PK1K0 + PA1A0 + PLu1Lu1 + PLr1Lr1 + PM1M0 + r0B0 + PB1B0
+ e1PBF1BF0 + TR1 = N1
iii) PK2(1− δ)K0 + PA2A0 + PLu2Lu2 + PLr2Lr2 + PM2xM1 + r1xB1
+ e2PBF2BF0 + TR2 = N2
iv) Ci = Ni, i ∈ {1, 2}
v) logPBixBi − log eiPBFixBFi = α + β
(
log ri − log
ei + 1
ei
rF i
)
vi)PB2xB2 = d0 + d1(1 + t2)P2x2 + d2
[
r2 − π2
1 + π2
]
vii) logPMixMi = a+ b log(1 + ti)Pixi + c log ri
viii) log
(
Lui
Lri
)
= a1 + a2log
(
PLui − PLri
PLui + PLri
)
(3.5)
Where, subscripts i, L, K, u, r, M , B, and F correspond to period, labor-leisure, capital,
urban, rural, money, bank, and foreign respectively. xLui is demand for urban leisure, xLri
is demand for rural leisure, xMi is holding of money, xBi is quantity of bank deposits, and
xBFi is quantity of foreign currency in period i. xi is vector of consumption, Pi is vector
of prices of consumption goods, and ti is vector of value added taxes in period i. PLui and
PLri are prices of urban and rural labor, PMi is price of money, PBi is discount price of a
certificate of deposit, PBFi is price of foreign currency in period i, and ei is exchange rate
10
10Units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency.
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in period i. Ci is aggregate consumption and Ni is aggregate income in period i. K0, A0,
M0, B0, and BF0 are initial holdings of capital, land, money, bank deposits, and foreign
currency, and Lui and Lri are allocations of urban and rural labor respectively in period
i. δ is rate of depreciation of capital, TRi transfer payment from government, and ri is
interest rate in period i. Constraint (i) represents the total value of consumption of goods,
leisure, and financial assets. Constraints (ii) and (iii) represent value of consumer’s holding
of capital, labor, and principals and interest earnings from domestic and foreign financial
assets in periods 1 and 2 respectively. Constraint (iv) imposes budget restrictions in each
period, that is, total consumption equals to total income.
rF i is foreign interest rate in period i, and π2 is the domestic rate of inflation in period
2. Constraint (v) describes how relative domestic and foreign interest rates, deflated by
change in exchange rate, affects proportion of savings made up of domestic and foreign
bonds. Constraint (vi) shows the relationship between domestic bond holding, consumption,
and real interest rate in period 2. Constraint (vii) is money demand equation, showing
the relationship between money holding, consumption, and interest rate. Finally, constraint
(viii) is a migration equation showing the relationship between relative holding of urban and
rural labor, and relative wage rate. a, b, α, and β are estimated constants, and d0, d1 and
d2 are constants estimated from calibration. Cobb-Douglas utility functions are assumed for
each consumer categories, for which weights are derived from the Pakistan social accounting
matrix consumption data.
3.3.4 Government
The government, in the model, collects personal income tax (labor tax), corporate tax
(capital tax), value added taxes, and import duties. Government provides public goods,
and pays for subsidies. Government covers domestic and foreign interest obligations on
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public debt and satisfies no-Ponzi scheme condition. Government deficits are financed by
a combination of monetary expansion, and domestic and foreign borrowing. Government
deficit in period 1 is:
D1 = G1 + S1 + r1B0 + e1rF1BF0 + T1 (3.6)
Where, G1 is spending on public goods, S1 is subsidy, and T1 is tax revenue in period 1.
r1B0 and e1rF1BF0 are domestic and foreign interest obligations respectively, based on initial
stock of debt. Government deficit in period 2 is:
D2 = G2 + S2 + r2(∆yBG1 +B0) + e2rF2(CF1 +BF0) + T2 (3.7)
Where, G2, S2, and T2 are public spending, subsidy, and tax in period 2. ∆yBG1 is the face
value of domestic bonds sold, and CF1 is foreign borrowing in period 1. r2(∆yBG1 + B0)
is domestic interest obligation, and e2rF2(CF1 + BF0) is foreign debt obligation in period
2. Foreign is exogenously determined by the lender, and domestic bond sale is determined
later by the government. The remainder of the budget deficit in period i is financed by
monetization.
3.3.5 Foreign Sector
A simple equation of aggregate demand for exports represent the foreign sector in the
model. The export equation is following:
∆Xi = σ1
[
π1
∆ei + πF i
]
+ σ2∆ywi (3.8)
Where, ∆Xi is change is dollar value of export, πi and πF i are domestic and foreign rates of
inflation, ∆ei is percentage change in exchange rate, and ∆ywi is percentage change in world
income in period i. σ1 is the elasticity between aggregate export demand, and domestic and
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foreign price indices; and σ2 is the elasticity between aggregate export demand and world
income.
3.4 Data
In this paper, I use data from four major sources. First, aggregate subsidy and govern-
ment expenditure data come from various publications of the Pakistan Ministry of Finance.
Second, electricity tariff data is obtained from National Electric Power Regulatory Author-
ity (NEPRA) publications. Third, household level microdata from Household Integrated
Economic Survey (HIES) of the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS) are used for subsidy
incidence analysis. Finally, for the computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis, I use
the social accounting matrix (SAM) for Pakistan, developed by The World Bank.
I obtain subsidy expenditure data from Pakistan Federal Budget, Budget in Brief docu-
ments for various years. Sectoral and total expenditure, budget deficit, and GDP data are
obtained from “Summary of Consolidated Federal and Provincial Expenditure” in Pakistan
Fiscal Operations documents for various financial years, and Pakistan Economic Review
various issues. Government of Pakistan (GOP) notified electricity tariff, and NEPRA deter-
mined electricity tariff data are obtained from NEPRA’s State of Industry Report, various
issues. For South Asian comparison of public expenditure in priority sectors, data for India
is obtained from Indian Public Finance Statistics 2014-15; and data for Bangladesh come
from “Statement III” in Budget in Brief documents, various issues.
I use 2011-12, 2013-14, and 2015-16 rounds of HIES data for household level analysis.
There are 14,720 households11 in HIES 2011-12, of which 45% are urban households, and
the rest 55% are rural households. Punjab has the highest proportion of households with
nearly 45%, followed by 25% in Sindh, 8% in Balochistan, and remaining 22% in Khyber
11Households, for which electricity consumption data are not available, are excluded from analysis. Around
7% of households in 2011-12 doesn’t have electricity consumption data.
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Pakhtunkhwa. Of the 16,044 households in HIES 2013-14, only 38% resides in urban areas,
and 62% resides in rural areas. Provincial distribution of households are similar to that of
HIES 2011-12. In HIES 2015-16, provincial distribution also remains similar; however, urban
and regional distribution of households gets reversed. Of the 22,792 households, 70% are in
urban areas, and the rest 30% are in rural areas.
The social accounting matrix for Pakistan, used in the CGE analysis, is based upon
Debowicz et al. (2013) and provided by The World Bank. This social accounting matrix
is similar to the one of 2008, and has been updated for 2010. The original SAM has 18
household categories, 10 types of labor, 13 types of land (including water bodies), and 4 types
of capital. Factor allocations by household categories are presented in Table 3.12. Labor is
the major factor share for urban quintile 1 and urban quintile 2, whereas formal capital is
the major share for urban other category. For 3 medium farm categories, land is the largest
factor share. For the rest of the categories, other capital is the largest factor share. There
are 50 types of consumption categories, of which 18 are food categories. Consumption share
of household categories are presented in Table 3.13. Food is by far the largest consumption
share for all categories except 3 medium farm categories. Food share in consumption is
also relatively smaller for urban other and rural non-farm other categories. The 50x50 I-O
matrix represents 2010 technology. For computational simplicity, the original I-O matrix is
aggregated to 27x27 matrix, where the first 26 rows and columns corresponds to domestic
production, and the 27th row and column represent single aggregate import.
3.5 Simulations
The subsidy incidence analysis for Pakistan suggests that rich households receive more
benefits from broad-based electricity subsidies, compared to poor households. Hence, a better
policy could be reducing broad-based subsidy expenditure and compensate poor households
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with targeted transfers. In the CGE analysis for Pakistan, I try to analyze the effects of
energy subsidy reduction and transfer of savings from subsidy reduction to poor households.
There is a 17% GST on electricity consumption in Pakistan. However, because of tariff
differential subsidy, the average effective GST rate is around 10% (Table 3.14). In the
benchmark simulation, the value added tax rate for energy sector is set at 10%, and in
counterfactual simulations, it is set at 17%. I run 2 counterfactual simulations. In the first
counterfactual simulation, energy subsidy is reduced as effective tax rate is increased to 17%,
which essentially generates budgetary savings. In the second counterfactual simulation, the
budgetary savings from first counterfactual simulation is distributed as a lump sum to four
poor household categories – urban quintile 1, landless farmer Sindh, landless farmer Punjab,
and landless farmer other Pakistan. The goal of these simulations are to create fiscal space
by reducing energy subsidy expenditure, and to use generated savings in targeted transfers
to relatively poor segments of population.
The model is first calibrated to historical Pakistan macro data, and then out of sample
simulation is carried out for 8 year period from 2013. Fiscal policy parameters remain
constant for the entire simulation period. A managed exchange rate is assumed, which is
devalued 6% per year. World growth rate and inflation rate are assumed to be 2% and
4% per year respectively. γ in bank lending equation (Equation 3.4) is assumed to be 0,
that is there is no credit rationing. The elasticity parameter a2 in the migration equation
(Constraint (viii) in Equation 3.5) is also assumed to be 0. Parameters for money demand
equation (Constraint (vii) in Equation 3.5) are obtained from Qayyum (2005).
3.5.1 Benchmark Simulation
Average annual real GDP growth rate in benchmark simulation is 3.44%, while average
rate of inflation is 9.90%. Budget deficit is quite high initially, and gradually stabilizes to
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7.3% of GDP in period 8. Interest rate declines over time and trade deficit gradually im-
proves. Aggregate tax revenue and aggregate expenditure are 271.8 and 387.1 respectively
over 8 years. Hence, aggregate budget balance is -115.2. A set of macroeconomic indica-
tors for benchmark simulation are presented in Table 3.15. Real income for all household
categories increases, except for “urban other”, and “waged rural landless farmers Punjab”
(Table 3.18). Real income growth is highest for “medium farm Sindh” category, and lowest
for “waged rural landless farmers Punjab” category. Aggregate average real income growth
for all categories is 3.23%, while it is 5.08% for rural household categories, and 0.03% for
urban household categories.
3.5.2 Subsidy Reduction Simulation
In the first counterfactual simulation, energy subsidy is reduced to create fiscal space.
Average annual GDP growth rate in subsidy reduction simulation becomes 3.37%, slightly
smaller than the benchmark simulation. Average rate of inflation is also smaller than bench-
mark average inflation. As, expected budget deficit under subsidy reduction simulation
improves. Aggregate expenditure declines to 348.0, and aggregate tax revenue declines as
well to 246.5. However, aggregate budget balance improves to -101.5. Hence, an aggre-
gate budget savings of 13.7 is generated over 8 years, which would be distributed to poor
households in the second counterfactual simulation. Macroeconomic indicators for subsidy
reduction simulation are presented in Table 3.16.
Average real income growth become smaller than the benchmark simulation for all house-
hold categories. Along with the 2 household categories that experience negative average
growth of real income in benchmark simulation, “waged rural landless farmers Sindh” also
experiences loss in income. Real income in each period by household categories are presented
in Table 3.19. Calculated utilities for all household categories decline, compared to utilities
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in benchmark simulation (Table 3.21). This suggests that reduction in subsidy adversely
affects each of the household categories.
3.5.3 Subsidy Reduction and Transfer Simulation
In the second counterfactual simulation, budgetary savings of 13.7 is distributed among
four poor household categories at the beginning of period 1. These categories are urban
quintile 1, landless farmer Sindh, landless farmer Punjab, and landless farmer other Pakistan.
A simple distribution rule is followed to make transfers to household categories. Transfer is
made in proportion of share of the household categories in aggregate income during period
1 of benchmark simulation. Urban quintile 1 has the highest proportion of 54.8%, followed
by 22.4% for landless farmer Sindh, 14.7% for landless farmer Punjab, and the remaining
8.1% for landless farmer other. Hence, urban quintile 1 receives 7.5, and the three landless
farmer categories receive 3.1, 2.0, and 1.1 respectively.
Average annual real GDP growth declines to 2.95% in this simulation. Average infla-
tion rate declines more than benchmark and subsidy reduction simulations. Budget deficit
at period 8 is -6.2% of GDP which is also less than the other 2 simulations. Table 3.17
presents the macroeconomic indicators for subsidy reduction and transfer simulation. Simi-
lar to benchmark simulation, average annual real income growth is positive for all household
categories, except “urban other”, and “waged rural landless farmers Punjab” (Table 3.20).
Calculated utilities, compared to benchmark calculations, decline for all household cate-
gories, except for the recipients of transfer payments (Table 3.21). Utilities for urban quintile
1, 3 landless farmer household categories increase in the subsidy reduction and transfer sim-
ulation. This suggests that compared to broad-based energy subsidy, transfer payments
improve welfare of poor households. Moreover, decrease in utility level for each household
categories12 are smaller in subsidy reduction and transfer simulation than subsidy reduction
12Except “waged rural landless farmers Punjab” category.
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simulation. This in a sense suggests that subsidy reduction and transfer outcomes are Pareto
superior to subsidy reduction outcomes.
3.6 Conclusion
Pakistan spends substantial amount of resources in electricity subsidy, which aggravates
budget deficit and crowds out priority sector spending. Moreover, non-poor households
receive comparatively larger subsidy benefits than poor households. Broad-based electric-
ity subsidy, therefore, may not be the right policy for serving the best purposes of poor
households. The alternative policy could be generating fiscal savings by cutting subsidy,
and making transfer to poor households. From the CGE analysis it appears that subsidy
reduction and transfer of savings improve welfare of poor households.
One caveat of my analysis is that I consider each household category in the social account-
ing matrix as one single household in the simulations. I do not know how many households
are there in each category. The distribution rule for transfer of savings was based on house-
hold category’s share in aggregate real income. This share can be larger if there are more
households in the category. The share can also be larger if income of the households in the
category are higher. Hence, larger share of transfer could be allocated to smaller number
of households, which could cause upward bias in utility calculation for any of the recipient
categories. Though I don’t know population distribution for SAM 2010 household categories,
I have information about SAM 2008 population distribution. Aggregate population count
of the four recipient categories in SAM 2008 was 16.4 million, and “urban quintile 1” cat-
egory has the largest share of 52.3% of this population. The “urban quintile 1” category
also receives more than 50% of the transfer share, based on the decision rule. It is unlikely
that population proportions change drastically for the 2010 SAM. Hence, utility calculations
for the “subsidy reduction and transfer” simulation is not affected by smaller number of
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households receiving larger share of transfers. However, information on population distribu-
tion will allow more accurate welfare analysis, which could be one of the extensions of this
research.
International development organizations like The World Bank and IMF regularly pre-
scribe developing countries to reform regressive energy subsidies, and to implement targeted
transfer programs. However, implementing targeted transfer programs, particularly in de-
veloping countries could be quite difficult and financially not viable. In this exercise I simply
transfer the total savings from subsidy reduction to poor households without considering any
cost of targeting. Welfare impacts could be much smaller or quite different if targeting and
implementation costs were considered. The next step of this research would be developing a
model with costs associated with targeting and implementation of transfer schemes, and to
conduct welfare analysis in presence of targeting cost.
Another possible extension could be linking the CGE outcomes with household level mi-
crodata, and conduct welfare analysis thorough micro-simulations. This will allow an in
depth analysis of how poor and non-poor households are affected by subsidy reform. This
paper provides primary results in support of regressive nature of energy subsidy; and welfare
improvement for poor households from transfer of savings. However, effective policy formu-
lation for subsidy reform would require further analysis of this issue. One definite finding of
this paper is that cutting energy subsidies hurts both poor and non-poor households. Poor
households are only better off when targeted transfers are made. If targeted transfers are
not economically viable, then continuation of broad-based energy subsidy could be a better
policy option. My future research agenda in this area will be to analyze and compare these
policy alternatives to figure out desired policies to achieve greater social welfare.
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Chapter IV
An Analysis of Public Infrastructure
Capital in Developing Countries
4.1 Introduction
How public infrastructure is associated with private sector productivity, and foster eco-
nomic growth, are widely asked questions in economics. It is commonly asserted that public
infrastructure facilitates private production by making the factors of production more pro-
ductive with increased level of infrastructure capital stock. Adequately provided public
infrastructure may also attract private investment, and thereby boosts economic activity.
Providing public infrastructure, however, is not free of cost, and requires financing through
taxation, borrowing, or foreign aid. Taxation has a direct negative impact on private sector
production, and excessive public borrowing can crowd out private investment. Hence, an in-
crease in tax rate or public borrowing for financing public infrastructure may offset expected
benefit from providing infrastructural facilities to private sector. There can be additional
impacts if private sector requires paying user fee in order to access public infrastructural
facilities. Studies, exploring these avenues, mostly feature developed or OECD countries.
There are very few studies that analyze public infrastructure capital in developing country
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context. In this paper, I will study the nexus between public infrastructure capital stock
and economic development in two developing countries – Mauritius and Bangladesh.
While investigating association between public capital and economic growth in low and
middle income countries, Aschauer (2000) asks three questions whether the amount of
public capital matters, whether how public capital is financed matters, and whether how
public capital is used matters. His results suggest that it is critical to determine how public
capital is financed and used, and how much to be accumulated. Similar to Aschauer (2000)’s
analysis, Straub (2008) also points out three critical issues regarding public infrastructure and
growth nexus in developing countries composition of infrastructure investments, sequencing,
and relevance of different sub-sectors. In addition to long run economic growth, public
infrastructure stock reduces income inequality (Caldero´n & Serve´n, 2004), and results in
higher total factor productivity growth in relatively poorer countries (Straub et al., 2008).
Another crucial aspect of public infrastructure provision in developing countries is that it not
only affects long-run level of industry, but also affects how rapidly industry grows (Isaksson,
2010). Analysis of public infrastructure in developing country context, with all these different
perspectives, is therefore more interesting and challenging.
It is standard to use infrastructure capital stock data to study public infrastructure’s re-
lationship with economic growth. However, for most of the developing countries, readymade
infrastructure capital stock data is not available. It is not possible to construct an infras-
tructure capital stock series since infrastructure investment time series data are not available
as well. Most of the studies on developing countries, therefore, use physical count of services
like number of telephone connections, capacity of electricity production, coverage of roads
and railroads etc. as measures of public infrastructure. Studies also use public investment
expenditure (as % of GDP) as a proxy for public capital stock, and employ cross section
or panel techniques for empirical analysis . In this paper I construct public infrastructure
capital stock from annual investment in electricity, and transportation and communication,
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for Mauritius and Bangladesh. The primary goal of this study is to estimate elasticities
of public infrastructure for various industry groups in the two countries. The secondary
objective is to extend this analysis to applicable socioeconomic issues.
Both Mauritius and Bangladesh were former British colonies, which became independent
states at around same time Mauritius in 1968 and Bangladesh in 1971. Mauritius, an upper
middle income country, is a small island nation in Indian Ocean, with area of 788 square
mile. Bangladesh, a lower middle income country, is located in South Asia with area of
56,000 square mile. Both these countries were mainly agro based economies at the time of
independence, and over the period of time the structure of economy gradually shifted towards
manufacturing and service sectors. Mauritius is often referred as the “African Success Story”
for achieving higher economic growth among the Sub-Saharan countries (Frankel, 2010).
Bangladesh has also shown impressive economic growth performance over last two decades.
Both of these countries have excellent national account and investment data that allows me to
develop infrastructure capital stocks for respective countries, and to analyze the relationship
between public infrastructure and economic development.
4.2 Theoretical Model
The direct channel of public infrastructure affecting economic growth is the productivity
effect since factors of production are gross complements (Straub, 2008). Besides conventional
channel of private input productivity, and complementarity effect on private investment,
Age´nor & Moreno-Dodson (2006) propose six alternative channels through which public
infrastructure can affect economic growth. These new channels are indirect effect on labor
productivity, effect on adjustment costs, effect on durability of private capital, impact on
health and nutrition, impact on education, and lastly magnification effect through education
and health. Theory predicts that public infrastructure affects economic growth through
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these direct and indirect channels, and there is a positive association between public capital
formation and economic growth.
A common practice in modeling public infrastructure capital stock and economic devel-
opment relationship is to include public capital into production function as an additional
input. With three factors of production capital, labor, and public infrastructure, production
function can be written in following form:
Qt = At f(Kt, Lt, Gt) (4.1)
where, At is productivity index, Kt is private capital stock, Lt is labor force, and Gt is
public capital stock. Romp et al. (2005) outline several caveats of such modeling. First,
this specification implicitly assumes non-rival property of public infrastructure and thereby
treats it as a pure public good which may not true in reality. Second, symmetric treatment
of public capital to private capital and labor does not go in line with standard marginal
productivity theory. Third, there could be geographical spillover effects affecting private
output; and fourth, substitutability between private and public capital may affect growth.
A generalized Cobb-Douglas functional form for Equation 4.1 can be written in logarith-
mic form as following:
logQt = logAt + ψK logKt + ψL logLt + ψG logGt (4.2)
Where, ψG is public infrastructure elasticity of output. Following (Aschauer, 1989, 2000),
and Gramlich (1994), and assuming constant returns to scale (i.e. ψK + ψL + ψG = 1),
Equation 4.2 can be written in following per unit of capital or per unit of labor forms:
log
Qt
Kt
= logAt + ψL log
Lt
Kt
+ ψG log
Gt
Kt
(4.3)
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log
Qt
Lt
= logAt + ψL log
Kt
Lt
+ ψG log
Gt
Lt
(4.4)
Equation 4.3 or 4.4 can be easily estimated to obtain an estimate ψG, which would indicate
the type of association between private output and public capital. However, the problem
arises from potential reverse causation (Romp et al., 2005). From neoclassical growth theory
we know that ∆Kt = sYt − δKt and at steady state, Kt = s
Yt
δ
, where s is savings rate,
Y is output, and δ is depreciation rate of physical capital. This implies that infrastructure
demand depends on output and, therefore, the causal relationship between infrastructure and
growth is difficult to identify. To overcome the causality problem Romp et al. (2005) refer an
intuitive solution of estimating simultaneous equations i.e. production as a function of public
capital, and public capital as a function of production assuming appropriate functional form
for the latter.
To incorporate a diminishing elasticity of public capital Arslanalp et al. (2010) extends
the standard model as following:
∆ logQ = α + βK∆ logK + βL∆ logL+ βG∆ logG
G
Q
(4.5)
where, G
Q
is the initial stock of public capital as percentage of GDP. They argue that there
can be potential non-linearity in productivity of public capital which can be controlled for
by introducing the interaction term in the model. They claim that if public infrastructure is
financed by capital taxes, then there is a disincentive effect from higher taxes which may ex-
ceed the productivity gain; and marginal productivity of public capital may decline thereby.
They further argue that inefficiencies in capital spending process may affect marginal pro-
ductivity of public capital as well.
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Another approach to estimate public capital output association is cost function approach.
Cost function can be written as –
C(Pt, Qt, At, Gt) = min
{Xi}
PtXt (4.6)
Where, Pt is vector of input prices and Xt is vector of inputs. Following Christensen et al.
(1973) the cost function can be written in the following trans-log form:
lnC =α0 + αq lnQ+
1
2
βqq(lnQ)
2 +
∑
i
βqi lnQ lnPi +
∑
i
αi lnPi
1
2
∑
i
βii(lnPi)
2 +
1
2
∑
i 6=j
∑
j 6=i
βij lnPi lnPj
(4.7)
Where, i ∈ {L,K}. The cost function is homogeneous of degree 1 in input prices. In this
exercise I use this trans-log cost function specification to analyze the association between
economic development and public infrastructure. Suppose, there are n different sectors in the
economy. The cost function of nth sector can be written as Cn = c(w, r,Qn, A,GE, GT ), where
w is the return to labor (wage rate), r is the return to capital (interest rate), Qn is sectoral
output, GE is the public electricity infrastructure stock, GT is the public transportation
and communication infrastructure stock, and A is technology. Cn is twice continuously
differentiable and has other standard properties of cost function. Differentiating Equation
4.7 with respect to lnw and ln r, and using Shephard’s lemma yields:
Xl
w
c
= αl + βql lnQ+ βll lnw + βlk ln r + βla lnA+ βlE lnGE + βlT lnGT (4.8)
Xk
r
c
= αk + βqk lnQ + βkk ln r + βkl lnw + βka lnA+ βkE lnGE + βkT lnGT (4.9)
Where, Xl andXk are labor and capital input demands respectively. Left hand sides of Equa-
tion 4.8 by Equation 4.9 are labor cost share and capital cost share respectively. Dividing
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Equation 4.8 by Equation 4.9 and after further simplification yields:
lnQ = η0 + ηa lnA+ ηl lnw + ηk ln r + ηE lnGE + ηT lnGT (4.10)
Where, ηE and ηE are elasticities of output and public electricity infrastructure, and of
output and public transportation and communication infrastructure respectively1. These
elasticities can be estimated using the following specification:
lnQt = γ0 + γa lnAt + γl lnwt + γk ln rt + γE lnGEt + γT lnGTt + ǫt (4.11)
4.3 Capital Stock Calculation
To estimate Equation 4.11, I need to construct time series of capital stocks of electricity
and transportation infrastructure. For capital stock calculation I apply perpetual inventory
method that takes the following form:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It−1 (4.12)
where,Kt is the capital stock available at beginning of period t, δ is the rate of depreciation,
and It−1is the gross fixed capital formation in period t− 1. Repeated substitutions of Kt−1
in Equation 4.12 yields:
Kt =
∞∑
i
(1− δ)iIt−(i+1) (4.13)
Equation 4.13 suggests that capital stock data can be calculated from gross fixed capital
formation data if the initial capital stock K0 is known. Harberger (1978) suggests using
steady state conditions from neoclassical growth literature to obtain initial capital stock.
1ηE =
rXkβlE−wXlβkE
wXlβqk−rXkβql
, and ηT =
rXkβlT−wXlβkT
wXlβqk−rXkβql
. Details of derivation of Equation 4.10 is provided in
the appendix section.
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Since the growth rate of capital equals the growth rate of output in the steady state, K0 can
be calculated from the following formula:
K0 =
I0
gGDP + δ
(4.14)
Harberger (1978) further suggests using three-year average investment and three-year average
GNP growth rate to eliminate any short-run fluctuations. Nehru & Dhareshwar (1993)
propose an alternative econometric approach for calculating I0. They run a linear regression
of log of investment over time, and use first period fitted value as I0. I obtain I0 following
Nehru & Dhareshwar (1993)’s approach, and obtain growth rate of GDP by regressing log of
GDP on year. Following IMF (2017), different time varying depreciation rates are assumed
for Mauritius and Bangladesh. The capital stock calculation equation, therefore,becomes:
Kc,t = (1− δc,t)Kc,t−1 + Ic,t−1 (4.15)
Where, subscript c denotes country. IMF (2017) sets different depreciation rates of public
capital for low, middle, and high income countries. For all country groups, depreciation
in 1960 was set at 2.5%, which remains same for low income countries, and increases to
3.55% and 4.70% respectively for middle and high income countries in 2015. According to
The World Bank classification of country and lending groups, Mauritius is an upper middle
income country, while Bangladesh is a lower middle income country. In line with IMF (2017),
I assume initial depreciation rate of 2.5% for both Bangladesh and Mauritius. I assume that
depreciation rate increases to 3.025% for Bangladesh, and 4.125% for Mauritius in 20162.
2For Bangladesh, I take average of low income country depreciation rate (2.5%) and middle income
country depreciation rate (3.55%). For Mauritius, I take average of middle income country depreciation rate
(3.55%) and high income country depreciation rate (4.70%).
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Following Gupta et al. (2014), I assume that depreciation rate increases monotonically at a
constant rate to reach the assumed depreciation rate in 2016.
4.4 Data
I use data from 1977 to 2016 to estimate elasticities for Mauritius. The interest rate
measure is the annual bank rate of Mauritius, which is a simple average of the weighted
average yield per annum of 91-day, 182-day, 273-day, and 364-day Government of Mauri-
tius Treasury Bills. Since July 2014, Bank of Mauritius has stopped reporting bank rates.
For years 2014 to 2016, “weighted average yield on bills accepted at primary auctions” is
used as interest rate measure. Data for 1999 to 2016 are obtained from various issues of
the Monthly Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Mauritius. For earlier periods, the end of
period (December) bank rates are used, as reported by Jankee (1999) and various World
Bank publications. The wage rate measure is average monthly earnings by industrial groups
obtained from the Survey of Employment and Earnings in Large (employing 10 or more)
Establishments, various issues by Statistics Mauritius. Average monthly earning data, for
some earlier years are obtained from the IMF country reports and World Bank publications.
From the year 2000 onward, average monthly earnings are reported for more disaggregated
industry groups. To construct a consistent series, weighted averages of monthly earnings
are calculated, where weight is sectoral employment share in large establishments. Nominal
wages are then deflated by the annual CPI to obtain real wages in constant 2006 prices.
Gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFC) and sectoral GDP data are obtained
from the Statistics Mauritius’s “National Accounts Estimate”, various issues, and “Historical
Series – National Accounts”. Until 1992, the national accounts of Mauritius was reported
for 10 major industry groups. From 1992 to 2005, there were 14 major industry categories,
which further increases to 19 categories since 2006. For consistency of sectoral output data,
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industry categories are aggregated to 10 initial categories. Details of aggregation is presented
in Appendix C. Similarly, GDFC series is also aggregated to generate “Electricity, Gas and
Water Supply” (hence forth electricity) and “Transport , Storage and Communications”
(hence forth transport and communication) capital stocks for Mauritius. Figure ?? shows
trend infrastructure GDFC as share of GDP. Average GDFC in electricity sector is 1.6% of
GDP, and average GDFC in transportation and communication sector is 3.6% of GDP. More
than 80% of the electricity capital stock, and around 70% of the transport and communication
capital stock in 2016 are public capital stocks. Figure 4.3 shows infrastructure capital stocks
in Mauritius over time. Average annual growth rate of electricity capital stock is 4.16% for
the sample period. Average growth rate was highest during 1996 to 2000 5-year period, and
lowest during 2005 to 2010 5-year period. For transport and communication capital stock,
average annual growth rate is 3.5% for the sample period. During 1986 to 1990 5-year period,
average growth rate was highest, and was lowest during 2010 to 2015 5-year period (Figure
4.5).
For Bangladesh, I use data from 1977 to 2015 to estimate sectoral output and public
infrastructure elasticites. Bank rate is used as the measure of interest rate. Bank rate data is
obtained from Monthly Economic Trends, various issues, published by the Bangladesh Bank.
Wage is measured by the Wage Rate Index (WRI) of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
(BBS). Unlike Mauritius data, WRI is a common index for all industry groups. Sectoral
output data are also obtained from BBS publication, “GDP of Bangladesh”, various issues.
Measures of public infrastructure investment are sector wise annual development program
(ADP) expenditures in power, transport, and communication. ADP expenditure data are
obtained from Implementation, Monitoring & Evaluation Division (IMED) of the Ministry
of Planning, Bangladesh. Trend in sectoral ADP expenditure as share of GDP is presented
in Figure 4.2. Average public infrastructure investment as share of GDP in electricity,
transport, and communication are 0.57%, 0.74%, and 0.13% respectively. Figure 4.4 shows
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public infrastructure capital stock in Bangladesh over time. Average annual growth rate is
4.5% for both electricity, and transport capital stock, and 3.5% for communication capital
stock during the sample period. Average growth rate for electricity capital stock is highest
during 2010 to 2015 5-year period, and lowest during 1991 to 1995 5-year period. Transport
capital stock average growth rate is highest during 1996 to 2000 5-year period, and lowest
during 2005 to 2010 5-year period. Average growth rate for communication capital stock is
highest during 2001 to 2005 5-year period, and lowest during 2010 to 2015 5 -year period
(Figure 4.6).
For sectoral output analysis, I consider 7 aggregated industry groups, which are i) agri-
culture, ii) mining, iii) manufacturing, iv) construction, v) trade, vi) finance, and vii) other
services. Average sectoral growth rates over 5-year periods for Mauritius and Bangladesh
are presented in Table 4.1 and 4.2. The Mauritian economy enjoyed a buoyant average eco-
nomic growth in late 1980s, and continued to grow steadily throughout 1990s. The economy
slightly slowed down during the first half of the new millennium, but bounced back in later
years. Manufacturing, construction, and trade sectors experienced high average growth in
1980s. However, average growth in these sectors declined in recent years; and the finance
sector stands out with strong growth performance since 2000s (Table 4.1). On the other
hand, Bangladesh experienced a decade of stagnation in the 1980s, and the economy started
flourishing since late 1990s. Bangladesh has been successful in continuing this success in re-
cent years as well. Manufacturing, construction, trade sectors have been experiencing strong
and steady growth since 1990s. Growth in finance sector has also been decent in recent years
(Table 4.2).
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4.5 Estimation
For estimation of public infrastructure elasticities, it is standard in literature to jointly
estimate equation 4.7 with equation 4.8 or 4.9. Some studies that follow this method includes
but not limited to Feltenstein & Ha (1995) for Mexican economy, Paul (2003) for Australian
economy, and Albala-Bertrand & Mamatzakis (2004) for Chilean economy. However, joint
estimation of equation 4.7 and equation 4.8 requires information on sectoral cost and factor
share , which are not readily available for developing countries. Due to data constraints,
I modify the factor cost share equations (Equation 4.8 and 4.9) to derive equation 4.10,
for which all required data are available. Equation 4.10 suggests using time series methods
to estimate γE and γT for different industry groups. However, it would require to check
time series properties of data to avoid spurious relationship. Meaningful estimation needs
time series data to be stationary, or the variables to be cointegrated if not stationary. A
more feasible approach could be using panel regression technique since there seven industry
groups. Following Feltenstein & Ha (1995), I estimate the following panel model:
lnQit = γ0 +
∑
i
δi Di + γE lnGEt +
∑
i
γEi lnGEt Di + γT lnGTt
+
∑
i
γT i lnGTt Di + γl lnwit + γk ln rt + γaT ime+ ǫit
(4.16)
Where, Di are industry dummy variables. Di takes the value 1 if sector is i and 0 otherwise.
Hence elasticity of output and electricity capital stock for sector i is γE + γEi; and elasticity
of output and transport and communication capital stock for sector i is γT +γT i. Agriculture
sector is the omitted category for dummy variables. The variable T ime controls for time
trend, which is a proxy for technology A. Controlling for industry dummies in the model
essentially makes it a panel fixed effect specification.
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Estimation results for Mauritius are presented in Table 4.3. Column 1 presents estimates
for electricity capital stock, and column 2 presents estimates for transport and communica-
tion capital stock. These estimates are then used to calculate industry group specific output
elasticities with respect to infrastructure capital stock, which are presented in Table 4.4.
Almost every industry group show positive elasticities for both electricity, and transport and
communication capital stock for Mauritius. This suggests that provision of infrastructure
stimulates sectoral output. Estimation results for Bangladesh are presented in Table 4.5.
In contrast to Mauritius estimates, most of the coefficient estimates for Bangladesh are sta-
tistically significant. I calculate elasticities for industry groups using these coefficients and
report the elasticity estimates in Table 4.6. Output elasticities of electricity capital stock for
all industry groups are positive. Elasticities are mostly positive for transport capital stock,
and negative and small for all industry groups for communication capital stock.
4.6 Conclusion
Estimated elasticities, in general, suggests that industry output is positively associ-
ated with infrastructure capital stock in both Mauritius and Bangladesh. Mauritius and
Bangladesh are quite different in terms of structure of economy. During 2011 to 2015 5-year
period service sector accounts for 73% in Mauritian economy, while only 56% in Bangladeshi
economy. In contrast, agriculture’s contribution in Bangladeshi economy is 18%, whereas
only 4% in in Mauritian economy. Despite differences in structure of economy, public in-
frastructure capital stocks appear to be important for economic activities in both countries.
Elasticity estimates are found to be related with the structure of economy. For example
output elasticity with respect to electricity capital stock is highest for finance sector in
Mauritius, and for manufacturing sector in Bangladesh. Output elasticity with respect to
transport is highest for both countries. Elasticity estimates for public communication capital
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stock are mostly negative in Bangladesh. This might be because of relatively smaller amount
of public investment in communication sector (Figure 4.2). The magnitudes of communi-
cation capital stock elasticities are also small, which indicates probable weaker relationship
between sectoral output and public communication infrastructure capital stock. Perhaps
private communication infrastructure capital stock is more relevant for economic activities
in Bangladesh.
Knowing the relationship between infrastructure capital stock and economic growth is
critical for the relatively resource scarce developing countries. Higher output elasticities
with respect to public infrastructure capital stock could encourage governments to relocate
resources for non-productive sectors to public infrastructure. For example many developing
countries spend substantial amount of money for food and energy subsidy, which left them
with fewer resources to invest in infrastructure. If public infrastructure stimulates economic
growth, then it will eventually result in increase in employment and income. It will ensure
more efficient use of resources and could increase social welfare. This could be studied in a
general equilibrium framework, where elasticity estimates from this paper can be used for
generating simulation results. This paper is a small step in direction of broader research
that examine trade offs and welfare consequences of public spending in productive and non-
productive sectors.
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Chapter V
Conclusion
I visit three important areas of government spending in my dissertation. In the first
essay, I analyze current expenditure per pupil and property tax revenue per pupil across
school districts in the USA, and examine how that varies with pollution level. Panel fixed
effect analysis for around 1000 metropolitan school districts from 1996 to 2008 academic
years suggests that pollution has negative impact on per pupil current expenditure and per
pupil property tax revenue. The policy implication of this exercise is that school districts
located in polluted areas require additional funding to ensure equity in public education.
In the second essay, I analyze the tariff differential subsidy program in Pakistan, and
find evidence in support of regressive nature of the subsidy. I then investigate whether poor
households in Pakistan would be more benefited if savings are created from energy subsidy
reform and distributed among the poor households through targeted transfer programs. I
conduct a computable general equilibrium exercise for Pakistan and find that reducing energy
subsidy would hurt both poor and non-poor households. However, making transfer payments
to poor households, would improve poor household’s welfare.
Finally in the third essay, I study how public infrastructure capital affects growth in
developing countries. This study contributes to literature by estimating output elasticities
with respect to public infrastructure capital stock for two developing countries – Mauritius
and Bangladesh. These two countries are different in terms of per capita income and structure
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of economy, and thereby provides an interesting contrast in this context. Estimated output
elasticities are mostly positive for both countries, which suggests that public infrastructure
stimulates economic growth in developing countries.
Education, social protection, and infrastructure are important facets of development
and social well being. My work finds that there are issues regarding equity, efficiency, and
allocation of resources in these sectors, which require policy attentions. Governments need
to address this issues for greater welfare. This work provides directions for future research
to facilitate appropriate policy formulations in this regard.
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Note: To examine the policy offset effect, I compare compound growth rate
of 3-digit ZIP code level Housing Price Index with compound growth rate
(over 3-year periods) of average property tax revenue per pupil at 3-digit
ZIP code level, from 1999 to 2008. Since I do not have school district level
housing price data, 3-digit ZIP code level HPI is the closest approximate.
If policy offset is 0, then compound growth rate of property tax revenue
per pupil would coincide with the orange line, where compound growth rate
of property tax revenue per pupil equals compound growth rate of HPI. If
policy offset is 1, i.e. full policy offset, then growth rates are 0 and will be on
the horizontal red line. Growth rates in between the upward sloping orange
line and horizontal red line indicates partial policy offsetting. In the figure,
85.4% of the observations lie in-between the orange and red lines. 5.1% of
the observations lie above the orange line,for which growth in property tax
revenue per pupil is higher than the growth in housing price index. And
the remaining 9.6% lie below the red line, for which growth in property tax
revenue is lower than the growth in housing price.
Figure 2.1: Policy Offsetting Effect
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Note: Initial property tax base is V0, which generates property tax revenue
R0. Property tax base increases from V0 to V1 due to decrease in pollution.
New property tax revenue can be R1 or R2 or R3 or R4 or R5, depending
on the elasticity of property tax rate and property tax base, EMV =
δm
δV
V
M
.
Figure 2.2: Elasticity and Policy Offsetting Effect Cases
80
55
00
60
00
65
00
70
00
75
00
80
00
Pr
op
er
ty
 T
ax
 R
ev
en
ue
35
00
40
00
45
00
50
00
55
00
St
at
e 
Re
ve
nu
e
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
State Revenue Property Tax Revenue
Figure 2.3: Trend in Average School District Revenue per Pupil
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Figure 2.4: Trend in Average Pollution Level
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Figure 2.5: Shift in State K-12 Financing Policy
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Figure 2.6: Compound Growth Rate of Pollution - 1992 to 2004 and Initial Pollution Level
83
0
5
10
15
%
 o
f E
xp
en
di
tu
re
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Pakistan India
Bangladesh
(a) Education (% of Expenditure)
0
1
2
3
%
 o
f G
DP
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Pakistan India
Bangladesh
(b) Education (% of GDP)
0
1
2
3
4
5
%
 o
f E
xp
en
di
tu
re
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Pakistan India
Bangladesh
(c) Health (% of Expenditure)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
%
 o
f G
DP
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Pakistan India
Bangladesh
(d) Health (% of GDP)
0
2
4
6
8
%
 o
f E
xp
en
di
tu
re
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Pakistan India
Bangladesh
(e) Social Welfare (% of Expenditure)
0
.
5
1
%
 o
f G
DP
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Pakistan India
Bangladesh
(f) Social Welfare (% of GDP)
Figure 3.1: Regional Comparison of Priority Sector Spending
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(c) Subsidy 2014
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(d) Recipient Households 2014
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(e) Subsidy 2016
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Tariff Differential Subsidy and Recipient Households by Con-
sumption Slab in Urban Areas
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(c) Subsidy 2014
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(d) Recipient Households 2014
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Tariff Differential Subsidy and Recipient Households by Con-
sumption Slab in Rural Areas
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Households by Consumption Slab and Expenditure Quintile in
Punjab Province
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(a) Urban 2012
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
 o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1−100 kWh 101−200 kWh
201−300 kWh 301−700 kWh
above 700 kWh
(b) Rural 2012
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
 o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1−100 kWh 101−200 kWh
201−300 kWh 301−700 kWh
above 700 kWh
(c) Urban 2014
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
 o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1−100 kWh 101−200 kWh
201−300 kWh 301−700 kWh
above 700 kWh
(d) Rural 2014
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
 o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1−100 kWh 101−200 kWh
201−300 kWh 301−700 kWh
above 700 kWh
(e) Urban 2016
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
 o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1−100 kWh 101−200 kWh
201−300 kWh 301−700 kWh
above 700 kWh
(f) Rural 2016
Figure 3.5: Distribution of Households by Consumption Slab and Expenditure Quintile in
Sindh Province
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of Households by Consumption Slab and Expenditure Quintile in
Balochistan Province
89
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
 o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1−100 kWh 101−200 kWh
201−300 kWh 301−700 kWh
above 700 kWh
(a) Urban 2012
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
 o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1−100 kWh 101−200 kWh
201−300 kWh 301−700 kWh
above 700 kWh
(b) Rural 2012
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
 o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1−100 kWh 101−200 kWh
201−300 kWh 301−700 kWh
above 700 kWh
(c) Urban 2014
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
 o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1−100 kWh 101−200 kWh
201−300 kWh 301−700 kWh
above 700 kWh
(d) Rural 2014
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
 o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1−100 kWh 101−200 kWh
201−300 kWh 301−700 kWh
above 700 kWh
(e) Urban 2016
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
%
 o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1−100 kWh 101−200 kWh
201−300 kWh 301−700 kWh
above 700 kWh
(f) Rural 2016
Figure 3.7: Distribution of Households by Consumption Slab and Expenditure Quintile in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of Tariff Differential Subsidy by Expenditure Quintile
91
0
2
4
6
8
Sh
ar
e 
of
 G
DP
 (%
)
1977 1983 1989 1995 2001 2007 2013
Electricity Transport & Communication
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Figure 4.2: Infrastructure Investment (as % of GDP) in Bangladesh
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Figure 4.3: Infrastructure Capital Stock in Mauritius
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Figure 4.4: Public Infrastructure Capital Stock in Bangladesh
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Figure 4.5: Average Annual Growth (over 5-year periods) of Infrastructure Capital Stock in
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Figure 4.6: Average Annual Growth (over 5-year periods) of Infrastructure Capital Stock in
Bangladesh
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Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Current Expenditure per Pupil 5505 10624.68 3679.15 4238.75 37030.79
Property Tax revenue per Pupil 5505 6277.20 4015.27 109.13 26446.41
School Quality Measure 5505 105.72 18.47 54.67 262.60
Cap-out Expenditure per Pupil 5505 1011.05 1490.39 0 38541.27
Total Debt per Pupil 5505 6248.76 5823.18 0 41126.63
Other Local Revenue Share 5505 10.24 7.17 0 80.32
State Revenue per Pupil 5505 4336.77 2407.34 52.11 32816.14
Housing Price Index 5505 126.54 32.99 76.71 237.83
Ozone Pollution 5180 85.01 7.84 44 111
NO2 Pollution 2885 22.01 5.78 6 37
PM10 Pollution 2725 28.62 5.92 14 45
SO2 Pollution 3825 72.22 39.73 16 373
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Table 2.2: Current Expenditure per Pupil -Linear Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Log Pollution -1,886*** -566.6* -469.3** -12.58
(422.1) (336.5) (235.9) (109.9)
Constant 19,854*** 13,612*** 11,575*** 12,013***
(1,865) (1,008) (780.7) (450.4)
Observations 5,180 2,885 2,725 3,825
R-squared 0.777 0.786 0.792 0.778
Number of District 1,036 577 545 765
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
97
Table 2.3: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil - Linear Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Log Pollution -2,905*** -1,311*** -99.54 -32.65
(365.6) (344.7) (210.6) (108.2)
School Quality 10.18*** 15.09*** 7.283** 12.95***
(3.451) (3.663) (3.085) (3.269)
Cap-out Expenditure 0.0377* 0.0445*** 0.0567 0.0537**
(0.0211) (0.0135) (0.0365) (0.0258)
Total debt 0.0491*** 0.0591*** 0.0524*** 0.0491***
(0.00469) (0.00648) (0.00632) (0.00628)
Other Local Revenue Share (%) -37.54*** -25.06*** -31.19*** -29.78***
(6.402) (6.078) (5.722) (4.857)
State revenue per pupil -0.176*** -0.211*** -0.158*** -0.195***
(0.0216) (0.0361) (0.0296) (0.0290)
Housing Price Index 7.416*** 2.698 5.434*** 12.17*
(2.072) (1.701) (1.889) (6.874)
Constant 18,175*** 10,251*** 5,052*** 4,785***
(1,651) (1,339) (837.3) (1,190)
Observations 5,180 2,885 2,725 3,825
R-squared 0.613 0.636 0.618 0.591
Number of District 1,036 577 545 765
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Current Expenditure per Pupil Specification - Wald F-statistic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Linear Model
γ1 = 0 19.96*** 2.84* 3.96** 0.01
(0.000) (0.093) (0.047) (0.909)
Quadratic Model
γ1 = γ2 = 0 10.17*** 4.12** 3.13** 1.59
(0.000) (0.017) (0.044) (0.205)
γ2=0 7.31*** 7.81*** 3.84** 3.18*
(0.007) (0.005) (0.051) (0.075)
Note: Null hypothesis are stated in the first column.
Prob > F in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.5: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil Specification - Wald F-statistic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Linear Model
β1 = 0 63.13*** 14.47*** 0.22 0.09
(0.000) (0.000) ( 0.637) (0.763)
Quadratic Model
β1 = β2 = 0 33.67*** 26.45*** 2.15 5.26***
( 0.000) (0.000) (0.117) (0.005)
β2=0 14.46*** 42.43*** 4.27** 10.07***
( 0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.002)
Note: Null hypothesis are stated in the first column.
Prob > F in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Current Expenditure per Pupil Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Log Pollution 30,253*** 8,891*** -8,177** -2,080*
(11,672) (3,270) (3,997) (1,175)
Log Pollution Squared -3,641*** -1,650*** 1,158* 240.1*
(1,347) (590.3) (590.8) (134.7)
Constant -52,408** -454.7 23,855*** 16,289***
(25,281) (4,498) (6,754) (2,543)
Observations 5,180 2,885 2,725 3,825
R-squared 0.778 0.789 0.793 0.779
Number of District 1,036 577 545 765
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Marginal Effects for Current Expenditure per Pupil
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percentiles Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
10 -1279.8*** -45.1 -1124.8** -333.0
(354.1) (317.3) (454.2) (220.5)
20 -1561.7*** -458.1 -914** -268.1
(369.3) (324.8) (365.1) (190.1)
30 -1833.0*** -646.7* -720.9** -210.9
(409.3) (349.6) (294.4) (165.3)
40 -2008.5*** -994.4** -542.6** -155.4
(445.4) (420.6) (246.7) (144.1)
50 -2094.7*** -1155.4** -458.4* -97.9
(465.4) (461.3) (233.2) (126.5)
60 -2264.0*** -1455.6*** -298.6 -39.6
(508.3) (545.2) (228.7) (115.3)
70 -2429.5*** -1730.7*** -149.1 24.5
(553.9) (628.5) (249.8) (113.0)
80 -2591.3*** -1984.7*** -8.7 91.7
(601.2) (708.8) (287.2) (122.5)
90 -2827.5*** -2440.5*** 187.2 215.2
(673.8) (858.3) (357.2) (163.0)
Observations 5,180 2,885 2,725 3,825
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Current Expenditure per Pupil With Control for Property Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Log Pollution 15,066 2,250 -5,451 -661.8
(10,933) (2,977) (3,605) (1,111)
Log Pollution Squared -1,791 -392.4 762.3 75.40
(1,261) (538.3) (531.6) (127.3)
Property Tax Revenue per Pupil 0.358*** 0.420*** 0.285*** 0.395***
(0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0418) (0.0371)
Constant -23,479 5,180 17,430*** 8,776***
(23,658) (4,036) (6,117) (2,474)
Observations 5,180 2,885 2,725 3,825
R-squared 0.802 0.824 0.811 0.811
Number of District 1,036 577 545 765
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.9: Current Expenditure per Pupil With Control for State Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Log Pollution 27,595*** 8,726*** -8,174** -2,505**
(10,577) (3,193) (3,680) (1,001)
Log Pollution Squared -3,368*** -1,628*** 1,159** 294.6**
(1,221) (569.2) (547.0) (114.7)
State Revenue per Pupil 0.330*** 0.336*** 0.233*** 0.317***
(0.0574) (0.0426) (0.0365) (0.0396)
Constant -47,176** -1,483 22,265*** 14,549***
(22,934) (4,452) (6,184) (2,139)
Observations 5,180 2,885 2,725 3,825
R-squared 0.816 0.821 0.818 0.812
Number of District 1,036 577 545 765
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Log Pollution 34,482*** 14,518*** -8,172** -2,833***
(9,671) (2,383) (3,942) (876.4)
Log Pollution Squared -4,235*** -2,761*** 1,213** 325.3***
(1,114) (423.8) (586.7) (102.5)
School Quality 10.21*** 16.21*** 6.469** 12.46***
(3.425) (3.687) (3.040) (3.215)
Cap-out Expenditure 0.0366* 0.0417*** 0.0576 0.0528**
(0.0213) (0.0138) (0.0366) (0.0258)
Total Debt 0.0488*** 0.0570*** 0.0519*** 0.0487***
(0.00467) (0.00635) (0.00624) (0.00623)
Other Local Revenue Share (%) -37.41*** -22.48*** -31.64*** -29.90***
(6.353) (6.173) (5.744) (4.836)
State Revenue per Pupil -0.176*** -0.212*** -0.157*** -0.192***
(0.0215) (0.0357) (0.0298) (0.0289)
Housing Price Index 6.650*** -3.183* 6.519*** 11.99*
(2.107) (1.860) (1.555) (6.985)
Constant -64,159*** -12,032*** 18,185*** 10,808***
(20,969) (3,366) (6,564) (2,165)
Observations 5,180 2,885 2,725 3,825
R-squared 0.614 0.649 0.619 0.594
Number of District 1,036 577 545 765
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.11: Marginal Effects for Property Tax Revenue per Pupil
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percentiles Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
10 -2200.9*** -433.6 -786.8* -466.2***
(312.9) (287.2) (418.5) (164.4)
20 -2528.9*** -1124.7*** -566.1* -378.3***
(319.6) (280.2) (330.1) (144.7)
30 -2844.6*** -1440.3*** -363.9 -300.8**
(346.8) (290.2) (261.3) (129.7)
40 -3048.7*** -2022*** -177.2 -225.7*
(373.3) (327.1) (218.5) (118.3)
50 -3148.9*** -2291.4*** -88.9 -147.7
(388.4) (350.7) (209.0) (110.6)
60 -3345.9*** -2793.7*** 78.4 -68.8
(421.2) (402.3) (214.6) (108.0)
70 -3538.4*** -3254.1*** 235 18.1
(456.7) (456.0) (245.2) (111.8)
80 -3726.7*** -3679*** 382 109.1
(494.0) (509.3) (289.5) (122.3)
90 -4001.4*** -4441.8*** 587.2 276.5
(551.9) (610.7) (365.7) (154.2)
Observations 5,180 2,885 2,725 3,825
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.12: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil - State Specific Time Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Log Pollution 12,906* 11,626*** -2,450 -2,136***
(7,806) (2,227) (3,217) (821.4)
Log Pollution Squared -1,513* -2,119*** 328.1 249.9**
(896.9) (397.3) (476.0) (96.96)
School Quality 12.11*** 17.89*** 8.775*** 13.74***
(3.456) (3.678) (3.071) (3.227)
Cap-out Expenditure 0.0457** 0.0510*** 0.0617* 0.0594**
(0.0193) (0.0135) (0.0333) (0.0238)
Total debt 0.0410*** 0.0529*** 0.0401*** 0.0407***
(0.00502) (0.00648) (0.00689) (0.00651)
Other Local Revenue Share (%) -40.61*** -23.63*** -36.14*** -32.89***
(6.408) (6.475) (5.974) (5.202)
State revenue per pupil -0.183*** -0.209*** -0.155*** -0.188***
(0.0225) (0.0359) (0.0291) (0.0284)
Housing Price Index 17.02*** 13.37*** 12.55*** 16.46***
(0.834) (1.122) (1.337) (0.859)
Constant -93,333*** -132,486*** -94,559*** -90,180***
(24,200) (22,879) (24,147) (20,375)
Observations 5,180 2,885 2,725 3,825
R-squared 0.553 0.602 0.559 0.550
Number of District 1,036 577 545 765
Year Fixed Effect No No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.13: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil - Dynamic Panel Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Log Pollution 36,942*** 11,300*** -5,931* -1,657**
(8,839) (1,837) (3,198) (712.2)
Log Pollution Squared -4,484*** -2,137*** 908.5* 191.7**
(1,022) (327.5) (475.5) (83.25)
Lagged Property Tax Revenue 0.358*** 0.525*** 0.474*** 0.562***
(0.115) (0.0338) (0.0439) (0.0324)
Total Debt 0.0457*** 0.0496*** 0.0451*** 0.0426***
(0.00430) (0.00542) (0.00547) (0.00522)
Other Local Revenue Share (%) -39.52*** -18.27*** -26.44*** -24.22***
(9.748) (4.823) (5.059) (4.005)
State revenue per pupil (consta -0.118*** -0.113*** -0.0957*** -0.0990***
(0.0240) (0.0221) (0.0199) (0.0172)
Housing Price Index 3.907** -4.487*** 4.520*** 15.97***
(1.545) (1.567) (0.892) (5.589)
Constant -71,107*** -9,902*** 12,522** 4,941***
(18,858) (2,521) (5,337) (1,755)
Observations 5,180 2,885 2,725 3,825
R-squared 0.665 0.720 0.692 0.690
Number of District 1,036 577 545 765
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.14: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil Regression Results - Weighted by Pupils
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Log Pollution 11,927* 9,145*** -1,528 -1,841***
(7,109) (1,267) (2,064) (554.6)
Log Pollution Squared -1,549* -1,782*** 273.2 202.7***
(809.0) (227.5) (306.2) (65.06)
School Quality 13.74*** 18.01*** 12.13*** 15.74***
(1.322) (1.865) (1.733) (1.646)
Cap-out Expenditure 0.0260*** 0.0446*** 0.0442*** 0.0407***
(0.00841) (0.0132) (0.0120) (0.0109)
Total debt 0.0356*** 0.0349*** 0.0329*** 0.0320***
(0.00301) (0.00420) (0.00398) (0.00381)
Other Local Revenue Share (%) -33.91*** -23.89*** -26.75*** -26.92***
(3.055) (4.236) (3.811) (3.722)
Housing Price Index 23.40*** 18.28*** 25.15*** 30.29***
(2.479) (3.279) (2.613) (3.846)
Constant -21,209 -8,965*** 2,479 4,537***
(15,649) (1,864) (3,566) (1,380)
Observations 5,180 2,885 2,725 3,825
R-squared 0.979 0.982 0.976 0.977
Number of District 1,036 577 545 765
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Analytic weights applied, where weights are average number of students.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.15: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil Regression - Including Assessment Limit States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Log Pollution 35,352*** 14,511*** -8,014** -2,863***
(9,608) (2,382) (3,971) (880.5)
Log Pollution Squared -4,334*** -2,761*** 1,185** 328.6***
(1,107) (424.0) (590.9) (102.9)
Assessment Limit * Log Pollution -43,178*** -18,693*** 3,792 3,194***
(9,875) (2,511) (4,154) (960.4)
Assessment Limit * Log Pollution Squared 5,314*** 3,468*** -589.1 -391.1***
(1,135) (445.3) (618.1) (116.2)
School Quality 8.928*** 13.01*** 7.465*** 11.87***
(2.627) (2.875) (2.299) (2.678)
Cap-out Expenditure 0.0325** 0.0386*** 0.0460* 0.0427*
(0.0161) (0.0114) (0.0270) (0.0236)
Total debt 0.0454*** 0.0525*** 0.0459*** 0.0464***
(0.00340) (0.00505) (0.00460) (0.00508)
Other Local Revenue Share (%) -33.38*** -21.79*** -29.26*** -28.65***
(4.945) (4.736) (4.210) (4.209)
State revenue per pupil -0.187*** -0.214*** -0.184*** -0.201***
(0.0206) (0.0308) (0.0290) (0.0273)
Housing Price Index 7.136*** -3.070* 7.063*** 12.68*
(2.014) (1.826) (1.547) (7.181)
Constant -39,072*** -5,029** 14,393*** 8,619***
(14,200) (2,299) (4,012) (1,787)
Observations 7,655 4,265 4,570 4,845
R-squared 0.596 0.630 0.582 0.588
Number of District 1,531 853 914 969
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.16: Spurious Regression Check - State Revenue per Pupil
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Log Pollution 8,063 490.3 -14.62 1,344
(10,522) (2,792) (6,114) (1,055)
Log Pollution Squared -825.8 -66.23 -3.381 -172.1
(1,210) (506.5) (901.8) (120.2)
Constant -15,501 2,966 3,976 2,266
(22,895) (3,894) (10,339) (2,307)
Observations 5,180 2,885 2,725 3,825
R-squared 0.437 0.446 0.388 0.434
Number of District 1,036 577 545 765
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.17: Property Tax Revenue - All Pollutant Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All No SO2 No PM10 No NO2 No Ozone
Log Ozone -3,455*** -3,680*** -4,426*** -3,076***
(723.4) (711.4) (593.6) (628.1)
Log NO2 -86.68 -275.9 -1,145*** -34.71
(380.9) (367.7) (377.7) (374.4)
Log PM10 -145.7 -93.99 -195.9 -84.20
(318.5) (301.4) (249.9) (312.8)
Log SO2 -137.8 -152.0 -114.0 -159.3
(136.6) (125.3) (133.5) (131.3)
School Quality 6.761* 6.359 12.67*** 12.50*** 7.413*
(3.987) (3.962) (3.698) (3.586) (4.060)
Cap-out Expenditure 0.00403 0.0197 0.0253* 0.0338** 0.00785
(0.0198) (0.0200) (0.0134) (0.0132) (0.0198)
Total debt 0.0629*** 0.0638*** 0.0599*** 0.0602*** 0.0640***
(0.00834) (0.00769) (0.00705) (0.00640) (0.00838)
Other Local Rev Share -19.87*** -22.65*** -25.40*** -26.54*** -18.75***
(6.807) (6.861) (6.193) (6.279) (6.648)
State revenue per pupil -0.150*** -0.152*** -0.204*** -0.205*** -0.155***
(0.0365) (0.0355) (0.0369) (0.0354) (0.0375)
Housing Price Index 2.040 2.013 7.861 7.459 2.492
(3.503) (4.691) (6.550) (6.391) (3.222)
Constant 22,008*** 22,871*** 29,275*** 29,185*** 6,372***
(3,543) (3,411) (3,229) (3,108) (1,935)
Observations 1,520 1,630 2,560 2,780 1,540
R-squared 0.643 0.648 0.650 0.655 0.634
Number of District 304 326 512 556 308
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.18: Minimum Monitor Distance Robustness Check - Ozone
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5 miles 9 miles 15 miles 20 miles
Log Ozone 29,175* 19,615* 4,078 3,095
(14,932) (10,351) (6,911) (5,954)
Log Ozone Squared -3,328* -2,297* -519.7 -403.9
(1,697) (1,179) (795.9) (688.1)
Constant -101,332*** -92,158*** -76,874*** -73,845***
(38,996) (28,356) (22,174) (20,264)
Observations 1,930 4,025 5,585 6,020
R-squared 0.508 0.550 0.552 0.547
Number of District 386 805 1,117 1,204
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: State, Local, and District controls are not reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.19: Minimum Monitor Distance Robustness Check - NO2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5 miles 9 miles 15 miles 20 miles
Log NO2 18,517*** 14,660*** 9,382*** 9,114***
(3,899) (2,987) (1,939) (1,731)
Log NO2 Squared -3,425*** -2,696*** -1,711*** -1,575***
(687.3) (521.0) (347.8) (312.0)
Constant -107,254*** -117,745*** -125,661*** -117,671***
(33,154) (23,325) (21,300) (19,841)
Observations 1,015 2,150 3,220 3,790
R-squared 0.594 0.604 0.600 0.590
Number of District 203 430 644 758
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: State, Local, and District controls are not reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.20: Minimum Monitor Distance Robustness Check - PM10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5 miles 9 miles 15 miles 20 miles
Log PM10 -1,020 -1,326 -1,233 1,145
(5,801) (4,037) (3,028) (2,832)
Log PM10 112.4 168.5 147.3 -216.2
(853.7) (594.5) (448.4) (421.2)
Constant -51,953 -112,071*** -84,178*** -73,560***
(35,216) (27,043) (23,881) (22,004)
Observations 1,070 2,105 3,065 3,660
R-squared 0.498 0.537 0.564 0.581
Number of District 214 421 613 732
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: State, Local, and District controls are not reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.21: Minimum Monitor Distance Robustness Check - SO2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5 miles 9 miles 15 miles 20 miles
Log SO2 -1,754 -2,129** -1,738** -1,395**
(1,130) (878.7) (749.8) (683.1)
Log SO2 Squared 196.8 235.3** 207.4** 172.7**
(132.2) (102.7) (89.77) (82.53)
Constant -68,638** -74,093*** -82,989*** -87,385***
(27,372) (20,833) (19,106) (18,374)
Observations 1,600 2,975 4,300 4,855
R-squared 0.480 0.545 0.563 0.555
Number of District 320 595 860 971
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: State, Local, and District controls are not reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
112
Table 2.22: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil - Unbalanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Log Pollution 31,145*** 11,342*** -1,143 -2,084***
(8,238) (2,215) (2,785) (663.8)
Log Pollution Squared -3,855*** -2,118*** 146.7 241.9***
(953.6) (393.6) (418.1) (79.16)
School Quality 10.07*** 17.21*** 9.060*** 13.06***
(3.341) (3.534) (2.762) (3.053)
Cap-out Expenditure 0.0358* 0.0422*** 0.0488* 0.0483**
(0.0203) (0.0126) (0.0282) (0.0239)
Total debt 0.0475*** 0.0529*** 0.0501*** 0.0490***
(0.00460) (0.00606) (0.00529) (0.00558)
Other Local Revenue Share (%) -35.83*** -24.36*** -30.66*** -27.51***
(6.209) (6.040) (5.124) (4.503)
State Revenue per Pupil -0.170*** -0.207*** -0.166*** -0.187***
(0.0213) (0.0357) (0.0288) (0.0276)
Housing Price Index 6.585*** 0.673 5.703*** 10.98*
(1.917) (1.726) (1.720) (6.063)
Constant -56,937*** -8,480*** 7,215 9,008***
(17,779) (3,082) (4,628) (1,678)
Observations 5,551 3,264 4,043 4,423
R-squared 0.616 0.640 0.616 0.597
Number of District 1,153 696 935 948
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
113
Table 2.23: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil - Different Time Sample - Ozone
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3-yr 3-yr 4-yr 4-yr
95-07 97-09 96-08 97-09
Log Ozone 27,075*** 32,000*** 41,410*** 33,855***
(8,695) (6,789) (10,887) (9,344)
Log Ozone Squared -3,347*** -4,013*** -5,032*** -4,209***
(1,002) (785.3) (1,252) (1,070)
School Quality 7.785** 19.50*** 9.940** 18.45***
(3.801) (3.155) (3.875) (3.100)
Cap-out Expenditure 0.0299 0.00936 0.0291 0.0131
(0.0228) (0.0134) (0.0247) (0.0167)
Total Debt 0.0452*** 0.0496*** 0.0455*** 0.0482***
(0.00842) (0.00533) (0.00888) (0.00562)
Other Local Revenue Share -34.82*** -42.07*** -30.57*** -40.67***
(7.847) (6.813) (6.891) (6.746)
State Revenue per Pupil -0.177*** -0.251*** -0.200*** -0.240***
(0.0222) (0.0283) (0.0296) (0.0286)
Housing Price Index 4.988 5.739*** 7.441*** 5.749***
(4.335) (1.665) (2.039) (1.651)
Constant -48,865*** -58,338*** -78,981*** -62,956***
(18,884) (14,704) (23,639) (20,411)
Observations 5,145 5,235 4,148 4,200
R-squared 0.580 0.653 0.616 0.641
Number of District 1,029 1,047 1,037 1,050
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.24: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil - Different Time Sample - NO2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3-yr 3-yr 4-yr 4-yr
95-07 97-09 96-08 97-09
Log NO2 8,753*** 19,849*** 16,710*** 20,903***
(2,956) (2,942) (2,670) (3,160)
Log NO2 Squared -1,673*** -3,563*** -3,078*** -3,687***
(508.4) (513.3) (470.4) (549.7)
School Quality 14.78*** 25.65*** 16.53*** 23.81***
(3.780) (4.006) (3.892) (3.735)
Cap-out Expenditure 0.0111 0.0112 0.0204 0.0284**
(0.0111) (0.0118) (0.0140) (0.0140)
Total Debt 0.0558*** 0.0561*** 0.0616*** 0.0538***
(0.00627) (0.00652) (0.00687) (0.00667)
Other Local Revenue Share -26.62*** -26.20*** -23.73*** -25.04***
(6.564) (8.222) (7.104) (7.185)
State Revenue per Pupil -0.244*** -0.318*** -0.242*** -0.297***
(0.0316) (0.0366) (0.0415) (0.0419)
Housing Price Index 16.51** 14.89*** 17.40** 15.63***
(7.495) (3.014) (8.174) (3.336)
Constant -6,691 -23,457*** -17,881*** -25,149***
(4,639) (4,480) (4,163) (4,829)
Observations 2,925 2,735 2,360 2,224
R-squared 0.615 0.691 0.658 0.678
Number of District 585 547 590 556
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.25: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil - Different Time Sample - PM10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3-yr 3-yr 4-yr 4-yr
95-07 97-09 96-08 97-09
Log PM10 -6,347* -4,117 -7,284* -2,597
(3,304) (4,483) (4,043) (4,417)
Log PM10 Squared 906.4* 551.3 1,068* 314.2
(487.4) (674.1) (606.1) (666.6)
School Quality 5.182 14.67*** 6.473** 14.56***
(3.187) (4.596) (3.277) (3.825)
Cap-out Expenditure 0.0420 0.0224 0.0419 0.0300
(0.0387) (0.0267) (0.0383) (0.0258)
Total Debt 0.0535*** 0.0482*** 0.0579*** 0.0477***
(0.00647) (0.00650) (0.00702) (0.00615)
Other Local Revenue Share -29.44*** -39.10*** -28.86*** -36.72***
(5.666) (8.152) (5.874) (7.067)
State revenue per Pupil -0.151*** -0.216*** -0.164*** -0.215***
(0.0277) (0.0330) (0.0357) (0.0363)
Housing Price Index 27.37*** 5.238*** 6.315*** 5.437***
(1.167) (1.836) (1.576) (1.761)
Constant 13,350** 11,633 17,458*** 9,901
(5,523) (7,368) (6,659) (7,264)
Observations 2,885 2,515 2,260 2,516
R-squared 0.596 0.619 0.630 0.621
Number of District 577 503 565 629
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.26: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil - Different Time Sample - SO2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3-yr 3-yr 4-yr 4-yr
95-07 97-09 96-08 97-09
Log SO2 -3,501*** -2,753*** -3,692*** -2,633***
(777.8) (782.7) (890.6) (818.9)
Log SO2 Squared 379.6*** 335.5*** 404.0*** 342.7***
(89.24) (90.87) (102.1) (96.92)
School Quality 8.292** 19.56*** 12.30*** 18.82***
(3.299) (3.954) (3.415) (3.672)
Cap-out Expenditure 0.0286 0.0252 0.0366 0.0406*
(0.0294) (0.0205) (0.0292) (0.0229)
Total debt 0.0513*** 0.0452*** 0.0559*** 0.0422***
(0.00616) (0.00711) (0.00669) (0.00742)
Other Local Revenue Share -24.42*** -33.60*** -25.90*** -32.25***
(5.194) (6.765) (4.833) (6.442)
State revenue per Pupil -0.185*** -0.270*** -0.220*** -0.248***
(0.0275) (0.0337) (0.0390) (0.0333)
Housing Price Index 4.501 17.26** 12.92* 8.677***
(6.170) (6.857) (7.275) (2.622)
Constant 13,490*** 9,101*** 12,410*** 9,611***
(1,877) (1,976) (2,106) (1,771)
Observations 3,880 3,485 3,120 2,884
R-squared 0.563 0.623 0.604 0.606
Number of District 776 697 780 721
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.27: Property Tax Revenue per Pupil - CBSA Relative Pollution Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ozone NO2 PM10 SO2
Relative Pollution -10.90** -11.09*** -5.826 -3.531***
(4.691) (4.222) (4.715) (1.177)
School Quality 10.98*** 16.22*** 7.265** 12.65***
(3.758) (3.765) (3.226) (3.217)
Cap-out Expenditure 0.0409* 0.0434*** 0.0575 0.0544**
(0.0227) (0.0140) (0.0391) (0.0260)
Total Debt 0.0501*** 0.0594*** 0.0522*** 0.0500***
(0.00505) (0.00667) (0.00653) (0.00645)
Other Local Revenue Share (%) -37.84*** -22.39*** -31.89*** -29.63***
(6.951) (5.929) (6.014) (4.917)
State revenue per Pupil -0.177*** -0.228*** -0.156*** -0.189***
(0.0227) (0.0381) (0.0302) (0.0302)
Housing Price Index 2.270 20.37*** 3.483*** 21.38***
(1.868) (2.372) (0.979) (2.625)
Constant 7,594*** 4,951*** 5,889*** 3,930***
(751.3) (740.6) (568.3) (523.8)
Observations 4,455 2,675 2,370 3,465
R-squared 0.616 0.639 0.610 0.599
Number of District 891 535 474 693
State-Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school district
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: NEPRA Tariff for Residential Consumption Exceeding 50 Units
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15
(Rs./kWh)
Punjab
1-100 kWh 3.9 7.9 6.8 9.4 12.1 11.6 9.7
101-200 kWh 7.0 10.6 8.7 12.4 15.0 14.5 11.6
201-300 kWh 7.0 10.6 8.6 12.4 15.0 14.5 11.6
301-700 kWh 9.3 13.0 11.2 15.0 17.2 16.2 14.5
above 700 kWh 10.8 14.5 13.5 16.6 18.8 18.1 16.2
Sindh
1-100 kWh 6.6 9.5 9.0 10.7 15.0 10.8 10.4
101-200 kWh 11.5 12.3 12.0 15.0 16.6 12.5 12.8
201-300 kWh 11.5 12.3 12.0 15.0 16.6 12.5 12.8
301-700 kWh 14.0 13.5 14.0 17.0 17.8 15.5 15.5
above 700 kWh 15.5 14.8 15.0 19.0 20.3 17.5 17.5
Balochistan
1-100 kWh 5.6 9.4 9.5 10.0 11.0 10.5 12.5
101-200 kWh 10.3 11.6 11.7 13.2 14.0 12.5 15.0
201-300 kWh 10.3 11.6 11.7 13.2 14.0 12.5 15.0
301-700 kWh 12.3 13.3 13.2 14.3 16.0 15.0 17.0
above 700 kWh 13.5 14.9 15.3 16.5 18.0 17.5 19.0
Khyber PK
1-100 kWh 6.2 9.8 9.0 11.5 15.0 12.9 13.3
101-200 kWh 11.0 15.2 10.0 15.5 16.5 15.4 16.9
201-300 kWh 11.0 15.2 10.0 15.5 16.5 15.4 16.9
301-700 kWh 13.4 11.1 11.0 17.5 18.5 17.2 18.0
above 700 kWh 14.8 17.5 13.5 19.5 20.5 18.3 19.0
Pakistan Avg.
1-100 kWh 5.6 9.2 8.6 10.4 13.3 11.4 11.5
101-200 kWh 9.9 12.4 10.6 14.0 15.5 13.7 14.1
201-300 kWh 9.9 12.4 10.6 14.0 15.5 13.7 14.1
301-700 kWh 12.2 12.7 12.3 15.9 17.4 16.0 16.2
above 700 kWh 13.6 15.4 14.3 17.9 19.4 17.8 17.9
Source: State of Industry Report, NEPRA, Various Issues.
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Table 3.5: GOP Notified Tariff for Residential Consumption Exceeding 50 Units
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15
(Rs./kWh)
1-100 kWh 3.4 4.2 4.5 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8
101-200 kWh 5.1 6.3 6.7 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1
201-300 kWh 5.1 6.3 6.7 8.1 8.1 12.1 10.2
301-700 kWh 8.3 10.2 10.7 12.3 12.3 16.0 16.0
above 700 kWh 10.0 12.7 13.3 15.1 15.1 18.0 18.0
Source: State of Industry Report, NEPRA, Various Issues.
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Table 3.6: Per Unit TDS for Residential Consumption Exceeding 50 Units
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15
(Rs./kWh)
Punjab
1-100 kWh 0.5 3.8 2.3 3.6 6.3 5.8 3.9
101-200 kWh 1.9 4.2 2.0 4.2 6.9 6.4 3.5
201-300 kWh 1.9 4.2 1.9 4.2 6.9 2.4 1.4
301-700 kWh 1.1 2.8 0.5 2.7 4.9 0.2 -1.5
above 700 kWh 0.8 1.8 0.2 1.5 3.7 0.1 -1.8
Sindh
1-100 kWh 3.2 5.3 4.6 4.9 9.2 5.0 4.6
101-200 kWh 6.4 6.0 5.3 6.9 8.5 4.4 4.7
201-300 kWh 6.4 6.0 5.3 6.9 8.5 0.4 2.6
301-700 kWh 5.7 3.3 3.4 4.7 5.4 -0.5 -0.5
above 700 kWh 5.5 2.1 1.7 3.9 5.2 -0.5 -0.5
Balochistan
1-100 kWh 2.2 5.2 5.1 4.2 5.2 4.7 6.7
101-200 kWh 5.1 5.3 5.0 5.1 5.9 4.4 6.9
201-300 kWh 5.1 5.3 5.0 5.1 5.9 0.4 4.8
301-700 kWh 4.0 3.0 2.6 2.0 3.7 -1.0 1.0
above 700 kWh 3.5 2.2 2.0 1.4 2.9 -0.5 1.0
Khyber PK
1-100 kWh 2.8 5.6 4.6 5.7 9.2 7.1 7.5
101-200 kWh 5.9 8.9 3.3 7.4 8.4 7.3 8.8
201-300 kWh 5.9 8.9 3.3 7.4 8.4 3.3 6.7
301-700 kWh 5.1 0.9 0.4 5.2 6.2 1.2 2.0
above 700 kWh 4.8 4.8 0.2 4.4 5.4 0.3 1.0
Pakistan Avg.
1-100 kWh 1.3 4.4 3.2 4.2 7.1 5.8 5.0
101-200 kWh 3.3 5.2 2.9 5.3 7.3 6.0 5.1
201-300 kWh 3.3 5.2 2.9 5.3 7.3 2.0 3.1
301-700 kWh 2.5 2.6 1.1 3.3 5.0 0.1 -0.4
above 700 kWh 2.2 2.2 0.6 2.4 4.2 -0.1 -0.7
Source: Author’s Calculation from State of Industry Report, NEPRA, Various Issues.
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Table 3.7: Minimum Amount of Subsidy by Consumption Slab
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15
(Rs.)
Punjab
1-100 kWh 27 192 118 185 319 295 200
101-200 kWh 54 380 232 367 633 584 396
201-300 kWh 240 804 428 791 1325 1286 707
301-700 kWh 425 1227 617 1213 2015 731 430
above 700 kWh 847 2339 833 2272 3974 0 0
Sindh
1-100 kWh 161 270 232 248 470 254 235
101-200 kWh 322 535 460 493 930 503 465
201-300 kWh 961 1136 989 1182 1781 878 933
301-700 kWh 1600 1734 1516 1869 2628 123 768
above 700 kWh 3894 3057 2855 3736 4796 0 0
Balochistan
1-100 kWh 113 267 258 215 266 240 342
101-200 kWh 226 528 510 426 527 475 678
201-300 kWh 740 1059 1007 935 1116 878 1383
301-700 kWh 1253 1587 1502 1441 1703 122 1441
above 700 kWh 2847 2799 2521 2228 3170 0 401
Khyber PK
1-100 kWh 141 286 232 291 470 360 380
101-200 kWh 282 570 458 578 929 713 755
201-300 kWh 871 1459 785 1317 1768 1455 1765
301-700 kWh 1459 2340 1109 2054 2605 985 2012
above 700 kWh 3493 2690 1249 4121 5072 0 781
Pakistan Avg.
1-100 kWh 68 223 164 214 364 294 257
101-200 kWh 138 442 324 425 720 583 510
201-300 kWh 472 959 615 952 1452 1197 1031
301-700 kWh 805 1474 901 1478 2182 599 915
above 700 kWh 1808 2530 1349 2798 4189 0 0
Note: From FY2014, the government switched electricity tariff structure to a ”previous-slab
benefit” structure from the ”all-slab benefit structure”, which limits subsidy benefits to heavy
electricity users. (Walker et al., 2014).
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Table 3.8: Maximum Amount of Subsidy by Consumption Slab
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15
(Rs.)
Punjab
1-100 kWh 52 376 230 362 626 578 393
101-200 kWh 238 800 426 786 1318 1220 746
201-300 kWh 424 1224 616 1210 2010 1527 850
301-700 kWh 846 2337 832 2270 3970 795 0
above 700 kWh
Sindh
1-100 kWh 316 529 455 486 921 499 461
101-200 kWh 955 1130 984 1175 1772 938 926
201-300 kWh 1594 1730 1513 1864 2623 919 1186
301-700 kWh 3888 3055 2853 3732 4791 0 568
above 700 kWh
Balochistan
1-100 kWh 221 523 505 421 521 471 671
101-200 kWh 735 1053 1002 930 1110 910 1360
201-300 kWh 1249 1584 1499 1439 1699 919 1858
301-700 kWh 2843 2797 2519 2227 3167 0 1840
above 700 kWh
Khyber PK
1-100 kWh 276 561 455 571 921 706 746
101-200 kWh 865 1450 782 1310 1760 1432 1625
201-300 kWh 1454 2339 1109 2049 2599 1780 2428
301-700 kWh 3488 2685 1249 4117 5067 1464 2790
above 700 kWh
Pakistan Avg.
1-100 kWh 134 436 321 420 713 577 505
101-200 kWh 468 954 613 947 1445 1175 1019
201-300 kWh 802 1472 900 1474 2177 1395 1334
301-700 kWh 1806 2528 1348 2796 4185 647 765
above 700 kWh
126
T
ab
le
3.
9:
A
ve
ra
ge
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
p
er
D
om
es
ti
c
C
on
n
ec
ti
on
20
08
-0
9
20
09
-1
0
20
10
-1
1
20
11
-1
2
20
12
-1
3
20
13
-1
4
20
14
-1
5
A
v
g.
A
n
n
u
al
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
(k
W
h
)
18
38
.5
6
18
61
.5
6
17
52
.8
9
18
50
.4
0
20
07
.8
2
21
12
.7
3
20
98
.6
4
A
v
g.
M
on
th
ly
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
(k
W
h
)
15
3.
21
15
5.
13
13
1.
47
15
4.
20
16
7.
32
17
6.
06
17
4.
89
A
v
g.
P
ri
ce
(R
s.
p
er
k
W
h
)
4.
44
5.
34
7.
48
8.
77
9.
16
9.
67
10
.6
7
A
v
g.
M
on
th
ly
E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
W
it
h
ou
t
G
S
T
(R
s.
)
65
3.
22
83
3.
53
11
11
.4
2
13
72
.4
5
15
76
.1
6
17
15
.7
3
18
62
.8
5
W
it
h
G
S
T
(R
s.
)
76
4.
27
97
5.
23
12
89
.2
5
15
92
.0
4
18
28
.3
5
20
07
.4
1
21
79
.5
4
A
v
g.
M
on
th
ly
S
u
b
si
d
y
B
en
efi
t
(R
s.
)
38
9.
77
60
8.
07
28
2.
62
62
9.
75
10
35
.5
1
48
6.
46
42
5.
50
S
ou
rc
e:
A
u
th
or
’s
ca
lc
u
la
ti
on
fr
om
S
ta
te
of
In
d
u
st
ry
R
ep
or
t,
N
E
P
R
A
,
V
ar
io
u
s
Is
su
es
.
127
Table 3.10: Distribution of Average Electricity Consumption per Household
Urban Urban Urban Rural Rural Rural
2011-12 2013-14 2015-16 2011-12 2013-14 2015-16
(kWh)
Punjab
1st Quintile 124.5 129.9 135.0 82.7 92.0 91.2
2nd Qunitile 158.1 156.5 164.1 102.5 109.2 113.5
3rd Quintile 176.9 182.4 183.8 127.4 125.8 128.9
4th Quintile 210.1 206.2 212.3 137.2 143.6 147.6
5th Quintile 291.7 260.1 293.2 164.8 162.8 196.3
Sindh
1st Quintile 93.6 106.9 116.2 58.4 54.4 60.5
2nd Qunitile 130.2 143.2 158.7 69.0 63.7 72.8
3rd Quintile 145.2 158.2 192.9 75.6 72.3 84.6
4th Quintile 167.1 190.0 221.0 92.4 83.5 94.2
5th Quintile 294.2 233.2 317.4 143.9 122.2 135.4
Balochistan
1st Quintile 101.0 102.8 117.6 77.2 67.3 90.5
2nd Qunitile 101.4 112.8 129.2 89.0 94.2 118.8
3rd Quintile 127.9 134.6 127.1 95.5 94.6 102.7
4th Quintile 124.8 135.2 139.6 102.7 102.5 106.0
5th Quintile 140.3 170.5 151.5 100.3 117.5 102.3
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
1st Quintile 119.4 141.0 156.0 102.8 113.7 102.0
2nd Qunitile 135.5 161.8 179.1 108.3 118.9 114.4
3rd Quintile 157.7 170.0 198.1 113.1 126.5 124.2
4th Quintile 152.3 188.7 224.4 122.0 133.6 152.6
5th Quintile 207.5 214.8 275.9 133.3 145.7 175.2
Pakistan Avg.
1st Quintile 112.8 124.1 131.0 81.6 76.6 83.3
2nd Qunitile 139.8 152.3 159.9 93.4 93.0 101.2
3rd Quintile 155.1 168.7 182.6 109.2 107.6 112.2
4th Quintile 179.7 197.1 209.4 123.0 124.3 132.3
5th Quintile 268.3 240.0 284.3 149.2 147.4 175.7
128
Table 3.11: Distribution of Average Subsidy per Household
Urban Urban Urban Rural Rural Rural
2011-12 2013-14 2015-16 2011-12 2013-14 2015-16
(Rs.)
Punjab
1st Quintile 472 744 464 307 539 340
2nd Qunitile 609 879 535 385 642 396
3rd Quintile 678 975 560 485 720 446
4th Quintile 812 1018 574 524 800 482
5th Quintile 1086 997 485 631 860 499
Sindh
1st Quintile 488 513 518 291 270 278
2nd Qunitile 714 641 688 354 313 335
3rd Quintile 806 679 771 391 352 388
4th Quintile 943 706 816 493 399 429
5th Quintile 1694 719 743 802 530 541
Balochistan
1st Quintile 443 472 791 333 314 609
2nd Qunitile 446 512 861 384 436 794
3rd Quintile 570 571 844 416 436 685
4th Quintile 558 583 915 446 463 708
5th Quintile 630 670 987 437 517 687
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
1st Quintile 735 982 1199 625 791 792
2nd Qunitile 845 1086 1376 663 819 887
3rd Quintile 998 1134 1516 697 868 971
4th Quintile 961 1195 1672 756 915 1172
5th Quintile 1327 1220 1833 829 959 1333
Pakistan Avg.
1st Quintile 529 709 678 374 430 413
2nd Qunitile 682 851 785 435 529 503
3rd Quintile 750 917 842 509 616 563
4th Quintile 846 964 895 578 699 656
5th Quintile 1260 974 856 695 796 753
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Table 3.14: Effective GST Rate for per Unit Residential Consumption
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15
(Rs./kWh)
Avg. GST Payment
i) on GOP Price 1.21 1.51 1.50 1.74 1.74 2.30 2.22
ii) if NEPRA Price 1.94 2.25 1.91 2.47 2.71 2.60 2.65
(%)
GST Rate 17 17 16 16 16 17 17
Effective GST Rate 10.59 11.42 12.50 11.28 10.29 15.04 14.27
Table 3.15: Macro Economic Indicators - Base Case
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Real GDP 100 100.2 98.9 102.6 109.8 113.9 121.0 126.7
Nominal GDP 100 120.4 129.7 146.8 176.4 192.6 235.6 245.4
Price Level 100 120.1 131.1 143.1 160.6 169.1 194.7 193.7
Inflation 0.0 20.1 9.1 9.2 12.2 5.3 15.1 -0.5
Tax Revenue/ GDP 22.3 21.5 21.0 20.3 20.2 19.5 19.8 19.0
Govt. Expenditure/ GDP 36.6 33.6 30.4 28.9 27.9 27.1 26.4 26.4
Govt. Deficit/ GDP -14.3 -12.1 -9.5 -8.6 -7.7 -7.6 -6.6 -7.3
Interest Rate 21.5 6.4 5.5 3.8 3.8 2.4 2.5 1.4
Exports/ GDP 15.7 16.1 17.1 18.6 15.2 20.8 20.0 23.9
Imports/ GDP 20.9 20.7 20.7 19.9 19.2 18.4 18.0 17.3
Trade Deficit/ GDP -5.2 -4.6 -3.6 -1.3 -3.9 2.3 2.0 6.6
Table 3.16: Macro Economic Indicators - Subsidy Reduction
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Real GDP 97.7 97.5 96.3 99.7 106.6 111.2 116.8 123.2
Nominal GDP 96.2 114.2 121.5 135.9 160.6 173.5 208.5 214.6
Price Level 98.4 117.1 126.2 136.3 150.6 156.0 178.6 174.2
Inflation 0.0 19.0 7.8 8.0 10.5 3.6 14.4 -2.5
Tax Revenue/ GDP 22.4 21.6 20.9 20.2 20.2 19.4 19.7 18.8
Govt. Expenditure/ GDP 36.9 34.1 29.9 28.5 27.2 26.5 25.7 25.8
Govt. Deficit/ GDP -14.6 -12.5 -8.9 -8.3 -7.0 -7.1 -6.0 -7.0
Interest Rate 20.3 5.9 4.9 3.3 3.2 2.0 2.0 1.1
Exports/ GDP 16.3 17.0 18.1 20.0 19.6 18.5 21.4 25.9
Imports/ GDP 21.5 21.3 21.4 20.5 20.0 19.2 18.8 18.1
Trade Deficit/ GDP -5.2 -4.3 -3.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.7 2.6 7.9
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Table 3.17: Macro Economic Indicators - Subsidy Reduction and Transfer of Savings
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Real GDP 98.4 96.0 95.4 98.5 104.9 108.1 115.0 120.6
Nominal GDP 103.5 109.5 115.1 124.8 145.1 151.1 183.5 193.5
Price Level 105.2 114.0 120.6 126.7 138.3 139.8 159.5 160.4
Inflation 0.0 8.4 5.8 5.1 9.2 1.0 14.1 0.6
Tax Revenue/ GDP 22.6 21.7 21.1 20.2 20.2 19.3 19.7 18.8
Govt. Expenditure/ GDP 36.2 38.4 33.6 28.4 27.1 27.1 25.3 25.0
Govt. Deficit/ GDP -13.5 -16.7 -12.5 -8.2 -6.9 -7.8 -5.7 -6.2
Interest Rate 9.4 3.2 3.1 2.1 2.3 1.3 1.6 -2.6
Exports/ GDP 15.2 18.1 17.8 20.4 19.4 23.2 21.1 24.8
Imports/ GDP 21.1 21.8 22.0 21.2 20.9 20.2 19.8 19.0
Trade Deficit/ GDP -5.9 -3.7 -4.2 -0.9 -1.5 3.0 1.3 5.8
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Table 4.3: Coefficient Estimates for Mauritius
(1) (2)
k = Electricity k = Transport&
Communication
γˆk 0.416 0.0184
(0.485) (0.279)
γˆk,Mining -0.359 -0.679
(0.610) -0.679
γˆk,Manufacturing 0.314*** 0.409*
(0.0815) (0.210)
γˆk,Construction -1.606*** 2.586***
(0.141) (0.0844)
γˆk,Trade -0.318** 1.211***
(0.128) (0.00850)
γˆk,F inance 0.926*** 0.318*
(0.136) (0.181)
γˆk,Other 0.412*** 0.867***
(0.0577) (0.0457)
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by sector
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.4: Elasticity Estimates for Mauritius
(1) (2)
Electricity Transport &
Communication
Agriculture 0.4159 0.0184
Mining 0.0570 -0.6602
Manufacturing 0.7295 0.4273
Construction -1.1905 2.6047
Trade 0.0975 1.2296
Finance 1.3423 0.3360
Other Services 0.8283 0.8855
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Table 4.5: Coefficient Estimates for Bangladesh
(1) (2) (3)
k = Electricity k = Transport k = Communication
γˆk 0.774** 0.0575 -0.290***
(0.340) (0.110) (0.0494)
γˆk,Mining 0.690*** -0.0226 0.441***
(0.00632) (0.0418) (0.0411)
γˆk,Manufacturing 0.768*** -0.0912*** 0.174***
(0.00758) (0.000189) (0.00640)
γˆk,Construction 0.286*** 0.493*** 0.0990***
(0.0376) (0.0327) (0.00571)
γˆk,Trade 0.371*** -0.00610 0.202***
(0.0256) (0.0298) (0.00262)
γˆk,F inance 0.301*** -0.122*** 0.191***
(0.00166) (0.00778) (0.0119)
γˆk,Other -0.0810*** -0.0146 0.142***
(0.0221) (0.0209) (0.00560)
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by sector
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.6: Elasticity Estimates for Bangladesh
(1) (2) (3)
Electricity Transport Communication
Agriculture 0.7743 0.0575 -0.2899
Mining 1.4639 0.0349 0.1511
Manufacturing 1.5426 -0.0337 -0.1157
Construction 1.0603 0.5501 -0.1910
Trade 1.1449 0.0514 -0.0880
Finance 1.0757 -0.0641 -0.0986
Other Service 0.6933 0.0429 -0.1477
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Appendix A: Pollution Measures
Measure Rules
Ozone Annual 4th highest daily max-
imum
1. 75% of the days within ozone monitoring season (at
least 135 days).
2. 75% of the hourly averages for the 8-hour period
are available (at least 18 observations per day); or if
the daily maximum 8-hour average concentration for
the day is greater than the level of the standard (0.075
ppm).
3. 8-hour average to be reported to the 3rd decimal
place; additional digits to the right of the 3rd decimal
place shall be truncated.
4. 3-year average of annual 4th highest daily maxi-
mum 8-hour average shall be reported to 3 decimal
places; digits to the right of the 3rd decimal place
shall be truncated.
Source: Federal Register Vol. 73 No. 60 pp. 16511 –
16512.
NO2 Annual arithmetic mean of all
of the reported 1-hour values
1. At least 75% of the hours in the year are reported
(at least 180 days – in line with 98th percentile crite-
ria).
2. Annual mean shall be rounded to the nearest whole
number.
Source: Federal Register Vol. 75 No. 26 pp. 6532 –
6534.
PM10 Annual arithmetic mean of
4 quarterly means concentra-
tions
1. 75% of the scheduled PM10 samples per quarter
(at least 11 days).
2. Quarterly average must be rounded to nearest 10th.
3. Annual average must be rounded to nearest 10th.
4. 3-year average shall be rounded to nearest integer.
Source: Federal Register Vol. 52 No. 126 pp. 24667
– 24669.
SO2 99
th percentile of 1-hour daily
maximum concentration
1. 4 quarters are complete 75% (at least 50%) of
sampling days for each quarter (at least 45 days).
2. 75% of hourly concentration value (at least 18 ob-
servations).
3. 99th percentile are not rounded.
4. 3-year average is rounded to nearest whole number.
Source: Federal Register Vol. 75 No. 119 pp. 35596
– 35597.
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Appendix B: Derivation of Infrastructure Elasticity
Estimation Equation
The cost function of nth sector is:
Cn = c(w, r,Qn, A,GE, GT ) (A1)
The cost function can be written in following trans-log form:
lnC = α0 + αq lnQ + αl lnw + αk ln r + αE lnGE + αT lnGT + αa lnA
+
1
2
(
βqq(lnQ)
2 + βll(lnw)
2 + βkk(ln r)
2 + βEE(lnGE)
2 + βTT (lnGT )
2 + βaa(lnA)
2
)
+ βql lnQ lnw + βqk lnQ ln r + βqa lnQ lnA + βqE lnQ lnGE + βqT lnQ lnGT
+
1
2
(
βlk lnw ln r + βla lnw lnA+ βlE lnw lnGE + βlT lnw lnGT
+ βkl ln r lnw + βka ln r lnA+ βkE ln r lnGE + βkT ln r lnGT
+ βal lnA lnw + βak lnA ln r + βaE ln a lnGE + βaT ln a lnGT
+ βEl lnGE lnw + βEk lnGE ln r + βEa lnGE ln a+ βET lnGE lnGT
+ βT l lnGT lnw + βTk lnGT ln r + βTa lnGT ln a+ βTE lnGT lnGE
)
(A2)
Differentiating Equation A2 with respect to lnw yields:
δ lnC
δ lnw
= αl + βql lnQ + βll lnw
+
1
2
(
βlk ln r + βla lnA+ βlE lnGE + βlT lnGT
+ βkl ln r + βal lnA + βEl lnGE + βT l lnGT
) (A3)
Assuming symmetry, that is, βij = βji, Equation A3 becomes:
δ lnC
δ lnw
= αl + βql lnQ + βll lnw
+ βlk ln r + βla lnA+ βlE lnGE + βlT lnGT
(A4)
Applying Shephard’s Lemma to Equation A4 yields:
Xl
w
c
= αl + βql lnQ+ βll lnw + βlk ln r + βla lnA + βlE lnGE + βlT lnGT (A5)
Similarly differentiating Equation A2 with respect to ln r and applying Shephard’s Lemma
yields:
Xk
r
c
= αk + βqk lnQ+ βkk ln r + βkl lnw + βka lnA+ βkE lnGE + βkT lnGT (A6)
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Dividing Equation A5 by Equation A6, and rearranging yields:
lnQ =
1
wXlβqk − rXkβql
[
(rXkαl − wXlαk) + (rXkβla − wXlβka) lnA
+ (rXkβll − wXlβkl) lnw + (rXkβlk − wXlβkk) ln r
+ (rXkβlE − wXlβkE) lnGE + (rXkβlT − wXlβkT ) lnGT
] (A7)
Let,
i) η0 =
rXkαl − wXlαk
wXlβqk − rXkβql
ii) ηa =
rXkβla − wXlβka
wXlβqk − rXkβql
iii) ηl =
rXkβll − wXlβkl
wXlβqk − rXkβql
iv) ηk =
rXkβlk − wXlβkk
wXlβqk − rXkβql
v) ηE =
rXkβlE − wXlβkE
wXlβqk − rXkβql
vi) ηT =
rXkβlT − wXlβkT
wXlβqk − rXkβql
(A8)
Hence,
lnQ = η0 + ηa lnA+ ηl lnw + ηk ln r + ηE lnGE + ηT lnGT (A9)
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Appendix C: Aggregation of Industry Groups for
Mauritius
1976 – 1991 1992 – 2005 2006 – 2016
1. Agriculture, hunting,
forestry and fishing
1. Agriculture, hunting,
forestry and fishing
1. Agriculture, forestry and
fishing
2. Mining and quarrying 2. Mining and quarrying 2. Mining and quarrying
3. Manufacturing 3. Manufacturing 3. Manufacturing
4. Electricity , gas and water
supply
4. Electricity , gas and water
supply
4. Electricity, gas, steam and
air conditioning supply
5. Water supply, sewerage,
waste management and reme-
diation
5. Construction 5. Construction 6. Construction
6. Wholesale & retail trade,
restaurants & hotels
6. Wholesale & retail trade,
repair of motor vehicles, mo-
torcycles, personal & house-
hold goods
7. Hotels and restaurants 8. Accommodation and food
service activities
7. Transport , storage and
communications
8. Transport , storage and
communications
9. Transportation and storage
10 Information and communi-
cation
8. Financing, insurance, real
estate and business
9. Financial intermediation 11. Financial intermediation
10 Real estate, renting and
business activities
12. Real estate activities
13. Administrative and sup-
port service activities
14. Professional, scientific
and technical activities
9. Producers of Government
services
11. Public administration and
defense; compulsory social se-
curity
15. Public administration and
defense; compulsory social se-
curity
10 Other services 12. Education 16. Education
13. Health and social work 17. Human health and social
work activities
14. Other community, social
and personal service activities
and private households with
employed persons
18. Arts, entertainment and
recreation Professional
19. Other service activities
145
References
Age´nor, Pierre-Richard, & Moreno-Dodson, Blanca. 2006. Public Infrastructure and Growth:
New Channels and Policy Implications. Policy Research Working Paper 4064. The World
Bank.
Albala-Bertrand, Jose´ M, & Mamatzakis, Emmanuel C. 2004. The impact of public infras-
tructure on the productivity of the Chilean economy. Review of Development Economics,
8(2), 266–278.
Anderson, Nathan B, et al. 2006. Property Tax Limitations: An Interpretative Review.
National Tax Journal, 59(3), 685–94.
Anderson, Robert J, & Crocker, Thomas D. 1971. Air Pollution and Residential Property
Values. Urban Studies, 8(3), 171–180.
Arslanalp, Serkan, Bornhorst, Fabian, Gupta, Sanjeev, Sze, Elsa, et al. 2010. Public capital
and growth. IMF Working Paper10/175. International Monetary Fund.
Aschauer, David Alan. 1989. Is public expenditure productive? Journal of monetary eco-
nomics, 23(2), 177–200.
Aschauer, David Alan. 2000. Public capital and economic growth: issues of quantity, finance,
and efficiency. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 48(2), 391–406.
Baker, Bruce D. 2012. Revisiting the Age-Old Question: Does Money Matter in Education?.
Albert Shanker Institute.
Banzhaf, H Spencer, & Walsh, Randall P. 2008. Do People Vote with Their Feet? An
Empirical Test of Tiebout. The American Economic Review, 98(3), 843.
Bayer, Patrick, Ferreira, Fernando, & McMillan, Robert. 2007. A Unified Framework for
Measuring Preferences for Schools and Neighborhoods. Journal of Political Economy,
115(4), 588–638.
Bayer, Patrick, Keohane, Nathaniel, & Timmins, Christopher. 2009. Migration and hedonic
valuation: The case of air quality. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
58(1), 1–14.
146
Caldero´n, Ce´sar, & Serve´n, Luis. 2004. The effects of infrastructure development on growth
and income distribution. Policy Research Working Paper 3400. The World Bank.
Ceballo, Rosario, McLoyd, Vonnie C, & Toyokawa, Teru. 2004. The influence of neighborhood
quality on adolescents educational values and school effort. Journal of Adolescent Research,
19(6), 716–739.
Cellini, Stephanie Riegg, Ferreira, Fernando, & Rothstein, Jesse. 2010. The value of school
facility investments: Evidence from a dynamic regression discontinuity design. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 125(1).
Champaloux, Steven W, & Young, Deborah R. 2015. Childhood chronic health conditions
and educational attainment: a social ecological approach. Journal of Adolescent Health,
56(1), 98–105.
Chay, Kenneth Y, & Greenstone, Michael. 2003. The Impact of Air Pollution on Infant Mor-
tality: Evidence from Geographic Variation in Pollution Shocks Induced by a Recession.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3), 1121–1167.
Chay, Kenneth Y, & Greenstone, Michael. 2005. Does air quality matter? Evidence from
the housing market. Journal of political economy, 113(2), 376–424.
Chen, Lei, Jennison, Brian L, Yang, Wei, & Omaye, Stanley T. 2000. Elementary school
absenteeism and air pollution. Inhalation Toxicology, 12(11), 997–1016.
Christensen, Laurits R, Jorgenson, Dale W, & Lau, Lawrence J. 1973. Transcendental
logarithmic production frontiers. The review of economics and statistics, 28–45.
Clements, Mr Benedict J, Coady, David, Fabrizio, Ms Stefania, Gupta, Mr Sanjeev, Alleyne,
Mr Trevor Serge Coleridge, & Sdralevich, Mr Carlo A. 2013. Energy subsidy reform:
lessons and implications. International Monetary Fund.
Clotfelter, Charles, Ladd, Helen F, Vigdor, Jacob, & Wheeler, Justin. 2006. High-poverty
schools and the distribution of teachers and principals. North Carolina Law Review, 85,
1345.
Clotfelter, Charles T, Ladd, Helen F, & Vigdor, Jacob L. 2011. Teacher mobility, school
segregation, and pay-based policies to level the playing field. Education, 6(3), 399–438.
Coady, David, Parry, Ian WH, Sears, Louis, & Shang, Baoping. 2015. How large are global
energy subsidies? IMF Working Paper 15/105. International Monetary Fund.
Crosnoe, Robert. 2006. Health and the education of children from racial/ethnic minority
and immigrant families. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 47(1), 77–93.
147
Crump, Casey, Rivera, Diana, London, Rebecca, Landau, Melinda, Erlendson, Bill, & Ro-
driguez, Eunice. 2013. Chronic health conditions and school performance among children
and youth. Annals of epidemiology, 23(4), 179–184.
Currie, Janet, & Almond, Douglas. 2011. Human capital development before age five. Hand-
book of labor economics, 4, 1315–1486.
Currie, Janet, Neidell, Matthew, & Schmieder, Johannes F. 2009a. Air pollution and infant
health: Lessons from New Jersey. Journal of health economics, 28(3), 688–703.
Currie, Janet, Hanushek, Eric A, Kahn, E Megan, Neidell, Matthew, & Rivkin, Steven G.
2009b. Does pollution increase school absences? The Review of Economics and Statistics,
91(4), 682–694.
Currie, Janet, Davis, Lucas, Greenstone, Michael, & Walker, Reed. 2015. Environmental
health risks and housing values: evidence from 1,600 toxic plant openings and closings.
The American Economic Review, 105(2), 678–709.
Debowicz, Dar´ıo, Dorosh, Paul, Haider, Hamza Syed, & Robinson, Sherman. 2013. A disag-
gregated and macro-consistent social accounting matrix for Pakistan. Journal of Economic
Structures, 2(1), 4.
del Granado, Francisco Javier Arze, Coady, David, & Gillingham, Robert. 2012. The un-
equal benefits of fuel subsidies: A review of evidence for developing countries. World
Development, 40(11), 2234–2248.
Dennis, Allen. 2016. Household welfare implications of fossil fuel subsidy reforms in devel-
oping countries. Energy Policy, 96, 597–606.
Dewey, James, Husted, Thomas A, & Kenny, Lawrence W. 2000. The ineffectiveness of
school inputs: a product of misspecification? Economics of Education Review, 19(1),
27–45.
Eide, Eric, & Showalter, Mark H. 1998. The effect of school quality on student performance:
A quantile regression approach. Economics letters, 58(3), 345–350.
Feltenstein, Andrew, & Cyan, Musharraf R. 2013. A computational general equilibrium
approach to sectoral analysis for tax potential: an application to Pakistan. Journal of
Asian Economics, 27, 57–70.
Feltenstein, Andrew, & Ha, Jiming. 1995. The role of infrastructure in Mexican economic
reform. The World Bank Economic Review, 9(2), 287–304.
Feltenstein, Andrew, & Shamloo, Maral. 2013. Tax reform, the informal economy, and bank
financing of capital formation. International Tax and Public Finance, 20(1), 1–28.
148
Feltenstein, Andrew, Mejia, Carolina, Newhouse, David, & Sedrakyan, Gohar. 2017. The
Poverty Implications of Alternative Tax Reforms: Results from A Numerical Application
to Pakistan. Working paper.
Frankel, Jeffrey A. 2010. Mauritius: African success story. NBER Working Paper No. 16569.
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gilliland, Frank D, Berhane, Kiros, Rappaport, Edward B, Thomas, Duncan C, Avol, Ed-
ward, Gauderman, W James, London, Stephanie J, Margolis, Helene G, McConnell, Rob,
Islam, K Talat, et al. 2001. The effects of ambient air pollution on school absenteeism due
to respiratory illnesses. Epidemiology, 12(1), 43–54.
Gramlich, Edward M. 1994. Infrastructure investment: A review essay. Journal of economic
literature, 32(3), 1176–1196.
Gulzar, Ahmed, Junaid, Novaira, & Haider, Adnan. 2010. What is hidden, in the hidden
economy of Pakistan? Size, causes, issues, and implications. The Pakistan Development
Review, 665–704.
Gupta, Sanjeev, Kangur, Alvar, Papageorgiou, Chris, & Wane, Abdoul. 2014. Efficiency-
adjusted public capital and growth. World Development, 57, 164–178.
Haas, Steven A, & Fosse, Nathan Edward. 2008. Health and the educational attainment of
adolescents: Evidence from the NLSY97. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 49(2),
178–192.
Ham, J. C., Zweig, J. S., & Avol, E. 2014. Pollution, Test Scores and the Distribution of
Academic Achievement: Evidence from California Schools 2002-2008.
Hanushek, Eric A. 1979. Conceptual and empirical issues in the estimation of educational
production functions. The Journal of Human Resources, 14(3), 351–388.
Hanushek, Eric A. 1986. The economics of schooling: Production and efficiency in public
schools. Journal of economic literature, 24(3), 1141–1177.
Hanushek, Eric A. 1997. Assessing the effects of school resources on student performance:
An update. Educational evaluation and policy analysis, 19(2), 141–164.
Hanushek, Eric A, Kain, John F, & Rivkin, Steven G. 2004. Why public schools lose teachers.
Journal of human resources, 39(2), 326–354.
Harberger, Arnold C. 1978. Perspective on Capital and Technology in Less-Developed Coun-
tries. In: Artis, MJ, & Nobay, AR (eds), Contemporary Economic Analysis. Croom Helm
Ltd, London.
Harrison, David, & Rubinfeld, Daniel L. 1978. Hedonic housing prices and the demand for
clean air. Journal of environmental economics and management, 5(1), 81–102.
149
Haverinen-Shaughnessy, Ulla, Moschandreas, DJ, & Shaughnessy, RJ. 2011. Association be-
tween substandard classroom ventilation rates and students academic achievement. Indoor
air, 21(2), 121–131.
Hedges, Larry V, Laine, Richard D, & Greenwald, Rob. 1994. An exchange: Part I: Does
money matter? A meta-analysis of studies of the effects of differential school inputs on
student outcomes. Educational researcher, 23(3), 5–14.
IMF. 2017. Estimating Public, Private, and PPP Capital Stocks. IMF Investment and
Capital Stock Database 2017: Manual and FAQ. International Monetary Fund.
Isaksson, Anders. 2010. Public capital, infrastructure and industrial development. Research
and Statistics Branch Working Paper 15/2009.
Isen, Adam, Rossin-Slater, Maya, & Walker, W Reed. 2015. Every Breath You TakeEvery
Dollar Youll Make: The Long-Term Consequences of the Clean Air Act of 1970.
Jankee, K. 1999. Financial liberalisation and monetary control reform in Mauritius. Univer-
sity of Mauritius Research Journal, 2(1), 9–28.
Jiang, Zhujun, Ouyang, Xiaoling, & Huang, Guangxiao. 2015. The distributional impacts of
removing energy subsidies in China. China Economic Review, 33, 111–122.
Kenyon, Daphne A. 2007. The Property Tax - School Funding Dilemma. Lincoln Institute
of Land Policy.
Koedel, Cory. 2008. Teacher quality and dropout outcomes in a large, urban school district.
Journal of urban economics, 64(3), 560–572.
Ladd, Helen, & Loeb, Susanna. 2013. The Challenges of Measuring School Quality: Impli-
cations for Educational Equity. Pages 22–55 of: Allen, D, & Reich, R (eds), Education,
Justice, and Democracy. University of Chicago Press.
Lankford, Hamilton, Loeb, Susanna, & Wyckoff, James. 2002. Teacher sorting and the plight
of urban schools: A descriptive analysis. Educational evaluation and policy analysis, 24(1),
37–62.
Lavy, Victor, Ebenstein, Avraham, & Roth, Sefi. 2014. The Impact of Short Term Exposure
to Ambient Air Pollution on Cognitive Performance and Human Capital Formation. Tech.
rept. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lucas, Robert E. 1988. On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of monetary
economics, 22(1), 3–42.
Ludwig, Jens, & Bassi, Laurie J. 1999. The puzzling case of school resources and student
achievement. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 21(4), 385–403.
150
Lutz, Byron F. 2008. The Connection Between House Price Appreciation and Property Tax
Revenues*. National Tax Journal, 61(3), 555.
Mensah, Yaw M, Schoderbek, Michael P, & Sahay, Savita P. 2013. The effect of adminis-
trative pay and local property taxes on student achievement scores: Evidence from New
Jersey public schools. Economics of Education Review, 34, 1–16.
Miller, Sebastia´n J, & Vela, Mauricio A. 2013. The Effects of Air Pollution on Educational
Outcomes: Evidence from Chile. IDB Working Paper (Department of Research and Chief
Economist); IDB-WP-468.
Mohai, Paul, Kweon, Byoung-Suk, Lee, Sangyun, & Ard, Kerry. 2011. Air pollution around
schools is linked to poorer student health and academic performance. Health Affairs,
30(5), 852–862.
Murray, Sheila E, Evans, William N, Schwab, Robert M, et al. 1998. Education-Finance
Reform and the Distribution of Education Resources. American Economic Review, 88(4),
789–812.
Musgrave, Richard A. 1964. Efficiency vs. Equity in Public Finance. Review of Social
Economy, 22(1), 1–6.
Nehru, Vikram, & Dhareshwar, Ashok. 1993. A new database on physical capital stock:
sources, methodology and results. Revista de ana´lisis econo´mico, 8(1), 37–59.
Papke, Leslie E. 2005. The effects of spending on test pass rates: evidence from Michigan.
Journal of Public Economics, 89(5), 821–839.
Pastor, Manuel, Sadd, James L, & Morello-Frosch, Rachel. 2004. Reading, writing, and
toxics: children’s health, academic performance, and environmental justice in Los Angeles.
Environment and Planning C, 22(2), 271–290.
Paul, Satya. 2003. Effects of public infrastructure on cost structure and productivity in the
private sector. Economic Record, 79(247), 446–461.
Qayyum, Abdul. 2005. Modelling the demand for money in Pakistan. The Pakistan Devel-
opment Review, 233–252.
Ransom, M. R., & Pope, I. C. 2013. Air Pollution and School Absenteeism: Results from a
Natural Experiment. Tech. rept. IZA Workshop of Labor Market Effects of Environmental
Policies.
Ransom, Michael R, & Pope, C Arden. 1992. Elementary school absences and PM 10
pollution in Utah Valley. Environmental research, 58(1), 204–219.
Rentschler, Jun. 2016. Incidence and impact: The regional variation of poverty effects due
to fossil fuel subsidy reform. Energy Policy, 96, 491–503.
151
Ridker, Ronald G, & Henning, John A. 1967. The determinants of residential property values
with special reference to air pollution. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 246–257.
Rivkin, Steven G, Hanushek, Eric A, & Kain, John F. 2005. Teachers, schools, and academic
achievement. Econometrica, 417–458.
Rockoff, Jonah E. 2004. The impact of individual teachers on student achievement: Evidence
from panel data. American Economic Review, 247–252.
Romp, Ward, De Haan, Jakob, et al. 2005. Public capital and economic growth: a critical
survey. EIB papers, 10(1), 40–70.
Ross, Justin M, & Nguyen-Hoang, Phuong. 2013. School District Income Taxes: New Rev-
enue or a Property Tax Substitute? Public Budgeting & Finance, 33(2), 19–40.
Sander, William. 1993. Expenditures and student achievement in Illinois: New evidence.
Journal of Public Economics, 52(3), 403–416.
Sander, William. 1999. Endogenous expenditures and student achievement. Economics
letters, 64(2), 223–231.
Sanders, Nicholas J. 2012. What doesnt kill you makes you weaker prenatal pollution expo-
sure and educational outcomes. Journal of Human Resources, 47(3), 826–850.
Schwartz, J. 2004. Air pollution and children’s health. Pediatrics, 113(Supplement 3),
1037–1043.
Sieg, Holger, Smith, V Kerry, Banzhaf, H Spencer, & Walsh, Randy. 2004. Estimating
the general equilibrium benefits of large policy changes: the Clean Air Act revisited.
International Economic Review, 45(4), 1047–1077.
Smith, V, & Huang, Ju-Chin. 1995. Can Markets Value Air Quality? A Meta-analysis of
Hedonic Property Value Models. Journal of Political Economy, 103(1), 209–27.
Snyder, Thomas D, Brey, Cristobal de, & Dillow, Sally A. 2016. Digest of education statistics
2014. National Center for Education Statistics.
Stafford, Tess M. 2015. Indoor air quality and academic performance. Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management, 70, 34–50.
Straub, Ste´phane. 2008. Infrastructure and Growth in Developing Countries: Recent Ad-
vances and Research Challenges. Policy Research Working Paper 4460. The World Bank.
Straub, Ste´phane, Vellutini, Charles, & Warlters, Michael. 2008. The effects of infrastructure
development on growth and income distribution. Policy Research Working Paper 4589. The
World Bank.
152
Sutton, Alice, & Soderstrom, Irina. 1999. Predicting elementary and secondary school
achievement with school-related and demographic factors. The Journal of Educational
Research, 92(6), 330–338.
Taylor, Corrine. 1998. Does money matter? An empirical study introducing resource costs
and student needs to educational production function analysis. W. Fowler (ed.), 75–97.
Thompson, Franklin T. 2002. Student achievement, selected environmental characteristics,
and neighborhood type. The Urban Review, 34(3), 277–292.
UNDP. 2016. The Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone.
Annual Human Development Report. United Nations Development Programme.
Walker, Thomas, Sahin, Sebnem, Saqib, Mohammad, & Mayer, Kristy. 2014. Reforming
Electricity Subsidies in Pakistan: Measures to Protect the Poor. Policy Paper Series on
Pakistan PK 24/12. The World Bank.
Weimer, David L, & Wolkoff, Michael J. 2001. School performance and housing values: Using
non-contiguous district and incorporation boundaries to identify school effects. National
Tax Journal, 231–253.
Wenglinsky, Harold. 1997. How Money Matters: The Effect of School District Spending on
Academic Achievement. Sociology of Education, 70(3), 221–37.
Wesseh, Presley K, Lin, Boqiang, & Atsagli, Philip. 2016. Environmental and welfare as-
sessment of fossil-fuels subsidies removal: A computable general equilibrium analysis for
Ghana. Energy, 116, 1172–1179.
Wilson, Kathryn. 2000. Using the PSID to study the effects of school spending. Public
Finance Review, 28(5), 428–451.
153
VITA
Biplab Kumar Datta was born in 1984 in Dhaka, Bangladesh. He completed his Bachelors
and Masters degree in Economics from the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. He earned
his second Masters in Economics from the Simon Fraser University, Canada. Prior to his
enrollment in the PhD program at the Georgia State University, Biplab worked at the Policy
Research Institute of Bangladesh (PRI) as an Economist. He also hold the position of a
Lecturer in the Department of Development Studies at the University of Dhaka.
Biplab participated in the Study of United States Institute for Student Leaders program
of the US Department of State in 2007, and spent a month as an exchange student at the
Green River Community College, WA. As an undergraduate student in economics, Biplab re-
ceived the “Best Budding Economist of South Asia” award at the 5th South Asian Economics
Students’ Meet 2008 in Delhi, India. Soon after completion of college, Biplab interned with
the IFMR Trust, India.
At Georgia State, Biplab was a recipient of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Fel-
lowship. Since fall 2014 he worked as a research assistant at Atlanta Fed. He also received
the Quantitative Economics Award, and E.D. (Jack) Dunn Fellowship of the Georgia State
University.
Biplab’s research interest includes public finance, economics of education, and public
health. Upon completion of PhD, Biplab has been accepted into the CDC Steven M. Teutsch
Prevention Effectiveness (PE) Fellowship, Class of 2017.
154
